

Dokumentation eines Austauschs zwischen einer Berliner und Belgrader Gruppe 2002

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INTRO

Als wir im Dezember 2002 in Berlin in den Zug stiegen, um in die eisige Kälte Belgrads aufzubrechen, wussten wir zumindest schon, wer uns erwartet. Der erste Teil des Austausches zwischen einer Gruppe von StudentInnen und jungen AkademikerInnen aus Belgrad, die in die Proteste gegen Milošević involviert waren, aber durchaus sehr unterschiedliche politische Positionen vertreten, und uns, einer Gruppe hauptsächlich bestehend aus in verschiedenen linken Zusammenhängen Agierenden, hatte bereits im Oktober 2002 in Berlin stattgefunden.



Der Austausch fand im Rahmen der politischen Reisen des INTERNATIONALEN ARBEITSKREISES (IAK e.V.) statt, der bereits Kontakte nach Belgrad hatte. Diskussionen über Nationalismus und Rassismus, die beiden inhaltlichen Schwerpunkte des Projektes, sollten in Belgrad fortgesetzt, neue Perspektiven eingefangen und viele Fragen gestellt werden. Zudem ging es natürlich darum, eine neue Stadt zu erkunden und etwas vom Leben und Alltag unserer AustauschpartnerInnen mitzubekommen. Herzlich wurden wir von ihnen am Bahnhof in Belgrad empfangen und zu unseren verschiedenen Unterkünften gebracht.

Unsere Berliner Gruppe hatte sich erst explizit aus Anlass des Austausches zusammengefunden, obwohl einige sich bereits vorher kannten. Für viele von uns war insbesondere der Kosovo-Krieg 1999 Anlass gewesen, sich mit der Situation in Jugoslawien auseinander zu setzen. Der erste deutsche Kampfeinsatz seit 1945 wurde als »humanitäre Intervention« verkauft und damit begründet, im Kosovo »ein neues Auschwitz« verhindern zu müssen. Angesichts dessen wollten wir wissen, wie die Menschen vor Ort die NATO-Bombardements empfunden und eingeschätzt haben. Die anti-serbische Propaganda in den deutschen Medien zu Zeiten Miloševićs, sowie das Schweigen und die unzureichende Analyse des größten Teils der deutschen Linken veranlassten uns, sich vor Ort mit den Veränderungen der letzten zehn Jahre in Serbien zu beschäftigen. Überraschend war für einige von uns vor allem die Tatsache, dass einige Menschen, mit denen wir sprachen, Hoffnungen in die Bombardierungen gesetzt hatten.

Die Ambivalenz aus der eindeutigen Positionierung der deutschen Bundesregierung auf Seiten der Kosovo-Albaner und dem breiten Protest gegen die Regierung in Serbien machte das Land für uns besonders spannend. Unser Ausgangspunkt war die fatale Bedeutung der deutschen Jugoslawienpolitik der 90er Jahre für die Ereignisse auf dem Balkan: Hatte nicht die Bundesregierung mit ihrer auf deutsche Kontinuitäten verweisenden »Öl ins Feuer«-Politik (das heißt mit der raschen Anerkennung Sloweniens und Kroatiens) den Konflikt überhaupt erst richtig angeheizt? Zentral sollte für uns die Frage nach den sehr unterschiedlichen Funktionen des Nationalis-

When we got on the train in Berlin to set off to the icy cold of Belgrade in December 2002, we knew at least who was going to expect us there. The first part of an exchange between a group of Belgrade university students and graduates who had been involved in the protests against Milošević while holding very differing political views, and us, a group mainly of activists in different leftist circles in Berlin, had already taken place in Berlin in October 2002. The exchange was part of the political journeys program of the INTERNATIONALER ARBEITSKREIS (INTERNATIONAL WORKING COMMITTEE) which already had contacts in Belgrade. In Belgrade, we planned to continue our discussions about the two main issues of the project, nationalism and racism, to broaden our perspectives and to pose a lot of questions. Of course, we also wanted to explore a new city and get to know our exchange partners' everyday lives. They welcomed us at the Belgrade train station and took us to our accommodations.

Our Berlin group had come together only on the occasion of the exchange, although some of us had known each other before. The war in Kosovo in 1999 lead many of us to have a critical look at the situation in Yugoslavia. The first German combat mission since 1945 was euphemistically called a „humanitarian intervention“ and justified by saying that a „new Auschwitz“ had to be averted. In view of these circumstances, we wanted to know how people in Serbia had judged and experienced the NATO bombings. The anti-Serbian propaganda in the German media during Milošević's term of office and the insufficient analysis of the situation by the majority of the German left lead us to deal with the changes in the last decade in Serbia. Some of us were surprised at the fact that there were people in Belgrade who had placed hopes in the bombings. Considering the clear positioning of the German government in favor of the Kosovo-Albanians on one hand, and the broad local protest movement against the Serbian government on the other hand, Serbia was of particular interest to us. Our starting-point was the fatal influence of the German

mus in Deutschland und (Ex-) Jugoslawien sein, insbesondere bezüglich einer Ethnisierung sozialer Konflikte.

Eine weitere Motivation war unsere Kritik an der europäischen Flüchtlingspolitik. Viele der in Deutschland lebenden Flüchtlinge aus (Ex-) Jugoslawien, insbesondere Roma, waren entweder Opfer der »humanitären Interventionen«, das heißt der NATO Bombardements auf Jugoslawien, oder Opfer der anschließenden Vertreibungen durch albanische Nationalisten, die erst durch die Politik der NATO-Staaten an Macht gewonnen hatten. In Deutschland hingegen wurden die Vertreibungen als Folge innerjugoslawischer Auseinandersetzungen betrachtet, für die keine weitere Verantwortung übernommen werden müsse. Im Gegenteil, die Abschiebungen in Flüchtlingslager und Slums wurden unter dem beschönigenden Namen »Rückführung« als Bestandteil der humanitären Hilfsaktion verkauft.

Für den Berliner Teil des Programms hatten wir uns vor allem zum Ziel gesetzt, die Ausgrenzung und Diskriminierung von Nichtdeutschen in Deutschland und den rapiden Anstieg von Nationalismus, Rassismus und Antisemitismus seit der sogenannten Wiedervereinigung aufzuzeigen. Eventuell zu positive Bilder von Deutschland bei unseren Belgrader AustauschpartnerInnen sollten so revidiert werden. Ein inhaltlicher Schwerpunkt des Berlin-Programms war die Situation von Flüchtlingen, sowohl als Folge des Krieges im Kosovo, als auch aus der Perspektive der Flüchtlingsselforganisierung. Auf dem Programm stand ein Vortrag von Helmut Dietrich von der FORSCHUNGSGESELLSCHAFT FÜR FLUCHT UND MIGRATION (FFM) über den Krieg im Kosovo unter dem Aspekt der Kooperation zwischen der NATO, verschiedenen NGOs und der EU und deren Strategien zur Flüchtlingsabwehr. Außerdem trafen wir uns mit der Flüchtlingsinitiative Brandenburg in einem Flüchtlingsheim in Brandenburg und einer Roma-Gruppe, die gegen ihre Abschiebungen Aktionen organisiert. Zum Schwerpunkt Rassismus in Deutschland seit der Wiedervereinigung sahen wir den Film THE TRUTH LIES IN ROSTOCK über das rassistische Pogrom in Rostock-Lichten-

foreign policy on the situation in Yugoslavia during the 90ies: Hadn't the German government aggravated the conflict with its »fuel to the fire« policy (that is by the rash recognition of Slovenia and Croatia) which showed a certain continuity of German policy towards the Balkans? The issue of the very different functions of nationalism in Germany and (ex) Yugoslavia, and the turning of social conflicts into ethnic ones in particular, was crucial for us.

Another motivation was our criticism of the European refugee policy. Many of the refugees living in Germany, Roma in particular, were either victims of the »humanitarian interventions«, that is of the NATO bombings on Yugoslavia, or victims of the subsequent expulsions by Albanian nationalists who had been supported and strengthened by NATO politics. In Germany, however, the expulsions were considered as a result of internal Yugoslavian conflicts for which no further responsibility had to be taken. On the contrary, the deportations to refugee camps and slums were sold as part of a humanitarian aid program and euphemistically called »repatriations«.

Our main goal for the Berlin part of the exchange was to show the exclusion of and the discrimination against non-Germans in Germany and the rapid increase of nationalism, racism and anti-Semitism since the so-called reunification. Too positive images of Germany our Belgrade exchange partners possibly had, should thereby be corrected. Thus one focus of the Berlin program was on the situation of refugees, both as a consequence of the war in Kosovo and from the perspective of refugees self-organization. A lecture by the FORSCHUNGSGESELLSCHAFT FÜR FLUCHT UND MIGRATION (Research Centre for Migration and Refuge) on the cooperation of NATO, NGOs and the EU and their strategies of repulsing refugees during the Kosovo war, was on the agenda. Furthermore we met the FLÜCHTLINGSINITIATIVE BRANDENBURG (Refugees Initiative Group in Brandenburg) and a Roma group taking actions against their deportations. For the issue of racism we watched the movie THE TRUTH LIES IN ROSTOCK about the racist pogrom in Ros-

hagen 1993, den wir mit Heike Kleffner diskutierten, einer Journalistin, die damals vor Ort war. Über die aktuelle Situation von Jüdinnen und Juden in Deutschland und den ansteigenden Antisemitismus redeten wir mit Vertretern des BÜNDNISSE GEGEN ANTISEMITISMUS UND ANTIZIONISMUS und des BUNDESVERBANDES JÜDISCHER STUDENTEN IN DEUTSCHLAND. Außerdem fand ein Besuch in der KZ-Gedenkstätte Sachsenhausen und im ANTIFASCHISTISCHEN PRESSEARCHIV statt. Durch die Diskussion eines Vortrags zum Thema Normalisierung, der in überarbeiteter Form in dieser Broschüre abgedruckt ist und anhand der Kurzfilmreihe NORMALISIERNG von Hito Steyerl, versuchten wir, die Veränderungen in Deutschland historisch und theoretisch einzubetten. Abends wurde neben den üblichen Kneipenbesuchen vor allem die schwul-lesbische Szene erkundet.

Die Idee des zweiten Teils des Austausches im Dezember in Belgrad bestand darin, einen Bogen zwischen den Ereignissen in Berlin und Belgrad zu spannen, die unterschiedlichen Erfahrungen auszutauschen und über serbischen und deutschen Nationalismus in Zusammenhang mit Rassismus, Antisemitismus, Antikommunismus und (im Falle Serbiens) der neuen Rolle der orthodoxen Kirche zu diskutieren. Zugleich hatten wir ein Interesse an feministischen Positionen und der Situation von Lesben und Schwulen, die durch Berichte über den von Hooligans überfallenen CSD 2001 in Belgrad traurige Berühmtheit erlangt hatten. Außerdem interessierten uns die ökonomischen Veränderungen seit dem 5. Oktober 2000, dem Sturz Miloševićs. Wir wollten Gruppen treffen, die auch heute noch einen Bezug zu Kommunismus und linker Gesellschaftskritik aufrecht erhalten, wollten etwas über die Situation von Roma in Jugoslawien erfahren und uns natürlich last but not least über die Gründe für die Bürgerkriege in den 90er Jahren klarer werden. Unsere Belgrader GastgeberInnen haben sich größte Mühe gegeben, unsere Wünsche unter einen Hut zu bringen, doch reichten zehn Tage für eine angemessene Reflexion unserer Gespräche und Diskussionen einfach nicht aus.

tock in 1993, and discussed about it with Heike Kleffner, a journalist who then was present in Rostock. Together with representatives of the BÜNDNIS GEGEN ANTISEMITISMUS UND ANTIZIONISMUS (Alliance against anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism) and the BUNDESVERBAND JÜDISCHER STUDENTEN IN DEUTSCHLAND (Association of Jewish Students in Germany), we discussed about the current situation of Jews and the growing anti-Semitism in Germany. We also visited the concentration camp memorial Sachsenhausen and the ANTIFASCHISTISCHES PRESSEARCHIV (Antifascist Press Archive). By discussing a lecture on normalization, a revised version of which is to be found in this reader, we tried to historically and theoretically analyse the social changes in Germany. In the evenings, we explored the pubs and the gay-lesbian scene of Berlin.

The concept of the second part of our exchange taking place in Belgrade in December, was to connect the events in Belgrade and Berlin, to exchange the different experiences and to discuss Serbian and German nationalism in connection with racism, anti-Semitism, anticommunism and (in the Serbian case) the new role of the Orthodox Church. We were also interested in feminist positions and in the situation of homosexuals which had become notorious by the hooligansí raid on the Belgrade gay parade in 2001. Furthermore, we wanted to know more about the economic changes since Miloševićs fall on 5 October 2000. We wanted to talk to groups still maintaining a positive reference to communism and leftist social criticism. The situation of Roma in Yugoslavia and, last but not least, the reasons for the civil wars in the 90ies were further topics on our agenda. Our hosts in Belgrade did their best to fit in all our wishes, but ten days were just not enough to reasonably reflect all the meetings and discussions we had.

At the end of the whole program we had to admit, that each of us was given an insight into the other world, but that a real exchange could only take place now that we know the different personal and political backgrounds. We have made up this reader in order to continue our exchan-

Am Ende der beiden Besuche stand die Einsicht, dass zwar ein Einblick in die jeweils andere Welt vermittelt werden konnte, aber ein Austausch, der seinem Namen gerecht wird, eigentlich erst jetzt, mit der Kenntnis der unterschiedlichen persönlichen wie politischen Hintergründe beginnen könnte. Um das Projekt unseres Austausches in diesem Sinne mit einer Dokumentation und Reflexion unserer Eindrücke aus Belgrad fortzuführen und auch, um anderen an Jugoslawien Interessierten einen Einblick in aktuelle dortige Diskussionen zu geben, haben wir diese Broschüre erstellt. Unsere Artikel können letztlich nur einen ersten Einblick bieten und neue Fragen aufwerfen, wir haben auch keineswegs den Anspruch, fertige Positionen zu vertreten. Einzelne von uns waren nach unserem gemeinsamen Besuch noch einmal in Serbien und konnten neue Eindrücke gewinnen, teilweise Fragen beantworten oder zumindest neu stellen. Einige dieser Eindrücke, vor allem während und nach der Ermordung von Zoran Đinđić sind deshalb noch zusätzlich in die Broschüre eingeflossen.

Wir haben keine thematische Einteilung der einzelnen Artikel vorgenommen, da viele der Themen so verschiedene Aspekte umfassen, dass wir uns nicht für übergeordnete Kategorien entscheiden konnten und wollten.

In der Online-Version [www.iak-net.de/belgrad2002] sind zusätzliche Links, Literaturhinweise und Texte, darunter eine Kritik an der Otpor-Bewegung und ein Artikel über die europäische Flüchtlingspolitik während der NATO-Bombardierung.

Zum Schluss möchten wir unseren Belgrader Freundinnen und Freunden ganz herzlich für ihre organisatorische Arbeit, ihre unerschöpfliche Diskussionsbereitschaft und ihre überwältigende Gastfreundschaft danken. Ohne sie hätten die Gespräche und diese Broschüre nicht zu Stande kommen können und wir hätten niemals so viel über Belgrad und seine BewohnerInnen gelernt.

Die Redaktion

ge, to document and reflect our impressions of Belgrade and to give those interested in Yugoslavia an insight into current local discussions. Our articles can only give a first overview and raise new questions, we do not claim to present final answers. Some of us visited Serbia again after our common stay there and gained new impressions, partially answered questions or at least reposed them. Some of these impressions, above all of the events during and after Zoran Đinđić's murder, therefore left their marks on the texts as well.

We did not categorize the articles according to their topics, because many of the topics comprehend so different aspects, that we could not and wanted not to decide on super-categories.

The online version [www.iak-net.de] offers additional links, literary references and texts. Among the texts are a critique of the Otpor movement and an article about the European refugee policy during the NATO bombings.

Last but not least, we would like to thank our Belgrade friends for their organizational work, their never-ending willingness to discuss with us and their overwhelming hospitality. Without them, the meetings and this reader could not have been realized, and we could not have learnt that much about Yugoslavia and its inhabitants.

The editors

THE IAK

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An einer Hauptstrasse in Belgrad [Foto: br]

The IAK consists of people who want to criticize society and thus want to not only reflect the social relations in Germany but relate them to the states of society in other parts of the world. This is why we organise political journeys for younger people. With groups of up to twelve participants we go to different countries to meet critical people and groups there.

In recent years, we visited Chile, Israel, Russia, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Denmark, the USA and other countries (partly, we did this within other organisations). There we deal with various topics such as the transformation process in Eastern Europe, youth movements in Turkey, the peace process in Israel or the question if there are any leftists in the USA. What is happening on the journeys depends on the country and the topics we chose to put the main emphasis on. However, on each of the journeys our interest lies in learning about and reflecting on the specific forms of racist exclusion and national formation, capitalism and gender relations, always critically relating them to German society as well.

We talk to our respective partner organisation and various other groups and persons during the journeys. Among them are anti-repression groups, newspaper projects, student organisations, youth organisations, human rights organisations, theoretical circles, squats, feminist, antifascist, antiracist, Marxist and anarchist groups. Meetings with Jewish commu-

nities, parties, trade-unions, ambassadors, or ethnic minorities may also be interesting regarding our questions. Doing that one not only learns about the social relations in the respective country but also about leftist theory and practice that is pursued there.

So, we do not pursue traditional internationalist solidarity work which uncritically shows its solidarity with national liberation movements. We do not have a paternalistic relationship towards the people we meet, but we discuss with them against the background of our critique of society, of the democratic state and nations and particularly of Germany.

Again and again we experience that we are forced to reanalyse our concept of society which we developed in Germany. And we do not travel as group leaders who take charge of the group. The program is always arranged together with the participants. We offer all participants the possibility to organise their lives by themselves during our journeys, to declare meetings to be boring or to arrange meetings by themselves. Nevertheless there will be time for tourist activities.

Most of the journeys are financially supported, among others by grants of the Federal Youth Ministry, the European Commission or different Youth education institutions. With the help of text collections and seminars we offer for preparation and the discussions in the country itself, one has learnt a lot on the journey. Often this results in brochures or single texts that interested participants make out. It also finds expression in our further work: We hold lectures and seminars to put our ideas up for discussion, also together with other groups.

However, we are not prepared to discuss about all topics and we are not going to tolerate racist, sexist or fascist ideas. You do not have to be a member of IAK, know any specific languages or have any previous knowledge about the respective country. If you would like to contact us in order to get more information on the currently planned activities or the procedure of enrollment, to get lists of our lectures, etc., feel free to use one of the possibilities above.

NORMALIZATION

THE CONCEPT OF NATIONALISM IN GERMANY

»What, damn it, is normal about this country? [...] You cannot be normal as long as you constantly claim to be normal. In no other country of the world it is insisted upon as much as in Israel and Germany. Both countries are damaged by the past – the one country emerged from a humanitarian catastrophe, the other country caused this catastrophe. Therefore, the very demand of being normal, to me seems to be totally absurd. A country which has wreaked such unspeakable havoc in this century as Germany did, is again a world power after 50 years. That is not normal. The Germans should modestly keep at least this awareness.«

Moshe Zuckermann [Israeli Historian] ¹

1 In an Interview with the German weekly Jungle World, issue 6/99, Feb 3, 1999



Vor aller Augen. – Fotodokumente des nationalsozialistischen Terrors in der Provinz,
temporäre Ausstellung in der Topografie des Terrors. Mit der Inschrift wird der Stadtrat
Dr. Alexander Doemens diffamiert.

The specific German concept of »Volk« (see right) has been a basic element of German national movements since the Romantics in the 19th century until National Socialism. Refraining from this concept was enforced by the Allies, foremost the USA, in 1945. Germany was divided, The FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY [FRG] became a Democratic State, integrated in Western Alliances [NATO, EEC], while the Eastern GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC [GDR] was founded as a Marxist-Leninist state belonging to the Warsaw Pact. Being Cold-War front states, they both tried – in different ways, of course – to reinvent German national identity within their realm. While the self-image of an antifascist »Socialist Nation« was prevailing in East Germany, the post-war identity in West Germany was based on economic wealth and anti-communism.

Particularly in West Germany, many officials in administrations, ministries, courts, etc., remained the same ones as in the Third Reich. Disregarding this continuity, in the period right after the war people rather perceived themselves as being apolitical and opposed to ideology and war on principle. There was very little dealing with National Socialism, the Holocaust was hardly ever mentioned at all. In the 1950s and 60s, any concepts and expressions possibly reminding of National Socialism, such as »VOLK«, »RASSE« [Race] or »JUDE« [Jew], were almost totally avoided in public discourse. This »time of repression« once led Adorno to the statement: »I consider the aftermath of National Socialism within democracy as being potentially more menacing than the aftermath of fascist tendencies against democracy«. He was rather concerned about former Nazis ruling the democratic state than about a bunch of Neo-Nazis. Despite all this silence about the Nazi past, there has – from the 1950s until today – been much talk about the »Suffering of the Germans« during the war (referring to German soldiers in Russia and the Allied bombings) and complaints about the division of the German state. Thus, the period from 1945 until 1989 can be seen as both an era of post-Fascism and as a period of attenuation or even »neutralization« of the National paradigm in Germany. The deep integration of the two German states into the

VOLK

Specific German concept of people/nation.
It describes a close community [Gemeinschaft] with strong emotional bonds, like family. The characteristic of being German is conceived as being inherited, the ancestry is crucial to the German concept of national identity. The German national character is regarded as an unhistorical, intrinsic entity. In the concept of VOLKSGEEMEINSCHAFT, which culminated in National Socialism, society is conceived as homogeneous community of VOLKSGENOSSEN. From this point of view, any person with an ancestry other than German [which can be determined arbitrarily, as the anti-Semitic Nuremberg Laws have shown] are to be treated as »foreigners« and [potentially] subjected to exclusion from society.

Cold-war world order practically outweighed any ambitions of national policy both in the East and in the West. Although the rhetoric of the »divided nation« still remained a principle of political discourse in the FRG, the existence of two German states was actually accepted by its policy establishment in the 1980s. West Germany had become an economic super-power, but its weight in international policy was rather small. Through the so-called »Reunification« in 1990 this situation changed dramatically. The incorporation of the East into West Germany was not only conceived as the end of the post-war era, but also as the final answer to the »GERMAN QUESTION«, which had been puzzling Germans for ages. As the very notion of »Reunification« shows, the whole process was not the result of political negotiations, but rather seen as the fulfillment of a compelling precondition, seen in the transcendental identity of the German »Volk«. The main slogan changed from »Wir sind das Volk« [We are the people], addressing the authorities in East Germany to »Wir sind ein Volk« (We are one people) – invoking the German concept of »Volk«. A common claim was made – by many Leftists as well – saying that Germany over 50 years after the war »finally« should

»come of age«, show national pride »without a complex« and establish a »normal« national identity, »just as in any other country«. The notion »normalization« appeared, describing the German desire to be just like any other nation. But what does this »normality« mean? Eventually, it is about the dealing with the Nazi Holocaust. Germans – as people referring to the concept of German national belonging – can only be »normal« in the sense of like other nations when ignoring or neglecting the Holocaust. At least, they would have to establish a commemoration positively referring to the German nation. Therefore, until the 1980s, the main strategy in the FRG basically had been not to mention the Holocaust at all. Nowadays, many Germans over-generalized to an universal phenomenon of modernity and claim some kind of particular German moral sensitiveness for humanity developed from the atrocities experienced in the past.

The following three issues of German policy since 1990 – of course closely intertwined with each other – are crucial for an understanding of the concept of »normalization«. It is a) Germany's new role in foreign policy, b) the nationalization of society including every day Racism and c) the changes in collective memory and remembrance politics.

FOREIGN POLICY: BACK TO WORK, SOLDIERS!

In the beginning of the 90s, reunified Germany was seeking for a stronger international role. There was talk about the »increased responsibility«, the »higher weight« and the »end of reservation« of German foreign policy. Germany wanted to expand its influence internationally. One of the first steps of this new German Foreign Policy was the acknowledgement of Slovenia and Croatia in 1991, which was actually the first time, Germany forced other EU members to follow its premises. Germany was aiming at an internationalization of the Yugoslav conflict in order to enforce the breakup of the so-called »multiethnic prison« [»VIELVÖLKERGEFÄNGNIS«] Yugoslavia and to improve the support of the rich regions in the North.

The new German foreign policy had to include the operation of German military forces abroad, which was kind of a taboo in

Germany after 1945, by constitution as well as in rhetoric. The German defense ministry performed a salami tactics: It started by sending out army paramedics to UN-missions [Cambodia, Somalia], followed by non-combating army units [Bosnia]. Military actions were from now on called »humanitarian interventions« or »peace keeping«. Throughout the 1990s, there had been a controversial debate within all German political parties. In 1994, both conservative chancellor Kohl and his main left opponent Fischer argued, German soldiers should never ever again be sent to the Balkans because of the German history.

In 1999, when Fischer had become Foreign minister, the argument had changed: The past should no longer be an obstacle, but rather a demand for Germany »taking responsibility« in military action. The Left government claimed, even just because »the dark past«, the Germans would be the right ones to enforce peace and humanity, and that the NATO-bombing of Yugoslavia would be the right way to »prevent a new Auschwitz in Kosovo«. There have been made several equations of the situation in Kosovo with the Holocaust – the media reported about »concentration camps« in Priština, Serbian Police was called the ›EINSATZGRUPPEN‹ [SS-divisions] of Milošević, expulsions and alleged mass murders were called »genocide« etc. The effect of this terminology was a complete perversion of roles: The Serbs became the new Nazis, while Germany finally became part of the Allied Forces of WWII. Meanwhile, such strong emotionalization of warfare is not necessary anymore. German forces are operating in Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Afghanistan and Djibouti – and no one seems to care about it. While the protests against the US-led war in Iraq have been overwhelming, no body cares about Germany having more troops abroad than any other country, excepting Great Britain and the US. Warfare is a regular component of the »New German Foreign Policy«, which was proclaimed again by the German government after September 11, together with the »end oft post-war time« and the proclamation of a »German Way«.

»GERMANY TO THE GERMANS – FOREIGNERS OUT«

There has been a tremendous nationalization of every day life in Germany since 1990: The »unified« country was from now on called Germany instead of »Federal Republic«, the national anthem had to be broadcasted daily on TV, more and more people reaffirmed their German national identity, even publicly. Nationalism became part of the common sense in Germany again, the statement »I am proud to be German« – formerly made by neo-Nazis only – became broadly accepted among ordinary people. At the same time, Nationalism was refused conceptually and strictly differentiated from positively marked »patriotism«. As German Federal President Rau stated in year 2000: »We must not mix up patriotism and nationalism. A patriot is a person who loves his fatherland. A nationalist is a person who disdains the other's fatherlands.«

As the German politics after 1990 show, the difference between patriotism and nationalism is rather rhetorical. In 1991/92, when euphoria about the »reunification« lessened and people faced massive social problems, »the Foreigners« were blamed. While politicians were complaining about the »abuse« of the right of asylum established in German constitution as a consequence of the Nazi past, and media launched campaigns against the »asylum-seeker-flood«, racist pogroms took place all over the land. »Deutschland den Deutschen – Ausländer raus« [English in the headline] was one of the main slogans shouted by the German mob. One of the dark highlights was the pogrom in Rostock in autumn 1992. While foreigners were attacked by neo-Nazis and other Racists for several days, receiving ovations by »ordinary inhabitants«, the police did not intervene at all. They only dispersed an anti-fascist demonstration which was trying to stop the riots. While German citizens were protesting against the violence in human chains with candles [LICHTERKETTEN], the constitutional right of asylum was nearly abolished in parliament.

The every day Racism in Germany also developed in the way of a political (sub-)culture. In some areas (especially in the East) neo-Nazis by strong presence and brutal attacks undisturbed established so-called »Nationally liberated zones«, i.e. areas where »non-German elements« do not dare to go out.

This Racist cultural hegemony has been mostly downplayed by politicians and social scientists to »right wing extremism«, »youth violence« or acts of the underprivileged. All these explanations neglect the spreading of Racist thinking and falsely link it to a certain spectrum of society. The very idea of Racism, the construction of »foreigners«, the division of »We« and »the Others« is not touched, since it's too »normal«. Meanwhile there is hardly any opposition anymore in German mass media or parliament to this nationalistic and in the broader sense even Racist discourses. German »normality« also means that Racist violence in Germany in many cases has become too usual for being mentioned in the media.

THE END OF HISTORY – GERMAN VERSION

In 1998, the German government was taken over by a new generation: born after 1945, many had-been Leftist activists having an anti-fascist self-image. The call for »normality« is articulated even stronger now, without any inhibitions. The collective memory of the Germans is now that of a »self-confident nation«, as Chancellor Schröder put it in his inaugural speech in 1998. In the same year it became clear that German »normalization« still implies an end of the remembrance of Nazi-era and the Holocaust – the German version of Fukuyama's »END OF HISTORY?«² Martin Walser, one of the best-known German writers, made a speech in which he legitimated his indifference for the Holocaust, calling Auschwitz a »moral bludgeon« [MORALKEULE], condemning »opinion soldiers« for »forcing« the Germans to deal with their past »in order to hurt us«. Walser's speech was followed by standing ovations of almost the entire German political and intellectual elite. When President of the Jewish Community in Germany Ignatz Bubis protested against Walser, he got rather isolated and even made responsible for growing anti-Semitism in Germany.

Since the mid-1990s, there hasn't been a year in Germany without a broad public debate about the collective memory. The Nazi past itself was researched, talked and written about more than ever in Germany. The framework was one of distan-

² In 1989, then senior official at the US State Department Francis Fukuyama published a controversial article named The End of History, speculating that Western liberal democracy may constitute the »end point of mankind's ideological evolution« and hence the »final form of human government.«



ce. World War II, the Nazis and the Holocaust became just another historical epoch. National Socialism was downplayed and universalized to being a »dictatorship« and thereby in an anti-Communist way equated with state Socialism in Eastern Germany – both called totalitarianism.

In 1995, the HAMBURGER INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH [HIS] presented an exhibition titled »WAR OF DESTRUCTION: CRIMES OF THE WEHRMACHT 1941 TILL 1944«. Although only presenting pictures of facts already known among historians, the exhibition somehow hit a nerve. It contradicts the myth of the brave German soldier and showed that war crimes and atrocities had been an intrinsic part of the German attack of Russia and the Balkans, rather than being sporadic incidents. The HIS was accused of being one-sided and un-scientific because of the shocking effect of the pictures shown in the exhibition. Conservative politicians and historians as well as neo-Nazis were protesting against the exhibition, which was closed down in 1999.

In 1996, Daniel J. Goldhagen's book »HITLERS WILLING EXECUTIONERS – ORDINARY GERMANS AND THE HOLOCAUST« was published. Even before the book was out, it was heavily discussed among historians and in the media in Germany. Goldhagen had focused on the perpetrators of the Holocaust. He identified them as Germans (not just as Nazis) and he determined anti-Semitism being a main motivation for the Holocaust. For saying simple things like »no Germans – no Holocaust«, Goldhagen was condemned in public, accused for being Racist and provoking newly anti-Semitism.

These two episodes demonstrate that dealing with the past in Germany still seems to come to its end where it means to accept an individual guilt or responsibility, e.g. of the own family. The German self-understanding is one of a democratic society which has nothing to do with ugly things like war,

Racism or a genocide. Whenever someone reminds the Germans that there is a certain link to those kind of things, the reaction is rather vehement and aggressive. Two of the last debates were about the decision for central Memorial for the European Jews murdered in the Holocaust and about a compensation for survivors of slave labor in Germany during World War II. In both cases, there have been strong reservation to accept any responsibility at all. The Memorial is to be build in the next couple of years, while the negotiations about the compensation ended up with Germany giving some five billion Euro to be paid only to people who manage to prove their exploitation and who renounce any further claims against German companies.

While the German state is a strong supporter of the International Court in The Hague, it rejects all claims for compensation of victims of Nazi occupation e.g. from Greece by saying that state sovereignty outweighs international claims. So the basic message of German dealing with the past is no longer »Don't mention the war!«, but »We can talk about everything – as long as you don't blame my family and we don't have to pay for it«.

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THE NEW SERBIAN NATIONAL IDENTITY

National identity is a social construct, a sum of elements belonging to historical, political and other discourses and practices within a society, with special function of integration and mobilization of society members. It implies that, first, the construction process takes place at a specific time, at which »genuinely novel identities come into being«, and second, it is possible to identify the constructors, groups of people initiating and carrying out that process. National identity therefore is not a reflection of some »natural« or »primordial« fact, but rather a way of connecting a number of people to various historical and mythological symbolic forms. Most nations were constructed during XIX century, when new-coming elites sought to legitimize novel political forms by appeal to the supposed superior antiquity of their »nations«.

We can see that, for example, the essential myth in the construction of Serbian identity, the myth of Kosovo battle, links Serbs of today to an indefinite group of people, and the basis of

this link is the presupposed common ethnic origin.


However, historical data shows that there's no reason to claim that sort of ethnic, let alone national continuity, since in

XIV century existed nothing like Serbian nation. The battle itself, interpreted as a confessional clash between Christian and Muslim armies, actually was a conflict of two alliances of feudal aristocrats of no clear ethnic or religious loyalty. So we must conclude that in forming an identity it is not the historical truth, but the mythological reinterpretation of history that makes it an object of emotional investment for individuals.

This is not an unusual case. It is just an example of the function of nation as »imagined community« . Nationhood is a structure inside the symbolic net that constitutes a society. Identities are symbolic resources that initiate integration through various media of social communication. The mechanism of national integration presupposes linking of symbolic elements to certain emotional responses; what is imagined is either community as such, or other symbolic contents which constitute a metonymical representation for community.

It is also very important to recognize social groups or classes which occasionally try to change constelation of national identity, to direct process of re-investment of psychic energy into new symbolic frames. We can take as an example one attempt of direct intervention of this type, a document compiled by a group of Serbian intellectuals in 1986, called

Memorandum. The purpose of this document was to diagnose the problems of Serbian nation and state and to offer solutions



for them. The document was not just a neutral analysis of the present situation, for it also offers a model or concept of the nation that could be, in their opinion, acceptable as a new resource of integration. The model was actually old, but it reappeared in new circumstances, and people who proposed it counted on their position of social elite. Memorandum explicitly claimed continuity between the Medieval kingdom destroyed by Ottomans in Kosovo and contemporary Serbia, as if it were one nation throughout history. It was an ideal picture of brave, wise and proud people who sacrifice their lives for the well-being of Serbian state and the whole of Christianity. Glorification of the Serbian »nation« from the time of Kosovo battle was meant for the hearts, not the heads of citizens; it was meant to re-activate the ambivalent process of identification with high emotional engagement.

It is not enough to know only what is the symbolic content of a particular national identity, but also who and when, under what terms, can intervene in discourse and change those symbolic connections constitutive for identity. The process of construction can reveal articulation of dominant political ideologies within a society and their impact on social process.

In order to understand what became of Serbian national identity in 1980's and 1990's, we have to glance at the circumstances of the time. Since late 1960's it was clear that Yugoslav federation was going through crisis. Particular nationalisms were getting stronger and stronger, and the outcome of this state of affairs was legalization of nationalism by Yugoslav constitution of 1974, which proclaimed sovereignty of nation-states. The federal level of government was abolished by principle of voluntary agreement between republics. The remaining integrative principles of Yugoslav society, communism and workers' self-management, were unsufficient to preserve the country from falling apart, and the key role in process of disintegration and war belonged to nationalist elites of Yugoslav republics.

So we come to the next crucial condition for construction of national identity, the existence of the significant Other. Consciousness of nationality requires distinction from the close, similar, but still other identity, and the two nationalities are often constituted as opposites. The case of Serbs and Cro-

ats is a perfect example of this. Since the interwar period it has become common to perceive the two in some kind of ambivalent togetherness. The fact is that during the 1980's both nations formulated question of state sovereignty as national sovereignty, and in both cases it included a radical anti-Serbian and respectively anti-Croatian rhetoric. Many Serbs who took part in war in Croatia said they wanted to prevent »history repeating«, because they thought that new Croatian state was a reincarnation of the fascist project of NDH (ISC, independent state of Croatia).

I shall try to point out some significant features of the re-construction process that began in mid 1980's:

1. As I already said, Serbian society at some point took over the old identification model built on Kosovo myth. The novelty lies in the background complex of interconnections between that model and the Serbian reality of 1980's. Traditionalist rhetoric was about reaffirmation of »basic values« and »real nature« of Serbian people, which were to be found in ancient customs, folk poetry and orthodox church. So, the meaning of this change was restoration of a nation concept of pre-communist times and it was interpreted as »coming out of the (communist) dark«. Paradoxically, the new-old traditionalism was much darker in its nationalist, theocratic and patriarchal views.

2. Consequently, Serbian Orthodox Church had a triumphant comeback. The Kosovo myth is based on ancient confessional conflict between Christianity and Islam, where Serbs play the role of guardians of Christian gates from Muslim invasion. Now, six centuries later, religion is supposed to tell us who we are, to reveal the hidden truth of our being and our historical mission. Religion is therefore essential for the construction of national identity. This argument claims that it's impossible to be really Serbian and not an Orthodox Christian, and conversely, religious identity is precondition of national identity.

3. Such a concept of nation is inevitably nationalist one – it includes a lack of tolerance for other nations and their members. Nationalism appears whenever national identity is grounded in extreme idealizations of history with blocked

possibilities of a rational historical reinterpretation. The situation with nationalism, and also Serbian nationalism, is such that significant others become primary objects of nationalist violence. It is transparent in course of intensifying nationalism in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia – prevailing attitude towards other nations in triangle is hatred. On a wider scale, we can see the development of a paranoid structure which produces various conspiracy theories and xenophobic feelings. The conspirators are mostly Western countries, Jews and masons.

4. In this logic of polarization it is necessary to distinguish friends from enemies and to locate the most dangerous enemies. In this case, that enemy is communism: communism is responsible for attacking the essence of Serbian national being, for breaking up the ties with tradition and the past. It is really difficult to describe all aspects of the change from communism to anti-communism. The picture is even more complicated when we take into account the ambiguity of that change, the fact that Serbia kept some basic elements of the communist system. There is a contradiction between anti-communist rhetoric, picturing communism as the greatest possible evil, and a lack of alternative ideological concepts, which enabled preservation of many communist institutions and practices.

5. The fact of being Serbian means much more than piece of information on certain individual. That's a principle of evaluation and exclusion. Non-Serbs as outsiders first have to prove their friendliness and pro-Serbian attitudes, otherwise they are enemies. This black and white logic of nationalism was a great tool of stimulation of the crisis and war between nations in former Yugoslavia. Every nation believed it was imperiled by others and every nation justified participation in war naming it »self defence«. The rigidness of their mutual identities was an obstacle to communication, which always requires a capability of identification with others.

As a conclusion, I want to say that it's necessary to take on a broader examination of various social phenomena in order to give a more detailed account of this identity articulation and stabilization, which is not possible in a short text like this.

Marija Mladenović (of the Belgrade group)



Discussion about Serbian nationalism and the cause of the 1990s-wars with three Historians teaching at the

BELGRADE WOMEN'S STUDIES CENTER

»NO, SORRY, WE STARTED IT!«

RADMILA RADIĆ [RR], born in 1958, is Historian [Ph.D.] at the Institute of Modern Serbian History in Belgrade and working on the History of the Serbian Orthodox Church.

OLIVERA MILOSAVLJEVIĆ [OM], born in 1951, is Historian [Ph.D.] and professor at the Faculty of Philosophy, Belgrade University. She is currently working on Nationalism, Racism and national stereotypes.

DUBRAVKA STOJANOVIC [DS], born in 1963 – has an M.A. in History and is assistant professor at the Faculty of Philosophy, Belgrade University. Her main subjects in recent time were the analysis of history textbooks, nationalism in the (re-) presentations of history and Serbian political parties and nationalism during the 1990s.



Burning Federal Parliament on October 5th 2000

In an attempt to catch the quite interrogative character of the conversation, we wanted to describe it as an interview. Please note that the wording however is not original due to multiple translations.

Q: How was it possible that a solid Communist structured society like the old Yugoslavia has been replaced by especially strong nationalism?

OM: There has not been anything like a strong Communist society in Yugoslavia before 1990, since there has not been any stable political system in Yugoslavia in the past hundred years. Nationalism is present in this area since the 19th century and Communism for some time referred to the second place. I want to put another question: How is it possible that during the time of Communism, the opposition always has been a Nationalist one and never a democratic one. The so-called »critical intelligentsia«, the opposition, was national, and in a certain moment it »emerged«. We can talk of a conflict here: On the one hand we had a Communist state and on the other hand a pretty strong Nationalism. Even before Communism, the Nationalists were rather unsatisfied with the Yugoslav state. Nationalism after 1990 was a negation of Communism and of the Yugoslav concept of multi-ethnicity. What happened here in the end of the 80s, was not only the negation of Communism, but also the negation of the Yugoslav state as a multi-ethnic entity.

DS: Maybe we should also say that since the 19th century, there have been two continuities both in Croatia and Serbia (the two main peoples within Yugoslavia): The first one is the concept of a homogenous nation and the second one was the Yugoslav idea and we may say that in the beginning of the 20th century, practically all Serbian intellectuals took the Yugoslav narrative as a new, a modern one, integrating the region. Only few stayed with that Nationalist idea. In Croatia the situation was almost the same, so the vast majority of people in Croatia and Serbia were pro-Yugoslavia before World War I. The first problems arose after the foundation of the first Yugoslavia, let's say in the 1920s. So, throughout the whole 20th century, we have a struggle of these two continuities, whereas the Yugoslav idea stand for the modern integration of the region, and a modern way to cope with all the social, political, national and confessional problems. It is crucial to understand that there has been national opposition against this idea in the whole 20th century. In the 1990s, not only Communism was overcome, but also the Yugoslav idea collapsed.

OM: I'd like to add, that everything that called itself »Anti-Communism« always aimed at the destruction of Yugoslavia, saying that all those nations could not live together anymore.

Q: Is the new Serbian national identity rather newly created or a continuity from the 19th century? How much was nationalism conserved during the Communist era?

DS: There is a continuity of Serbian nationalism since the 19th century so it was never interrupted. But it is important to say that practically all the elites were pro-Yugoslav in the beginning of 20th century. This is crucial, because many people like to say that Yugoslavia was created at a peace conference, that it had nothing to do with their peoples, that its recreation in the cold war was a mistake, that people never wanted it, that it was only in the interest of the great powers etc. That's why I'm insisting on the popularity of the Yugoslav concept before World War I. This is a fact which most people currently working on the Serbian respectively Croatian nation, don't want to admit. However, of course in the 80s the new nationalist identity was created by media, by poets, by psychiatrists [like for instance Radovan Karadžić]. So it was in fact built up again but there was a continuity of nationalist ideas

among the intellectual elite.

OM: Before World War II, during the bad economic crisis of the 1930s, this Nationalism also emerged. This Nationalism always gained power in a state of crisis, and therefore can be seen as the only way, the only idea for a transformation of society when there are problems, because there are no other ideas. In World War II, both Croatian ustaša and Serbian četniks had almost the same Nationalist agenda of an ethnic homogenous empire on the Yugoslav territory. In the 1990s this story just repeated. And of course, the victory of the Communist partisans ensured that none of the two sides succeeded that time.

RR: You asked if nationalism after 1945 had been conserved. In a way this is right, because Nationalism in Yugoslavia first was expressed openly again in the 1960s, before that the pressure by the Communist leaders had been very strong. Politicians from that time say, that nationalism reemerged mainly via religion. Celebrating e.g. religious holidays became an state-independent and alternative way of self-expression and was forming the political opposition in that time. Most advocates of nationalist thinking were (ex-) Bourgeois intellectuals who wrote their first texts in the 1970s, mostly in church media. The link between religion and nation (Croatian Catholics and Serbian Orthodox) was reestablished.

OM: The fact which made it possible for Yugoslavia to survive until 1991, was that the Communists regarded the nationalists the main enemy and not the democratic opposition.

Q: What were the reasons for the upcoming of nationalism in the 1960s. What had changed since before?

RR: Firstly, Yugoslavia was facing its first bad economic crisis at that time, which showed that the Communist reforms did not work out. Secondly, there have been made some changes within the political system itself. There have been two trends within the Communist party, the centralists and those who rather opposed it. In this light, Alexander Ranković's removal from his position as interior minister in 1966 was a very symbolic act of that time.

OM: The strange thing is, when Ranković, who was a Serb, died in 1983, 100,000 people attended his funeral. It was nothing public, just a modest funeral and turned into a demon-

stration of Serbian nationalism. Although it was not the case that time, today Ranković is regarded as one of the first »fighters« for the Serbian national cause. Actually, he was rather Communist than nationalist, devoted to Tito until he died. But in the view of Serbian nationalists he became a symbol for the Serbs being the victims of Yugoslavia. He became a »Serbian hero« simply by being Serb and by ruling with an »iron hand«, especially against Albanian people in Kosovo. Today, Serbian nationalists still refer to this period of 20 years after WWII, advocate the police state and condemn the liberalization after.

Q: What exactly does Ranković stand for?

DS: Ranković is a symbol especially for the treatment of the Albanians – the serious repression, that's why he was celebrated by Serbian nationalists like at his funeral. Even nowadays, you can hear people say, that if Ranković would still have been in power in the 1970s, there wouldn't have been any »SHQIPTARS«¹ or uprising of Albanian nationalism at all.

RR: After Ranković's dismissal, the constitution was changed, giving more rights and autonomy to the Albanians in Kosovo. At the same time, MasPok, the Croatian nationalist mass movement, was developing. Savka Dapčević-Kučar, one of the leaders of this movement, has written about this in her 1971 book »Croatian Spring« [Hrvatsko Projeće].

Q: What was the situation of the Serbian Orthodox church like during Communism? Have there been violations of churches? Where the Orthodox suppressed harder than other religious groups?

RR: The story of today's Serbian nationalists goes like this: Serbs have been the victims throughout the years from the foundation of Yugoslavia, they have been the victims in both World Wars. The greatest victim is the Orthodox church, since it's Serbian. Communism as such was not really a problem for the Orthodox church, although Marxists believed that religion should be marginalized in society. The actual problem for the Serbian Orthodox church was its financial and economic dependence on the Serbian state. All church property and real estate was nationalized [expropriated] by the Communists and the church simply couldn't live on the donations of their believers. Many people think that Communism destroyed people's faith in religion, but that's not true. We have recently

done a research which shows a polarization among Serbs about this already in the middle of the 19th century. For example, we found in the archives a law from 1839, in which Prince Miloš urges the Serbs to go to church.

Concerning the pillage and arson of churches: Those things happened, mainly in the period from 1945 till 1953. There were also attacks on Priests and other church representatives. Yet, this was not only the case with the Orthodox church, but with all confessions. The difference is the way, the other communities, especially Catholics and Muslims reacted to this repression – they were simply not dependent on the Yugoslav state that much. What happened here between 1945 and 1953 is basically what happened in many Eastern European Countries and what the Russians did during the 1920s and 30s.

DS: These last remarks are very important, because of this argument that there has been a repression of the Orthodox church, because Tito was a Croat and hated the Serbs and the Orthodox, etc. Serbian nationalists claim that the Serbs had been treated in a completely special way – therefore it is so important to know that things like that happened in all of Eastern Europe and against all churches within former Yugoslavia. Here, you get to know something about the obsessions of the Serbs.

RR: Those obsessions are demonstrated by what happened few days ago² – The Serbian Minister of Religion said that the Communists were responsible for this incident. [That people behave irreverently like this, etc.]

DS: So, they are guilty for everything!

Q: So there is some kind of »tradition of secularization« in Yugoslavia. Is religion today becoming an important power in Serbia again?

RR: This is a puzzling question, because actually today, many people claim that the church's position has changed completely, that it is more important and that more and more people are faithful. But I disagree with that view. I would claim that the Serbs are not very traditional believers, like the Russians or

¹ Shqiptars is the Albanian name for Albanians, but in Serbian language the word is used as an pejorative invective for Albanians.

² On December 24, 2002 [Christmas], the British ambassador was present in Belgrade for an Anglican service to take place in an Orthodox cathedral in Belgrade. Nationalists from the Obraz-Movement rallied in front of the church, refused the Anglicans access to the church and thus prevented the service from taking place at all.

the Romanians are. I would rather say that the Serbs are respecting traditions pretty much, in this way they also respect the church. In the 80s and 90s, you could see more and more people belonging to the church formally, by confession, but the number of actual true believers is still not very high. To illustrate that: Many people celebrate SLAVA,³ like St. Nicola's on December 19, when the city was empty like under curfew. But the churches are just as empty, so this is no proof of belief. Also, Priests are not invited to the family homes when they are celebrating the SLAVA, as they should. Maybe it is different in the province, but in the big cities, it is basically about tradition, not about belief.

However, the church is much more present in society than it used to be and much more young people are dedicated to the Orthodox church, some even in a very radical, almost pro-Fascist way. On the other hand, the Serbian Patriarch was twice appealing to these people in TV, asking them to vote, but he didn't succeed. They simply didn't obey him – the other day he got almost hit by the young crowd.

DS: Actually, there was a huge manipulation with the church and religiosity in general – one of the main explanations for the wars in former Yugoslavia was naming it a religious war. That implies that the war was some kind of fate, a must, beyond human control. Of course, this was a manipulation of facts – the war was about territories, nothing else. It's manipulative to claim hundred year old religious hatred and eternal conflicts between Christians and Muslims, like the young Obraz-people manipulate religion, because in fact they are Fascists, who like to use Christianity or Orthodoxy or whatever as a cover. But in fact it's pure Fascism. In Serbia, we don't have that much anti-Semitism, as there aren't that many Jews living here. But the hatred against Muslims and Catholics or the Racism against Albanians is covered by that religious discourse, which has nothing to do with the real causes of the war.

Q: Who are these young people?

Their movement is called »OBRAZ«, which means cheek and is a Serbian symbol for honor. It has always been a very strong symbol. Whenever you want to hurt someone's feelings or damage his/her reputation, you would tell him/her that s/he

lost his/her cheek.

Q: What impact on gender relations does the increasing role of the church have?


RR: None.⁴

Q: Don't you see any tendencies for gender roles getting more traditional?

RR: The roles remained pretty much the same. The church has a very traditional understanding of gender roles, reducing the women to be the »better half« of their husbands. Maybe there are some developments on a long-term basis, but basically there is nothing new about that.

Q: Haven't there been any changes in women's everyday life in the recent years?

OM: In the long run, maybe it is going to be worse. Recently, the church presented a bill on the general prohibition of abortion. Unwanted children should be given to the church, that would take care of them. If you imagine a continuation of the Obraz-movement, we might get a terribly patriarchal society. Yet, the church does not have that much influence that it would have much impact on gender roles in society. There are certain innovations, for example more and more women are studying theology. Or young women going to church wearing a kerchief, which has never been traditional at all, not even 50 or a 100 years ago.



Svetisava, orthodoxe Kirche in Belgrad

Q: What is the situation like in Serbia? Have there also been launched campaigns against abortion, like by the Catholic church in Croatia?

DS: In Croatia, the church is much, much more powerful than here, in many ways – financially, politically. You can hear important church representatives condemn abortion in some patriotic speeches from time to time, but there is no organized campaign like with posters and stuff – at least not yet.

Q: Has Milošević been a Nationalist, a Communist, both, or something completely different?

³ Traditional Serbian family celebration according to the (Orthodox) Christian patron saints.

⁴ Literally: »Ništa!« (Nothing!)

OM: Well, he came from the Yugoslav Communist elite, but he is known as a national leader, not as a Communist.

DS: But today, many people and especially Serbian nationalists claim that everything went wrong because Milošević was a Communist, that the Serbs would have won the wars if he was not, etc. After the political change of October 5, 2000, they said »Finally, after 55 years, the end of Communism has come even to Serbia«. No one wants to accept anymore, that he was a nationalist and that the whole catastrophe of the 1990s came from the nationalistic ideas, he supported.

Q: How do you think, nationalism and capitalism actually work(ed) together in Yugoslavia?

OM: This is tricky to answer. In the early years, being just



another Communist apparatchik, Milošević was rather unknown. He became famous on a single day, April 24, 1987 at Kosovo Polje [Blackbird Field], telling the Serbs »no one will ever beat you again«. In the years 1989 to 1992, when he was preparing the wars and rearming, he was using Communist rhetoric, mainly to becalm people who were unsatisfied because of the economic crisis. When he felt strong enough politically, he adopted nationalistic rhetoric. In 1989,

on the 600th anniversary of the battle at Kosovo Polje, he assured the Serbs that he will cope with all other nations in Yugoslavia, be it with arms. So today, nationalists claim that Communism in Yugoslavia ended in 2000, but Milošević had removed the five pronged star from the national flag already in 1991. He led four wars against other nations, he introduced the multiparty system. The actual end of Communism in Yugoslavia, or Serbia, was in 1990. Of course, Milošević was keeping parts of the old system he could benefit from financially, like the state property. In the recent years, when the nationalistic rhetoric of ĆETNICS became popular, he was drawing not on Communist, but on Partisan rhetoric.

Q: How has the relationship between nationalism and capitalism developed after Milošević?

OM: Milošević always tended to ensure his power and maybe he was the first one using nationalism for that purpose. Although he has nothing to do with neo-liberals, his political rhetoric is full of euphemisms, like for instance the term »anti-bureaucratic revolution«, which in fact meant the abolition of autonomy in Kosovo and Vojvodina by »fighting bureaucracy« in these two entities. The repression in Kosovo started again and there was a song saying three Serbias would become one again. This development had a major impact on Yugoslavia. According to the 1974 constitution, the Yugoslav government consisted of a council with eight members, six from the republics and two from the autonomous regions within Serbia. By governing Serbia, abolishing autonomy in Kosovo and relying on loyal allies in Montenegro, Milošević actually was in control of four of the eight seats in the government council. By this means, he blockaded Yugoslavia, nothing could be decided against his will. Today, in The Hague, he is always assuring that he didn't rule the country alone, that there have been eight people in government – so he seems to neglect that four of these eight people were actually him.

Q: What do you expect for the future of Yugoslavia? Do we have to anticipate further separations, like in Vojvodina or Montenegro?

DS: Well it's difficult to predict anything, especially here in Serbia. But I'm afraid that even now, after ten years of this crisis, we are facing the same questions that we've been facing at the beginning of the 90s or even at the beginning of the 20th century: Do we want to become a normal European state of law with multiple parties, parliament, modernization, etc. or do we want some Sonderweg? I don't think we have a proper answer to this crucial question yet. Approximately one half of today's leading parties are still not only clinging to nationalistic discourses, but still on that Sonderweg, saying like: Yes, we want to be European, but we want to do it our way. We want something of European constitution, but we don't want to lose our national, ethnic identity, etc. So these parties are drawing on a continuity we also have in this country for more than a hundred years. The other part is modernizing, non-

nationalistic parties. And the question »Who will win?« is not a question of today only, but of more than a century. We lost so much time and yet we are just entering a new circle of the same old dilemma – where to go. That's even more dramatic than the question of what is going to happen with Vojvodina or Montenegro. Those things get less important if we decide to go a normal, civilized way of European integration. If we do not choose that way, anything is possible.

Q: Which political parties stand for this Western trend? And how many voters support them?

DS: It's hard to say, since we are waiting for elections to come. Maybe some 15 per cent. Of course, there is a very strong pressure from the international community, form the World Bank, which is giving all those credits, maybe that is going to help in civilizing society. The Party of the Prime Minister Đinđić is more or less [laughter] – well, speaking about the Serbian case, not about Europe, the Democratic Party is a modernizing force, also G 17 Plus.

Q: But all those »normal« modern Western European states you are referring to as an alternative to nationalism are in fact deeply based on nationalism. Take for instance Germany – they supported the breakup of Yugoslavia in favor of ethnical homogenous entities. Therefore they did recognize Slovenia and Croatia so quickly, and right after this the wars started...

DS: No, no, that came at the end – we started it, sorry. [laughs] We started it!!!

OM: The wars had been prepared for four years – the year 1991 was merely the end of this process. It is the view of Milošević, that the Western world is responsible for the breakup of the old Yugoslavia. Concerning those parties supporting the Western way: It's really hard to tell sometimes what their positions are, because they do not say it clearly, for fear of nationalists. There's even different factions within many parties. The nationalist however cannot escape Europe either – so they would say something like »Europe: give us money and go home!«.

Q: Do you really think that there is such dualism between anti-modernist nationalism and modern Western societies?

DS: Of course I agree that modernity doesn't have a single meaning and that it is quite controversial. I just wanted to put it a bit more simple for discussion and easier to understand, if possible at all. I don't really think that it is pure ideal.

Q: Are there any current plans for a ›Greater Serbia‹ or a unification with Republika Srpska?

DS: No one dares to say, because that would mean to be against the Dayton treaty and people would be sent to The Hague directly. However, Koštinica actually said that we are just waiting for a future chance. There is something which did not change among the majority of intellectuals in this country that creates the nationalistic ideology. Of course you cannot read it openly, but in articles and writings about culture, art or literature you can always find this metaphor that we were on some kind of waiting list, and that there is something to come we are expecting – but no one says when or what. You can feel that we are in some state of transition, not only transition of society and economy, but also a transition towards a new state. It is something to be read between the lines, Koštinica said it more openly than anybody else.

OM: This thesis of a »unification« is absurd. It can only lead to a new war. Republika Srpska has never been a part of Serbia. The border at Drina river is a historical one. It might happen some day, but it can only lead to new war!

Q: Has there really been only a nationalist opposition against Milošević? Wasn't there anything else? Any non-nationalistic opposition or resistance?

DS: It's not only that the opposition has been nationalistic. The problem was that the leader of opposition, who are in power today, actually made that nationalistic program. So the program which lead Serbia to the wars, was not a Milošević-program – it was the program of opposition. It is what Olivera said in the beginning, that the opposition against Yugoslav Communism in Serbia, Croatia and around was not a democratic, but only a nationalistic one. Among writers, church representatives, university professors and especially in the ACADEMY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES [SANU], so in different institutions of the intellectual elite, the oppositional program to Communism was created, and that was a ›GREATER SERBIA‹ with the nationalistic program leading to war.

When the oppositional parties were founded by Vuk Drašo ković, Zoran Đinđić, Vojislav Koštunica and all the others who are in power today, they all created a program with one and the same answer: The aim of Serbia should be »a state where all the Serbs will live together«. This is a euphemistic expression for ›Greater Serbia‹, it doesn't sound as dangerous as the latter, it doesn't remind you of ethnic cleansings.

The opposition set this goal of an All-Serbian state. Milošević adopted this goal from their program – and that became one of the most serious problems of Serbian opposition. As Milošević took their program, he also took their political identity completely. At the very beginning of the wars, Serbian opposition didn't have its own identity anymore. The only claim they could make, was to do better in the wars. They were so nervous, saying »Hey, this was our idea!«. They were actually watching Milošević putting their precious ideas into practice. That was one of the problems of opposition, and a main reason why Milošević stayed in power for thirteen years. There has never been an alternative idea. We had oppositional parties, but with the same program. No one – except for the Civic Alliance [GSS] – had another idea than putting the national question.

OM: Well, the Serbs have been told the same old story for more than ten years now: We are the victims and we are surrounded by enemies. So the story Labus tried to introduce, which is about Europe, modernization and globalization, was entirely new and never heard before here. Maybe that's why he got only about 800,000 votes [at the 2002 presidential elections, ed.].

DS: Of course, this is also a problem of nowadays government, because they are not able really to come up with another idea, because nationalism is their genuine program, they cannot just change and be somebody else. They are in fact nationalists. They are trying to act modern, to change the discourse, to be European, but still there are no true alternatives to the nationalistic program in Serbia.



Ministry of Defense bombed by NATO 1999

LIEBER EINEN SOZIALEMOKRATISCHEN MILOŠEVIĆ ALS NEOLIBERALISMUS

Diskussion mit AutorInnen von prelom, Journal of the School for History and Theory of Images

PRELOM ist eine intellektuelle Gruppe, die in kleiner Auflage eine gleichnamige Zeitschrift herausgibt, die sich mit Theorie, Popkultur und Kunst beschäftigt. Die Zeitschrift richtet sich weder an ein breites Publikum noch erhebt sie den Anspruch der Agitation, stattdessen will sie Diskussionen und Verständigung innerhalb einer theorieinteressierten Linken anregen. Sie kooperiert mit Gruppen und Einzelpersonen aus allen Ex-jugoslawischen Republiken und publiziert Texte von linken Intellektuellen wie Slavoj Žižek, Renata Salecl und Boris Buden, um nur einige ex-jugoslawische AutorInnen zu nennen.

PRELOM heißt Bruch und wurde bislang von Studierenden am CENTER FOR CONTEMPORARY ART – SCHOOL OF THEORY AND HISTORY OF IMAGES herausgegeben. Dieses Zentrum ist Teil eines alternativen akademischen Netzwerkes und bietet Seminare außerhalb des regulären Universitätsbetriebes an, wodurch sich auch die Mitglieder der Redaktion von PRELOM kennen gelernt haben. Sie beziehen sich vor allem auf Althusser, aber auch auf Marx und Freud, übersetzen und publizieren Ernesto Laclau und Alain Badiou ins Serbische. Nach Selbstauskunft verstehen sie ihre Arbeit als einen Versuch, durch Konfrontation mit den lokalen und nationalistischen kulturpolitischen Konzepten, die durch die Kriege zerstörte Kommunikation wieder herzustellen. Die HerausgeberInnen der Zeitung grenzen sich von NGOs und Grassroot-Gruppen ab, da sie das Konzept des ›Anderen Serbien‹ ablehnen und keine Bewegung von unten kreieren wollen. Ihre Strategie sehen sie in der Besetzung universitärer Posten und in der Aufklärung.



DAS ›ANDERE SERBIEN‹ UND DIE TRAUMATISIERTE GENERATION

Das ›Andere Serbien‹ ist eine Selbstbezeichnung von NGOs und in der Ära Miloševićs vom Belgrader Kreis erfunden worden. Das Konzept markierte die Abgrenzung vieler NGOs von Milošević ohne dabei zu begreifen, dass sie Teil dieses Serbiens waren. Slobodan Karamanić, Mitglied von PRELOM, kritisiert daran, dass dadurch eine Opferposition eingenommen werde und dies die kroatischen, bosnischen und albanischen

schen Kriegs-Opfer Serbiens relativiere. Die NGOs als Opfer des nationalistischen Milošević. Er sieht im Konzept des »Anderen Serbiens« einen Kampf binärer Positionen (das Erste versus das Andere), die um Authentizität kämpfen, obwohl sie beide Versionen des heutigen hegemonialen Nationalstaats sind. Der Diskurs der NGOs über die Repression unter Milošević stelle eine Viktimisierung dar.

Seit 1989 gebe es einen weltweiten Umbruch, der eine ganze Generation traumatisiert habe. Die Traumatisierung bestehend darin, dass sich niemand diesen Umbruch genau erklären könne. Die Gesellschaften des Ostblocks verlören ihre symbolische Basis und seien seitdem einem radikalen ökonomischen und politischen Wandel unterworfen, der in fast allen ehemals sozialistischen Ländern den Nationalismus befördere. Diese Auffassung ist auch in der deutschen Linken keine Unbekannte. Die Dichotomie von Kapitalismus und Realsozialismus hat auch in westeuropäischen Ländern eine Leerstelle hinterlassen und ging mit Identitäts- und Bewegungskrisen der Linken einher. Für viele Gruppen in Deutschland gab es 1989 einen tiefen Einschnitt und eine Umorientierung. Die kommunistischen Gruppen, die bis dahin noch existierten, wenn man von TraditionskommunistInnen wie der DKP und der MLPD absieht, lösten sich zu diesem Zeitpunkt auf oder gingen in der PDS oder den Grünen auf. Dieses Problem betrifft also nicht nur Serbien, ist aber – aufgrund der früheren blockfreien Position Jugoslawiens – besonders tragisch für jene, die linke Politik machen wollen.

SCHULDDISKURS UND NEOLIBERALISMUS NACH MILOŠEVIC

Slobodan Karamanić geht es um die Thematisierung von Verantwortung anhand der Person Milošević. Nicht Milošević oder die Medien hätten das Volk manipuliert, es hätte ihn vielmehr gewählt. In diesem Zusammenhang macht Slobodan einen meines Erachtens problematischen Vergleich mit der deutschen Vergangenheit. Wie in Deutschland nach dem Nationalsozialismus gäbe es in Jugoslawien einen Schulddiskurs, ähnlich der deutschen Kollektivschuldthese, der von NGOs wie dem HELSINKI COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, dem CENTER FOR CULTURAL DECONTA-

MINATION, dem BELGRADER KREIS und dem ALTERNATIVE EDUCATION NETWORK forciert wird.

Diese Schuld lehnt PRELOM jedoch ab, da die jugoslawische Bevölkerung nicht kollektiv schuldig sei an den Opfern und den Kriegen im ehemaligen Jugoslawien, sondern die ökonomischen Verhältnisse sie dazu gezwungen hätten. Was für Deutschland der Versailler Vertrag, sei für Serbien die Verschuldung in den 80ern gewesen.

An dieser Stelle läuft ihre universalistische Kritik ökonomischer Verhältnisse in eine bedenkliche Richtung, die der vorherrschenden Vergangenheitsaufarbeitung in Deutschland gleicht. Wie Adorno schon in den 60ern festgestellt hat, gab es in Deutschland nie eine wirkliche Annahme von Schuld. Der Begriff der »Kollektivschuld« war eine Projektion der deutschen Bevölkerung. Niemals hat es diesen Vorwurf gegeben. Er wurde von dieser benutzt, um jegliche Verantwortung für den Nationalsozialismus abzuwehren. Die These, Versailles sei der Ausgangspunkt für den Aufstieg der NSDAP gewesen, entspricht der Analyse konservativer Kreise, die die Schuld für den Nationalsozialismus damit letztlich den Alliierten des Ersten Weltkriegs geben. Die Konsequenz aus dieser Analogie wäre, Hitler und Milošević zu vergleichen, was politisch fatal wäre. Trotzdem ist PRELOM positiv anzurechnen, dass sie ökonomische Gründe für den Zerfall Jugoslawiens in Betracht ziehen, während ansonsten oft vom Diktator Milošević die Rede ist. Dies würde sich jedoch in eine Relativierung des Nationalsozialismus einfügen, in der sowohl der Nationalsozialismus als auch der realexistierende Sozialismus schlicht als Totalitarismus deklariert werden. Unklar bleibt in ihrer ökonomischen Theorie auch, ob die jugoslawische Bevölkerung nun lediglich Objekt ökonomischer Verhältnisse war oder selber verantwortlich für politische Verhältnisse gewesen ist.

PRELOM sieht Parallelen zwischen Milošević und der sogenannten Demokratischen Opposition (→Đinđić, Drasković, Pesić, Otpor, etc.), da diese von Beginn an nationalistic gewesen seien, Kontakte zu Karađić unterhielten und Milošević vorwarfen, nicht nationalistisch genug zu agieren, was Bosnien und Slawonien anbelange. Als Unterzeichner des Dayton-Vertrags hatte Milošević der Eingliederung der serbischen Republik in Bosnien zugestimmt

und damit eine Vereinigung von serbischer Republik und Serbien verhindert. Die demokratische Opposition kritisierte Milošević dafür, dass er sich angeblich in die Tradition der Sozialistischen Föderativen Republik Jugoslawiens stelle und nicht dem Westen zuwende. Er wurde von ihr als Nachfolger Titos gesehen, mit dem sich nach 1990 nicht mehr identifiziert werden solle. Dieser Bezug Milošević auf die sozialistische Republik Jugoslawiens war jedoch, nach Aussagen von PRELOM schon seit 1992 nicht mehr gegeben, als er sich von der kommunistischen Partei lossagte und die Sozialistische Partei Serbiens gründete. Zudem heißt die 1992 neu gegründete Republik nicht mehr »sozialistisch« und der Stern auf der Staatsflagge ist verschwunden. Was jedoch Milošević von der Opposition unterscheide und ihn positiv von →Đinđić abhebe, sei der Bezug auf einen Wohlfahrtsstaat gewesen, der nun im Abbau begriffen sei. Was den Nationalismus anbelange, gebe es eine Kontinuität von 1989 bis heute, seit Oktober 2000 jedoch nicht mehr unter sozialstaatlichem, sondern unter neoliberalen Vorzeichen. Und wenn PRELOM wählen könnten zwischen Sozialstaat und Neoliberalismus, würden sie sich für Ersteren entscheiden.

Auf den Einwand, dass Nationalismus in Jugoslawien nicht erst seit 1989 existiert und es immer wieder nationalistische Artikulationen in einzelnen Republiken stattfanden und diese möglicherweise befördert wurden durch die Existenz von Republiken, entgegnete Slobodan Karamanić lapidar, dass es keine kroatische Nation gebe und die Bezeichnung Nationalismus diese Behauptung unterstütze, da sie suggeriere, es gebe eine. Seiner Meinung nach gehe es beim Zerfall Jugoslawiens um Identitätspolitik. Die kroatische Identität wurde durch den Bezug auf Kroatien und Nationalstaat über die jugoslawische Nation gestellt. Kann ich noch nachvollziehen, dass ihm die Unterscheidung von jugoslawischer und kroatischer Nation wichtig ist, hört das Verständnis an dem Punkt auf, an dem der Begriff »Identitätspolitik« – mir eher geläufig als Kritik an identitätsfeministischen Positionen – den Nationalismus und seine Kriegspolitik relativiert und die Tatsache verkennt, dass die Konstruktion von neuen Nationen sich längst materialisiert hat. Ich kann nur mutmaßen, dass

Slobodan eine Unterscheidung von politischer und völkischer Nation macht. Das bedeutet, daß er unterscheidet zwischen einer Nation, die verschiedene Gebiete vereinigt und einer, die ein Territorium aufspaltet in kleinere Einheiten, wie es in vielen Ländern Osteuropas nach 1990 der Fall. Trotzdem ist mir nicht klargeworden, welcher Nationsbegriff dieser Analyse zugrunde liegt und wann – in den Augen von »PRELOM« – eine Nation »echt« ist. Konsequent zu Ende gedacht, müsste es dann gute und schlechte, wahre und falsche Nationen geben. Selbst die Tatsache, dass sich nach einer Volkszählung von 1981 nur 5,4% der Bevölkerung als Jugoslawen definierten, hielt Slobodan nicht von dieser These ab, denn dies sage nichts darüber aus, ob die Volkszugehörigkeit über die Nation gestellt wurde, schließlich könne man sich als Kroatin definieren und gleichzeitig als Angehörige der jugoslawischen Nation begreifen. Es entstand der Eindruck, dass PRELOM retrospektiv das sozialistische Jugoslawien nicht nur als den besseren Staat ansah, sondern auch den Nationalismus vor dem Zerfall dieses Staates nicht erwähnenswert findet. Möglicherweise ist das typisch für die »traumatisierte Generation«, die nur vom Vergangenen als dem Besseren schwärmen kann. So unterschied sich dieses Gespräch auch sehr stark in der Atmosphäre von denen mit NGOs, da sie sehr deprimiert auf Fragen nach Zukunft und politischen Utopien reagierten.

Claudia Lichnofsky

Slobodan Karamanić war Teil der Belgrader Austauschgruppe.

Ein Text von Vladimir Maksimović zu Otpor und NGOs ist in der Online-Version dieser Broschüre unter www.ik-net.de zugänglich.



VORWÄRTS UND RUHIG VERGESSEN...

Eindrücke von zwei Besuchen in Besuchen in Kragujevac, im Dezember 2002 mit dem INTERNATIONALEN ARBEITSKREIS (IAK e.V.) und im April 2003 mit der JUNGEN PRESSE NIEDERSACHSEN (JPN e.V.).

»In die EU wollen hier alle, oft ohne zu wissen, was das eigentlich bedeutet« – die Worte von Christian Hellbach, demstellvertretenden deutschen Botschafter in Belgrad, fallen mir wieder ein, als ich nach Kragujevac komme. Auch in dieser ehemaligen Industriemetropole gilt die EU als der große und oftmals unhinterfragte Hoffnungsträger.

Da ist zum Beispiel die KOALICIJA ŠUMADIJA – eine kleine Partei, die im Gegensatz zu den meisten anderen serbischen Parteien ihren Hauptsitz in Kragujevac hat. Beim Eintritt in das Büro fällt sofort die große EU-Flagge auf, die zugleich das

Parteiwappen ist. Daneben hängen historische Fotos aus der Šumadija, der zentralserbischen Region um Kragujevac. Auf einem Fernseher läuft MTV, jedoch ohne Ton, dazu kommt klassische Musik aus den Lautsprechern einer Kompaktanlage. Das Partei beabsichtige, so wird uns erklärt, Kragujevac wieder zur Hauptstadt Serbiens zu machen (wie bereits im 19. Jahrhundert, bevor Belgrad die zentralistische Metropole des Landes wurde). Zudem soll Serbien in Regionen aufgeteilt werden. Durch die Ausrichtung am EU-Konzept EUROPA DER REGIONEN erhofft man sich einen schnelleren Anschluss an die Europäische Union. Über dieses Ziel hinausgehende Forderungen werden kaum genannt. Auf die Frage nach den Zielen der Partei heißt es, sie wolle an die Macht zu kommen. Die politische Ausrichtung der Partei wird lakonisch mit »Mitte« beschrieben. Nach dem Besuch will ich diese Partei zunächst nicht so recht ernst nehmen – später erfahre ich,

dass sie 2.000 Mitglieder hat und Teil des serbischen Regierungsbündnisses DOS ist.

Deutschland steht heute für viele Menschen, nicht nur in Kragujevac, für den Westen, für Wohlstand und vor allem für Europa. Fast Alle, die wir treffen, bemühen sich, ihrem Bild vom Westen zu entsprechen. Immer wieder wird uns von der »Zeit nach MILOŠEVIĆ« berichtet, oft in einem Tenor, als habe es davor gar kein politisches oder kulturelles Leben in Serbien gegeben. Mit Freude wird uns von vielfältigen Kontakten mit deutschen Organisationen oder von den Partnerschaften mit den deutschen Städten Hannover und Ingolstadt berichtet. In einer merkwürdigen Mischung aus Stolz und Dankbarkeit wird sich für jede noch so kleine Spende von Hilfsorganisationen bedankt – wie etwa für zwei Kühlchränke, die der Arbeitersamariterbund einem Kinderheim in Kragujevac stiftete.

Dass die Hilfe aus dem Ausland so gerne gesehen wird und dass unserem Besuch und unserem Interesse mit großer



Freude begegnet wird, ist keineswegs verwunderlich. Auch wenn es unsere GastgeberInnen nicht gerne zeigen, so ist Kragujevac doch spätestens auf den zweiten Blick geprägt von Armut und Perspektivlosigkeit. Die offizielle Statistik der Stadt zählt schon nicht mehr die Arbeitslosen, sondern diejenigen, die noch in Beschäftigung sind: Bei einer Bevölkerung von 180.000 Menschen sind dies rund 60.000, davon über 80% im öffentlichen Sektor. Der letzte Rest der einst für die Stadt so wichtigen Industrieproduktion endete mit der Bombardierung des Zastava-Autowerks durch die NATO 1999.¹

Doch selbst vor dem Hintergrund dieser Perspektivlosigkeit weckt die große Dankbarkeit gerade Deutschland gegenüber

in mir ungute Gefühle. Denn ein Thema findet bei unserem Besuch in Kragujevac kaum Erwähnung, obwohl es das kollektive Gedächtnis der Stadt jahrzehntelang geprägt hat: Im Oktober 1941 verübte die deutsche Wehrmacht hier eines der größten Kriegsverbrechen auf dem Balkan.

Kurz nach Beginn der deutschen Besatzung Serbiens waren in der Nähe von Kragujevac bei Kämpfen mit Partisanen zehn deutsche Soldaten getötet und 26 weitere verwundet worden. Laut eines Befehls des deutschen Oberbefehlshabers in Serbien, General Böhme, sollten für jeden toten ›Volksdeutschen‹ 100 und für jeden verwundeten 50 serbische sogenannte ›Geiseln‹ erschossen werden. Noch an den beiden folgenden Tagen wurden in den umliegenden Dörfern 422 männliche Personen erschossen. Um die von Böhme vorgegebene Anzahl von 2300 Erschießungspflichtigen zu erreichen, besetzte die Wehrmacht am dritten Tag die Stadt Kragujevac. Männer, Jugendliche und Kinder wurden aus Wohnungen, Werkstätten, Fabriken und Läden gezerrt, das örtliche Gymnasium wurde überfallen und komplett Schulklassen mit ihren Lehrern in eine alte Kaserne gesperrt. Am Morgen des 21. Oktober 1941 begann die Wehrmacht mit der massenhaften Erschießung der Verhafteten im Wald äumarice außerhalb der Stadt. Die Juden unter den Männern waren schon zuvor erschossen worden. Die genaue Zahl der Opfer des Massakers von Kragujevac ist noch immer unbekannt, neuere Schätzungen gehen aber von etwa 2400 Menschen aus.

Das Massaker zeigt das grausame Vorgehen der Deutschen in Serbien. Über 90% der serbischen Jüdinnen und Juden wurden vernichtet, zum großen Teil schon zu einer Zeit, in der in anderen Teilen Europas die Deportationen in die Vernichtungslager gerade erst begonnen hatten. Auch Zehntausende Roma, und vermeintliche ›Kommunisten‹ und ›Partisanen‹ fielen den Deutschen zum Opfer, bevor diese 1944 von den Partisanen in Jugoslawien besiegt wurden.

¹ Aufgrund der ökonomischen Krise und des internationalen Embargos gegen Jugoslawien in den 90er Jahren war die Produktion 1999 ohnehin schon sehr stark eingeschränkt. Die NATO bombardierte jedoch gezielt jene Teile der Zastava-Werke, die noch in der Lage waren, produktiv zu arbeiten und richtete mit der Bombardierung u.a. der Autolackiererei auch immense Umweltschäden an, für deren Beseitigung in Serbien schlicht das Geld fehlt.

Nach dem Sieg der Partisanen unter Tito wurde Kragujevac zur Stadt des 21. ОктоBER – zum zentralen Ort in Jugoslawien für die Erinnerung an die Opfer der deutschen Besatzung und vor allem des antifaschistischen Kampfes der Partisanen. Mehrere Straßen und Einrichtungen in Kragujevac sind nach dem 21. Oktober benannt. Im Gymnasium, in dem damals die Schüler verhaftet wurden, gibt es heute einen Klassenraum, in dem Bilder der Erschossenen zu sehen sind. Durch die mit der Erinnerung einhergehende Globalisierung der Partisanen wurde Kragujevac in Serbien auch inoffiziell die ›rote Stadt‹ genannt.

In den 70er Jahren wurde am Ort der Erschießungen in Šumarice ein 352 Hektar großer Gedenkpark mit einem Museum errichtet. Im Park liegen 30 Grabstätten, zehn davon mit künstlerisch gestalteten Monumenten. Alljährlich zum 21. Oktober wird der Park zur Pilgerstätte für Zehntausende. Es gibt kaum eine serbische Schulklass, die den Gedenkpark in Kragujevac nicht besucht hätte. Daran hat sich auch nach dem Ende des Sozialismus in Jugoslawien nicht viel geändert. Auch am 21. Oktober 2002, dem 61. Jahrestag des Massakers, gedachten über 30.000 Menschen den Opfern. Bisher fünf Millionen Menschen haben den Gedenkpark besucht, nicht eingerechnet die BewohnerInnen der Stadt, für die der Park ein beliebtes Ausflugziel ist.

Doch die Transformation Jugoslawiens zu einem serbischen Nationalstaat hinterlässt auch hier seine Spuren: Die Roten Sterne auf den Grabsteinen sind längst verschwunden, oft wurden sie durch gesprayte christliche Kreuze ersetzt. Zur Zeit entsteht mitten auf dem Gedenkgelände, zwischen den Massengräbern, eine orthodoxe Kapelle. Die offizielle Begründung lautet, den Religiösen unter den Opfern solle eine all zu späte Ehre zu Teil werden, was auf das eigentliche Ziel hindeutet: Ein Gegenstück zur Ästhetik der Partisanen-Heroisierung zu schaffen. Auf private Initiative, aber von der Stadt geduldet wurde vor ein paar Jahren auch ein Kriegerdenkmal zur Ehrung der TSCHETNIKS, der serbischen ›Helden‹ des Ersten Weltkriegs auf dem Gelände errichtet. Für Nenad Glisić, Mitglied der ›Arbeiterpartei‹ in Kragujevac, hat dies eine doppelte Funktion: Zum einen waren die TSCHETNIKS im Zweiten Weltkrieg die Widersacher der kommunistischen

Partisanen, die für das mittlerweile verhasste Jugoslawien stehen. Zum anderen kämpften sie schon im Ersten Weltkrieg für die serbische Nation, eine Idee, die im Gegensatz um Antifaschismus der Partisanen für viele wieder als etwas sehr Wichtiges gilt.

Mitte der achtziger Jahre besuchte Petra Kelly das Museum in Kragujevac. Ins Gästebuch schrieb sie damals, die Grünen würden sich dafür einsetzen, dass sich solche Verbrechen nicht wiederholen. 1999, als die Grünen an der Regierung waren, wurde das Museum zu einem der berüchtigten ›Kollateralschäden‹ der NATO-Bombardierungen. Gleich mehrmals wurde das Gelände des Gedenkparkes – wenn auch versehentlich – getroffen, das Museum wurde dabei erheblich beschädigt. Durch Bombensplitter wurde neben zahlreichen Fensterscheiben auch eine Skulptur mit dem Titel ›Der Faschismus ist überwunden‹ beschädigt.

Unmut darüber kann ich in Kragujevac nicht entdecken. Nach dem Sturz MILOŠEVIĆS bekam das Museum einen neuen Leiter: Der Historiker Nenad Đorđević, regionaler Vorsitzender der DEMOKRATISCHEN PARTEI (DS) des ermordeten Premiers ĐINĐIĆ. Dessen Regierung hatte das Museum einfach der Stadtverwaltung von Kragujevac übertragen, obwohl diese kaum das nötige Geld für den Betrieb hat. Đorđevićs Ziel ist eine inhaltliche Neukonzeption der Ausstellung, zu der es nur heißt, sie sei »über 30 Jahre als und noch von den Kommunisten«. Ein Wunsch ist es, einen deutlicheren Bezug auf die Kriege der 90er Jahr in Jugoslawien herzustellen, so ist zum Beispiel eine Zusammenarbeit von KünstlerInnen aus verschiedenen Staaten des ehemaligen Jugoslawiens und ehemaligen KriegsgegnerInnen geplant. Doch die weiteren Pläne für die Umgestaltung des Museums lassen nichts Gutes ahnen. Statt dem 21. ОктоBER das Museum unter dem Motto ›Für Frieden und Toleranz‹ stehen – und künftig Allen gewidmet sein, die »den Mut zum Widerstand aufbrachten«. Das kann so ziemlich alles heißen – es steht zu befürchten, dass dabei das Massaker der Deutschen in Kragujevac und damit auch die Opfer zu einem Thema unter vielen werden. Eine Entschädigung für das Massaker vom deutschen Staat, ob für die wenigen Überlebenden des Massakers, ob für Angehörige von Opfern oder in sonstiger Form, hat es bis

heute nicht gegeben. Auch die wenigen Überlebenden der über 590.000 JugoslawInnen, die während der deutschen Besatzung zur Zwangsarbeit gezwungen wurden, sind bisher weitgehend ignoriert worden. Selbst auf Gelder der 2001 genannten Stiftung für die sogenannte ›Entschädigung‹ ehemalige NS-ZwangsarbeiterInnen haben die allermeisten keinen Anspruch. Deutschland behauptet, es sei 1971 ein Entschädigungsabkommen zwischen dem damaligen Präsidenten Tito und der Bundesregierung geschlossen worden. Dabei handelt es sich jedoch lediglich um einen zinsgünstigen Kredit von einer Milliarde DM, der zudem bereits zu einem Drittel wieder zurückgezahlt wurde. Jegliche darüber hinausgehende rechtliche oder finanzielle Verantwortung lehnt der deutsche Staat kategorisch ab.²

Während die Deutschen über eine Entschädigung der jugoslawischen Opfer nicht einmal mehr reden wollen, machen sich deutsche Vertriebenenverbände zusammen mit Teilen der neuen serbischen Regierung Gedanken über eine »rechtliche und moralische Wiedergutmachung« für das »verlittene Unrechts« der ›Donauschwaben‹ – der einstigen deutschen Minderheit in Jugoslawien, die nach 1945 ausgesiedelt wurde, nachdem sie die deutsche Besatzungsmacht aktiv und begeistert unterstützt hatte – ähnlich wie die sogenannten ›Sudetendeutschen‹ in der Tschechoslowakei.

Selbst eine verbale Entschuldigung der NATO für die Beschädigung des Museums durch die Bombardierungen 1999 ist bis heute ausgeblieben. Die Schäden wurden inzwischen behoben. Unterstützung gab es dabei von ausländischen GewerkschafterInnen und FriedensaktivistInnen, u.a. von der ›Gesellschaft zum Schutz von Bürgerrecht und Menschenwürde‹ (GBM) – einmal mehr eine Nichtregierungsorganisation aus Deutschland.

br




Erschießung der Wehrmacht in Pancevo
22. April 1941



General Franz Böhme; Oberbefehlshaber der
Wehrmacht in Serbien 1941



² In ähnlichen Fällen, so z.B. im griechischen Ort Distomo, verklagten Überlebende eines Wehrmachtmassakers die BRD auf Entschädigung. Während sie vor dem obersten griechischen Gericht Recht bekamen, argumentierten die gleichen Vertreter Deutschlands, die sich in Den Haag für die internationale Verfolgung von Kriegsverbrechen einsetzen, ein griechisches Gericht könne nicht die Immunität des deutschen Staates infrage stellen. Vor deutschen Gerichten wurden die Klagen der Opfer von Distomo wegen angeblicher Nichtzuständigkeit oder Verjährung gar nicht erst verhandelt.



»Gedenkstein für die ermordeten Schüler
und Lehrer im Gedenkpark 21. OKTOBER



Museum und Gedenkpark 21. OKTOBER



»WE BELONG TO SERBIAN CIVILIZATION«



Synagogue in Subotica, built in 1902 (Jewish Historic Museum Belgrade)

It's a very warm welcome – it doesn't seem to be too usual that visitors from Germany pay interest in the affairs of the Jewish Community in Belgrade. We are hosted by Miša Levi, president of the Jewish Community in Belgrade and later joined by Aca Singer, Holocaust Survivor and President of the FEDERATION OF JEWISH COMMUNITIES IN YUGOSLAVIA (FJCY).

JEWISH COMMUNITIES IN SERBIA

Today there are about 3,300 Jews in Serbia, two thirds of them living in Belgrade. There is a number of smaller communities, mainly in the north of Serbia, in Vojvodina. The last existing Jewish community in Kosovo was closed in 1999 when its members flew from the NATO-bombings. There never have been Jews in Montenegro, historically.

The Jewish Community in Belgrade has about 2,000 members and is pretty much secularized. Only a few religious people keep up Jewish traditions, follow religious laws, etc. The service on Shabbat is attended by less than 20 people. Most of the active community members are elder people, among them many Holocaust survivors, coming to the Community center for social and medical care.

Right at the beginning, Mr. Levi points out that the situation for Jews in former Yugoslavia used to be different than in Western Europe, but also than in other Eastern European countries. During Real Socialism, Jews were accepted – alongside the different ethnic groups within Yugoslavia (Serbs, Croats, Slovenes etc.), they were regarded as a national or ethnic minority, not a religious group, very much like the Muslim Bosniaks.¹ Many Jews however, who did not want to declare any national belonging of their own, simply called themselves Yugoslavs.

Any relations between the Jews and other nations were very well regulated by law and in practice. According to Levi, until the mid or late 1980s, Nationalism was no big deal in Yugoslavia. As he points out, Yugoslav Jews felt well-protected in this period, in spite of the heavy anti-Zionist politics of Yugoslavia. The strong support of the Arab cause, including financial aid and military training to the PLO, unlike in many Eastern European Countries never had any negative impact on the attitude towards Jews within Yugoslavia. There was a very strong anti-Israeli, anti-Zionist propaganda in the state-controlled media in Yugoslavia, but at the same time it was strictly forbidden to offend (Yugoslav) Jews as such.

Die Belgrader Synagoge 2002

¹ The Muslims (or Bosniaks as they call themselves nowadays) in Bosnia were considered a national minority. They could declare themselves being Serbian, Croatian or even Muslim. By this process, the Bosniaks became a nation, although 95 per cent of them were either Serbians or Croats by origin who converted into Islam during the reign of the Ottoman Empire in the 17th or 18th century.



Miša Levi

Until the end of the 1980s, nationalism played a certain role in Slovenia and Croatia. Even during the Tito era, there was a strong influence of the Roman Catholic church and dreams of national independence in these areas. However, at the end of the 80s, nationalism started to increase severely also in Serbia under President MILOŠEVIĆ. His politics was based on the narrative that the Serbs were in a subdued position in Yugoslavia and they should finally dare to exercise their nationalism. Although Levi acknowledges national feelings and pride as such, Serbian nationalism in his eyes started out to as an utterance of intolerance, first targeting Croats and Slovenes, later Muslims (Bosniaks as well as Albanians) and at the end of 90s finally Jews. Levi sees this as quite unusual, Jews not being »the first in the line« to feel reemerging nationalism.

The typical mechanism of anti-Judaism – blaming »the Jews« for what one did – spread during the NATO-bombing. US-Foreign Minister Madleine Albright, who happens to be of Jewish origin, was considered a Jew conspiring against Serbia – the nationalist propaganda did not differentiate between Americans and Jews anymore. Regardless whether one is in favor of the NATO bombings or not, Yugoslav Jews were accused to be part of that conspiracy so that Levi feels forced to point out: »We have less in common with Madleine Albright than with Orthodox Christians here in Belgrade [...] We belong to Serbian civilization«.



Aca Singer

After Milošević was overthrown, the Jewish Community expected that anti-Semitism would decrease, but it turned out to be different – it grew even further under the new democratic regime. But Levi is still optimistic. He notices some kind of inertia in public opinion: »It takes time until you change something in people's minds« he says. Another point is that freedom of speech as it is now always means that you can say anything in public whether it is true or not, including that you can offend whoever you want.

For Levi, the increase of anti-Semitic propaganda is a result of this newly gained freedom of speech. Today, there is a vast amount anti-Semitic literature, pamphlets and books, such as the »PROTOCOLS OF THE ELDERS OF ZION«. They were of course forbidden in Tito's period and when ever they occurred, there head been trials, the last in 1987. But in the 90s, Levi says, »we couldn't control it any longer. Now in the period of Kočunica, in the period of freedom of press, we experienced a blow up, a burst in printing of anti-Semitic literature«. Today, there are several editions of the Protocols in Yugoslavia, they are among the twenty best selling books, very cheap and mostly sold at those smalls stands on the street, kept under the counter, but also openly available at major bookstores. But people know, and if they ask for it, they get it. For Levi, the anti-Semitism is not on a alarming level yet – and he hopes that things don't get worse, especially in the interest of the old people who sur-

vived the Holocaust.

Mr. Levi then tells about a »very very ugly event« that happened two days before, on December 24 (Christmas). The British ambassador was meeting the Serbian Patriarch and they were supposed to hold an ecumenical service on the Anglican Christmas Eve. However, in front of the church, a crowd of Orthodox nationalists gathered. They refused the ambassador admittance and actually prevented that service from happening. They said they wouldn't let an Anglican service happen in an orthodox church and didn't even obey the Patriarch, who was urging them to leave.

Later, the protesters were identified as members of OBRAZ². As Mr. Singer points out, this is an ultra-nationalist Serbian organization which is also very anti-Semitic. »Officially, they're not against Jews, Croats or other minorities, but in fact they are«. They are mainly addressing university students and are cooperating with some sympathizing intellectuals, like Žarko Gavrilović, a hardcore anti-Semite who is even in quarrel with the leaders of the Orthodox church about that. Lately, Kosta Cavoški, a well known professor of law at Belgrade university, joined a discussion with Gavrilović organized by OBRAZ – Mr. Singer still wonders why he did so, because according to him, during Milošević, Cavoški was known as a smart intellectual and regime critic.

THE HOLOCAUST

Later in the conversation, we get to talk about the Holocaust in Yugoslavia [see infobox]. Before the Germans occupied Yugoslavia in 1941, two anti-Semitic laws had been passed, one restricting the number of Jewish students, the other forbidding Jews to trade with food. These were the only anti-Semitic political acts – so that in retrospect, it was »not so bad for the Jews«, Levi says.

The most important thing to mention for Levi is that many Jews actually succeeded in escaping from death by fleeing to Kosovo and later on to Albania, which was in the Italian occupation zone. All Jews were interned in camps under Italian rule as well, but they were not subject to extermination. On their way through Kosovo, the Jews were protected by Serbian and Albanian families equally. Mr. Singer estimates that around

4,200 Jews could survive by the help of Serbs, Albanians and of course Italians.

In Croatia and Bosnia, the situation was quite different. The Ustaöa even organized the extermination itself at Jasenovac. In Bosnia, some Muslims formed a SS-division organized by Hajj Amin Al-Husseini, the Mufti of Jerusalem who became a friend of Adolf Hitler. His Muslim »Handjar« [sword] division collaborated very pedantically with the Nazis also in the extermination of Jews.

The Serbian administration did not exterminate or kill Jews, but they collaborated with the German forces. In the first days of the occupation they organized the registration of all Jews, they had some lists which determined who was Jewish and who not. They were arresting Jews and handing them over to the Germans. The Chetnics (Serbian royalists) were not united and didn't have one particular attitude towards the Jews, it differed from brigade to brigade. Most of them tried to adopt the Nazi politics, but not consequently. There have even been cases of Jews being Chetnics.

JEWISH COMMUNITY LIFE AFTER THE HOLOCAUST

»We were lucky that we could come back«, Mr. Singer starts out. After the end of World War II, it was a terrible situation. In most families, there was not more than one survivor. And there were more men than women, because the latter had mostly been exterminated. As a consequence of that, there were many mixed marriages, between Jews and Christians. That had been quite usual even before the war, but not that often. For the Jewish Community this caused the problem that actually not all of its members were Jews anymore. Considering the difficult situation, they did not only regard those people as Jews, whose mother was Jewish. »According to Jewish religious law, a person born by a Christian mother is not a Jew, but we said: Yes, he is a Jew and he can be a member of our community – We're quite liberal on this«.

We want to know from Mr. Singer, what happened to the synagogues during and after the war. Most of them were destroyed, he says. The synagogue in Zemun (being part of Croatian »NDH« during the war) is one of the few that were (↓ SEITE 38)

² Obraz means cheek, a Serbian symbol for (national) dignity and honor.

THE HOLOCAUST IN YUGOSLAVIA

In Yugoslavia there had been a long tradition of Jewish life going back to the ancient Roman Empire. In 1931, there had been 121 communities – both Sephardic and Ashkenazi – with 73,000 members. At the beginning of the German invasion in 1941, this number had increased to 80,000, including more than 4,000 refugees from Germany.

When Germany invaded Yugoslavia, the country was split up into several parts. Regions at the borders were annexed by Germany, Italy, Hungary and Bulgaria. The Croatian Fascists [Ustaša] formed the so-called »INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA« [NDH], a quisling state on the grace of Germany. It included all of Croatia and Bosnia, as far as Zemun, across the river Sava from Belgrade. Serbia itself was under direct control of the German Army, the Wehrmacht.

The Destruction of the Jews in Serbia was the quietest and most consequent one. After the beginning of the Serbian uprising in June 1941, all male Jews were deported to the concentration camps Topovske äupe, Šabac or Niš and shot in mass executions during September and October 1941. Women and children have been exterminated at the »Sajmište« concentration camp in the period from December 8, 1941 until May 1942. About 94% of the Jews in Serbia were killed, only about a thousand survived. The community of Belgrade Jews has been almost totally destroyed in the Holocaust. Dorćol [the Belgrade Jewish quarter] and almost all synagogues were demolished in the bombing of Belgrade in early April 1941. Some of the Belgrade Jews have been killed at the Banjica concentration camp.

In Croatia, the Ustaša implemented the Nuremberg Laws. Here, the destruction of the Jews was part of the genocide against so-called »foreign elements«, in which hundreds of thou-

sands of Serbs, Jews and Roma were killed. In June 1941, mass arrests started, most of the arrested have been murdered at the concentration camp Jasenovac. About 7,000 Jews were deported to Auschwitz and other concentration camps. About 10,000 Jews from Croatia survived, some in the camps, but most by fleeing into Italian controlled areas of Yugoslavia.

In Macedonia, controlled by Bulgaria, about 7,000 Jews were arrested and sent to Treblinka concentration camp in 1943, where they all have been murdered in gas chambers. Only about a thousand Jews from Macedonia survived.

In Baèka province, which was under Hungarian control, mass shootings of Jews took place in January 1942, as »retaliation« for the uprising of Serbs against German occupation. Many of the surviving Jews were deported for slave labor. After the Germans took over the power in Hungary in March 1944, most of the Jews still living in the area were deported to Auschwitz and most of them killed.

Most surviving Yugoslav Jews were rescued by escaping into Italian controlled territories (Albania, Southern Serbia, Istria and parts of the Dalmatian coast). The Italian government was organizing the protection of the Jews together with Yugoslav forces. The Germans and the Croats tried to force Italy to an extradition, but they failed. When Italy capitulated in September 1943, the camp on Rab island, where most of the Jewish refugees were held, came into control of the communist partisans.

About 66,000 of the 80,000 Jews in Yugoslavia have been murdered by the Germans and their allies.

Source: Encyclopedia of the Holocaust, edited by Israel Gutman

not destroyed. Germans and Croats used it as a weapon depot and it was still in a good condition in 1945. After the war, it was returned to the Jewish community. So, they had a synagogue, but there were hardly any Jews left to use it. In addition to that, the synagogues were not nationalized by the state officially, like other property of the Jewish Community, but there was pressure by the state so sell them. So the synagogue in Zemun was sold under the condition to be used for cultural purposes only. When right-wing extremist Šešelj became mayor of Zemun, he sold it as a restaurant and he didn't even keep the promise not to serve pork in there. Other synagogues were used for cultural events as well. The former synagogue of Novi Sad today is one of the most beautiful concert halls in Serbia. Ljubisa Ristić, one of the most famous Serbian theatre directors (and now leading member of the YUL), turned the old synagogue in Subotica into a theatre – but today it is not used anymore and is dilapidating.

»Everywhere there is always more or less Anti-Semitism, but in Serbia it has been less and is still less than in other countries in the East and in the West«, Mr. Singer claims. The Serbian Orthodox Church for example is very traditional, but its (negative) influence on the people is rather small. Mr. Singer originally comes from the Vojvodina, where many Hungarians live. There, as in Hungary, the Catholic church has much more influence – even today. In Hungary there are also more anti-Semitic incidences. Mr. Singer tells about the agitation against (Holocaust survivor) Imre Kertesz after winning the Nobel-prize. People ask »Why is a Hungarian Jew getting the Prize, and not a non-Jewish Hungarian writer?« Unfortunately, according to Singer, many people support this kind of attitude in Hungary.

JEWISH COMMUNITIES DURING THE WARS IN THE 1990S

When wars started in Croatia and Bosnia, most of the Jews from these territories, especially from Bosnia, escaped to the main cities of Zagreb and Belgrade. From there, they continued elsewhere, most of them went to Israel or to other Western countries. Some Jews, mainly from cities like Sarajevo, stayed in Belgrade. At the same time, because of the

unsafe and economically bad situation in Serbia, Jews living here, emigrated to Israel and other places in the West, so the absolute number of Jews in Serbia actually didn't change very much. »Many returned, they didn't stay there forever. They have been in Israel for a while. And there they decided whether they wanted to stay«. As Mr. Singer explains to us, especially elder people had difficulties to adjust to a new environment. But most of the young people spent at least some years in Israel.

»What about Kosovo?«, we ask. According to Mr. Levi, Albanian nationalists started to prepare the separation of Kosovo long before Milošević came into power. Since the middle of 1980s, Albanian nationalism has been really strong. Some Jews (like many Serbs) even escaped from Kosovo already at the end of the 1980s. Because of the unbearable situation, during the 1990s, more and more Jews escaped from Kosovo and came to Belgrade. During the NATO-bombings in 1999, the Jewish community of Priština was closed and they formed a Jewish community in exile in Zemun. They are currently receiving humanitarian help from American Jewish organizations. Another Jewish community in Prizren was closed down at the same time. Today, there is no Jewish community left in Kosovo, and there are hardly any Jews at all.

DEALING WITH THE HOLOCAUST

Asked about the Jewish community's relationship with Germany, Singer answers that it is now a good one. Once, an official at the German embassy told him: »Mr. Singer, you are the first Jew I get to know personally, who survived a German KZ«. Singer sees this as a sign for both curiosity and a certain historical consciousness. But when talking about compensation, the relations are not that well. Jews from other countries mostly did receive some kind of compensation payments by the German state, but the Jews in Yugoslavia did not.

Mr. Singer then tells the story of a conference in Berlin where he was among others meeting then German President Roman Herzog. He introduced himself to Herzog as head of the Jewish communities of the FR Yugoslavia and asked him about the outstanding compensation. Herzog answered – as Federal President – that he was neither in charge of nor responsible

for this. After some hours, Singer introduced himself to Herzog again, this time as former prisoner in Auschwitz. Only then, Herzog stated that the Yugoslav Jews in fact had received a compensation – by Tito.

Singer also had talks with German representatives about the ban on Holocaust denial in Germany. The reason for this law, he was told, was that Germans maybe would tell their children that the Holocaust was all a lie, but that they would very much follow the law and rather not do so if it was prohibited. In Serbian criminal law there is no special article about Holocaust denial. But there is this Nazi propaganda actually denying the Holocaust and even the existence of Auschwitz. The Serbian law doesn't take this into account – it only knows »agitation against other nations or religions«.

For Singer, this difference in legislation is of importance, considering the increasing nationalist revisionism in Serbia. The reference is no longer anti-Fascism, but the Serbian nation. According to this, no longer the fighters from World War II (the partisans), but those from World War I (Serbian nationalist warriors) are celebrated. At the same time this nationalism grows, there is an increasing anti-Semitism and the government is doing nothing about it. Many of the old prosecutors and judges remained the same and they simply don't care. Officially, the (Yugoslav) President Kočunica is no anti-Semite. But he doesn't care about the prevention of anti-Semitism either. Thank God, there has been no desecrations of Jewish cemeteries yet, Mr. Singer ends.

At the end, Mr. Levi wants to know, what role we think the remembering of the Holocaust has or should have today. After we stated that we think that it's important to keep up the view of the victims and protect them from being humiliated or pocketed by the collective memory of the perpetrators, Mr. Levi comes to speak about the recent wars in Ex-Yugoslavia. He is increasingly asking himself, if he has to think about that as genocide or war crimes as well. Back in 1994, Levi says, he would have put his hand into the fire for the Serbs, that they did not kill any innocent civilians. Today, he has changed his view but he also has to see that many people still – like himself – cannot accept the cruel facts of what happened.

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During our stay in Belgrade we were interested in the situation of Roma in Yugoslavia, during socialism as well as today. Being concerned with the deportation of Roma refugees from Germany to Serbia, we were especially interested in the situation of those Roma. This article is based on an interview with Dragoljub Acković, director of the Roma Community Center April 8th in Belgrade and on a report of the German party PDS about the situation of Roma returning from Germany to Serbia.

If you are walking through Belgrade, you will easily notice that the situation for Roma is problematic. There are many beggars in town, people rummaging in the garbage and collecting old paper – most of them are Roma. If you go by train through Novi Beograd, the quarter of skyscrapers built in the 70s, you cannot miss the small, simple sheds without electricity or water supply, made of aluminum, wood or corrugated iron. Today, there are approximately 400,000 to 800,000 Roma in Serbia, which has 10 million inhabitants, about 100,000 of them living in Belgrade. Many of them are war refugees, or Displaced People.

Hate speech and prejudices against Roma are very widespread in the Serbian population. As Mr. Acković tells us, there are no Roma representatives either in the republic or federal parliament, just a few lower clerks on the municipality level. »But if you look for Roma who are doctors, engineers, journalists, etc.,« Acković says, »they are few that it is not worth to be mentioning.«

Acković puts much emphasis on the difference between the two terms »emancipation« and »integration«. In the last 10 to 15 years, a discourse of »integration« has been established by politicians, sociologists, anthropologists etc. mostly in Western Europe. The word »integration« stems from Latin language and originally means to fit something in, to subordinate. Thus, the concept of »integration«, like »tolerance«, mostly refers to the norms of the majority group in society. Mr. Acković, however, prefers the concept of »emancipation«, since it is based on individual rights, not on assimilation.

The discourse on »integration« of Roma in Western Europe is a

recent phenomenon, however in Yugoslavia, Roma have been integrated for quite some time even before WWII. Already in 1916, the first regular school for Roma children was established in the Vojvodina region. In 1935, the first newspaper in Romani language was founded in Yugoslavia. Of course, the German occupation and the Holocaust ended integrationist politics. During the Holocaust, about 500,000 Roma were killed in all of Europe. In Socialist Yugoslavia, Roma institutions reappeared and compared to other Eastern European countries, Roma were well-represented in the public. In 1981, the first Romani radio program started in Belgrade and in 1986, the first Romani TV-station went on air in Priština [Kosovo]. Even today, a daily radio program in Romani is something Roma do not have in many other countries. In Serbia, Romani language and culture is an optional subject in schools since 1986 and it is even planned to become a regular subject.

Acković complains that many scholars and well-educated Roma experts do not understand the difference between the concepts of »emancipation« and »integration«. He would not say that everything is alright, but yet he claims that in Yugoslavia the process of emancipation of Roma was much more advanced than in other European countries. The »story about increasing tolerance towards Roma« told not only in Western countries since the end of World War II, however, is »a pure lie«, Acković maintains.

To illustrate this, Mr. Acković tells us about his experiences as an international Roma representative. Since 1971, he has been involved in the work of the INTERNATIONAL ROMANI UNION [IRU] and he is a member of the IRU parliament. In Ireland for example, Roma still are not allowed to buy their own land and to settle there. In Poland, there are hardly any Roma children in public schools. This applies also to Slovakia and the Czech Republic. Anyway, all these countries claim to grant full civil rights to Roma. At Prague airport, you have even Scotland Yard officers sitting at the counter to prevent Roma from flying to the United Kingdom. When traveling through Europe as senior Roma official, Acković sometimes gets searched at the borders. »This is tolerance«, he states with an ironic undertone.



Oxfam postercampaign for Roma rights 2002

ANTIZIGANISM IN SERBIA AND GERMAN REFUGEE POLICY

Gespräch mit Draguljub Acković

Also in Yugoslavia, Acković was facing problems as Roma representative, especially during the Milošević era. On April 8th, 1994 for example, on the Roma National Day, Milošević – for Acković the symbol of ethnic distance – wanted some pictures taken of him, Milošević and other Roma for the media. But he did not even ask. Finally, since it was a Roma holiday and since Acković was taking part in an international conference at the same time, he actually refused to join Milošević. According to Acković, there have been serious problems for Roma people during Milošević's rule. When the League of Communists was transformed into the SOCIALIST PARTY OF SERBIA [SPS], many Roma members lost their positions and some even got excluded from the party. A few years later, Acković himself got fired as chief editor of the cultural program of Radio Belgrade after he had publically announced »It is not our fault when we don't get far when we are led by a blind«.

After October 5, Acković has probably become the best known Roma in Belgrade after he bluntly said in an interview that »Mr. Milošević should not have been extradited to the Hague [ITCY], but shot here in Yugoslavia« for having established »ethnic closeness« in Serbia. By »ethnic closeness«, Acković means the establishing of an ethnical homogeneous Serbian nation state. This is still the case even after Milošević was overthrown, as a 2001 survey about social & ethnic distance in Serbia shows. Belgrade sociologist Bogdan Jurović asked: »Can there be talk of integration, assimilation or segregation of Roma in Serbia?«. Some of the findings are shown in the table.

ROMA REFUGEES IN GERMANY

During the Berlin part of our exchange program, we have also

been dealing with the situation of Roma. According to the UNHCR, there are about 60,000 Roma refugees from Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo currently living in Germany. They flew mainly in the beginning of the 90s, when the civil war started, and in 1999, to escape the NATO bombings. In Germany, their status has only been one of temporary residence. In 2002, a repatriation treaty between Germany and Yugoslavia has been implemented. Now, all Roma refugees are bound to leave Germany either by »voluntarily return« or by deportation. Most Roma do not return to Kosovo, where they flew from, because of the still unsafe situation, but go to Belgrade.

Question	Serbs	Muslims	Hungarians	Yugoslavs ¹
Would not marry a Roma	80%	24%	55%	58%
Do not want to have a friendship with a Roma	24%	24%	20%	58%
Do not want to have a Roma as neighbor	30%	59%	17%	16%
Do not want to live in the same state as Roma	15%	14%	6%	6%
Do not want to have sexual relationship with a Roma	50%	65%	33%	55%
Would accept a direct blood transfusion (from arm to arm) from a Roma- - only if they were in danger of their life	33%	20%	51%	48%
[Partially or entirely] think that Roma have a hard life, because they are lazy and irresponsible	40%	40%	30%	32%
[Partially or entirely] think that Roma have a hard life, because they are lazy and irresponsible	68%	84%	60%	35%
Think that Roma cannot be trusted and that they are unreliable	57%	72%	57%	39%
Think that Roma should emigrate out of Europe and found a state at some empty space in Africa or Asia	19%	6%	5%	7%

For Serbian authorities, the refugees are rather an additional problem. To Sanda Rašković-Ivić, Serbian refugee commissioner [who has actually been dismissed in February 2003], this is merely a »ticking social bomb«. There is no government assistance for Roma returning from Germany. Rašković-Ivić has to admit that she actually »can't do anything for these people«, since she is only responsible for the Internally Displaced People (IDPs), i.e. Serbs and Roma directly coming from Kosovo, but not for those repatriated from other countries. And according to her, there isn't any other competent authority either.

¹ In Yugoslavia, each individual could »choose« its ethnic identity at census or opinion polls. Those, who did not want to define themselves as Serbs, Muslims or Hungarians [or other], were simply categorized as YUGOSLAVS.

Karin Hopfmann, speaker for refugee policy within the PDS-party in the Berlin parliament, has been researching the situation in Belgrade in December 2002.² To her, the policy of repatriation is irresponsible, since it does not show any consideration for the living conditions of Roma in Serbia. Only those returning »voluntary« get a payment by the German state, but far too little to found a new existence on it. Thus, most of them are forced to live in simple illegal sheds on public ground described earlier. Most settlements are not even registered, because they cannot afford the expense of about 300 dinars (4.5 Euro), and because the registration does not bring any benefit, like for instance social welfare or other forms of support.

According to Hopfmann, the vast majority of returning Roma does not have a great chance to meet acceptance and become integrated in society. One crucial problem is education. Many »returning« Roma children were born in Germany and know Serbian only orally, if at all. Also the school entrance tests, which asks for a general knowledge of the Serbian society are an obstacle.

To sum up, it can be said that although some achievements in the emancipation of Roma have been made in Socialist Yugoslavia, and although the situation for Roma in Serbia is better than in most surrounding countries, according to Mr. Acković there is still a lot of discrimination and prejudice against Roma. This applies even more to the many refugees and Displaced People among the Roma, which are living under very poor conditions and who are practically excluded from society. Neither are the Serbian authorities taking care of this situation, nor are Western governments interested in it. On the contrary, they repatriate the Roma, in order to get rid of unwanted refugees. Where ad how they want to live or what happens to them, seems to be of no interest for anybody. Thus, the international NGOs, which actually have taken over major parts of Serbian social politics, cannot help much. Those few organizations working on the Roma issue at all, mostly launch media campaigns against racial prejudices. Considering the situation of Roma, activities like Oxfam telling people on posters that »Roma« in Romani language means »Human being« [»Rom znači Čovek«], seem futile, if not sometimes even cynical.

² Karin Hopfmann's report about returning Roma from Germany can be downloaded [in German language] at <http://www.krit.de/roma/roma-in-belgrad.pdf>.

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LINKS & FURTHER READING:

EUROPEAN ROMA RIGHTS CENTER, providing reports, documents and further links: www.errc.org

CAFOD's [British NGO] work with Serbia's Roma community www.cafod.org.uk/easterneurope-serbia_workwithromash.html

EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON REFUGEES AND EXILES [ECRE]

Report on protection of refugees and IDPs in Serbia www.ecre.org/positions/serbia.shtml

THE PATRIN WEB JOURNAL: Romani Culture and History www.patrin.com

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE ROMA [English and German] www.geocities.com/Paris/5121/history

»KEIN LAND – NIRGENDWO?« Ergebnisse einer Recherche-reise von Karin Hopfmann [PDS] zur Situation von Roma-flüchtlingen in Jugoslawien [in German only]

www.krit.de/roma/roma-in-belgrad.pdf

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


Roma settlement in Belgrade in 2000

STUDIES OF THE EXCLUDED

A Visit at the Belgrade Women's Studies Center

Together with the Belgrade part of our group, we were invited to the Belgrade Women's Studies Center. We talked to Daša Duhaček, who holds a MA in Political Philosophy and is project coordinator of the executive committee and co-founder of the Center, and to Biljana Dojčinović, who has a MA in Literature, works as library and network program manager and is also co-founder of the Center. We talked about the history of the Belgrade Women's Studies Center and its activities and theoretical backgrounds.



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attracted to the party. Today, an alliance of SPS and JUL holds about 13 per cent of the seats in Serbian parliament. In February 2003, party leader MIRA MARKOVIĆ escaped to Moscow just before her designated arrest. [www.jul.org.yu/]

ZAJEDNO [TOGETHER] Informal coalition of SPO, DS and GSS formed before the 1996 elections in March 1996, intending to defeat MILOŠEVIĆ. In September 1996, the DSS also joined ZAJEDNO. However, the coalition broke up again in spring 1997.

ZEMUN CLAN Mafia clan named after the Belgrade suburb Zemun. Led by LEGIJA, commander of the RED BERETS special police unit and probably counting some 2-300 members. The ZEMUN CLAN is notorious for the conjunction of war crimes and organized crime. It was nurtured by corruption under MILOŠEVIĆ and its members were kind of »untouchable« until the assassination of PM ĐINĐIĆ in February 2003. Since then, the government brought about 300 charges against clan members. The clan is among others accused of the kidnapping and assassination of former Serbian president IVAN STAMBOLIĆ in 2000, the assassination of four leading officials of the SERBIAN RENEWAL MOVEMENT [SPO] in 1999, dozens of robberies, more than 50 murders in Belgrade, drug traffic, etc.

ŽIVKOVIĆ, ZORAN Serbian prime minister since March 18, 2003, after the assassination of ZORAN → ĐINĐIĆ. Živković was one of the founding members of the → DEMOCRATIC PARTY and has always been a loyal ally of ĐINĐIĆ. After the municipal elections of 1996, he became mayor of Serbia's third largest city, Niš and later Minister of the Interior of the → FRY. Today, Živković, just like ĐINĐIĆ, ingratiates himself with the EU by making efforts in political reforms, cooperation with the → ICTY and the fight against organized crime. However, without the support of the → DSS in Serbian parliament, it is by no means certain that Živković will be able to go on until the end of his mandate in the end of 2004.

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→Košturnica and →LABUS] and 36 % in a later ballot [2nd after Košturnica, LABUS not being on the list]. In February 2003, ŠEŠELJ left Serbia and gave himself up to the Hague tribunal →ICTY.

SFRY see →SOCIALIST FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA.

SOCIALIST FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA

[SFRY] – Second Yugoslav state established in 1944 under the regime of the →LEAGUE OF COMMUNIST, led by Marshall Tito until his death in 1980. The SFRY, mostly referred to as »the former Yugoslavia«, consisted of the six republics, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia and Serbia, including the two autonomous provinces Kosovo and Metohia, and Vojvodina. After the 1974 constitution, each republic had its own constitution, supreme court, parliament, president and prime minister. Between 1991 and 1992, all of the republics, except for Serbia and Montenegro declared their independence. On April 27, 1992, these two republics acknowledged the breakdown of the SFRY by proclaiming themselves the successor state to the SFRY, taking the name →FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA [FRY].

SOCIALIST PARTY OF SERBIA [SOCIALISTIČKA PARTIJA SRBIJE – SPS]. Founded in July 1990, practically only a new name given to the LEAGUE OF COMMUNISTS OF SERBIA after all other Communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe had fallen, but when the »old« Yugoslav Federation still existed. The SPS was dominated by SLOBODAN MILOŠEVIĆ, its foundation being part of the strengthening of Serbia's position at the cost of the Federal institutions under MILOŠEVIĆ's reign since 1987. Until 2000, the party and the state were almost completely interchangeable. The party controlled state property, police and media, and where the SPS lost power, the →JUL stepped in to fill the vacuum. Today, Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ is still party leader. [www.sps.org.yu/eng/]

SPO see →SERBIAN RENEWAL MOVEMENT.

SPS see →SOCIALIST PARTY OF SERBIA.

SRS see →SERBIAN RADICAL PARTY.

STAMBOLIĆ, IVAN Nephew of Tito and main mentor of Slobodan →MILOŠEVIĆ, who has been his successor both as Secretary General of the →LEAGUE OF COMMUNISTS OF SERBIA [LCS] in 1987 and as President of Serbia in 1989. Later, STAMBOLIĆ became one of the harshest critics of MILOŠEVIĆ's nationalism. In 2000, STAMBOLIĆ had been kidnapped while jogging and missing ever after. His body was first found during the state of emergency in spring 2003 and substantiated the suspicion of MILOŠEVIĆ and the RED BERETS, respectively the ZEMUN CLAN standing behind his assassination.

SURČIN-CLAN – Mafia clan named after another Belgrade

suburb. ZEMUN- and SURČIN-CLANS have close connections to each other. However, since the assassination of ĐINĐIĆ, there is hardly talk of the SURČIN-CLAN. Analysts claim that this is due to the fact that the post-Milošević political elite, i.e. ĐINĐIĆ & Co. is much closer connected to this group than to the ZEMUN-CLAN. The SURČIN-CLAN is said to be in control of the cigarette smuggling in Serbia and Montenegro.

TURBOFOLK Ethno-style techno (similar to Oriental House) with Serbian lyrics which is big in Serbia since the early 90s with →CECA as one of the most famous singers. Turbofolk could be called the soundtrack of a nationalistic (sub-)culture.

UNMIK [UNITED NATIONS INTERIM ADMINISTRATION MISSION IN Kosovo] UN-mission based on UN-Security Council resolution 1244, which shall »assure the safe return of all refugees« to their homes in →Kosovo. Under the control of UNMIK and in close cooperation with KFOR-troops [NATO], Western →NGOs have built up a new civil and state-like infrastructure in Kosovo, as well as organized elections. Officially, UNMIK reaffirms the »territorial integrity« of Yugoslavia and just an autonomy for Kosovo. However, UNMIK and KFOR did not make too much of an effort preventing anti-Serbian violence and although having quarrels with Albanian political leaders, the head of the UNMIK mission, Michael Steiner does not oppose plans of a independence of Kosovo. [www.unmikonline.org/]

USTAŠA [INSURRECTIONIST] Croatian fascist movement, ruling in the Croatian puppet state →NDH from 1941 to 1944. The USTAŠA cooperated closely with the German Nazis, and even organized and executed the persecution and extermination of so-called »foreign elements« (i.e. Jews, Roma, Serbs) itself. The name USTAŠA goes back to the Croatian national movement in the 19th century. With the separatism in the 90s, many reminiscences of the USTAŠA have been made. To many Serbs, USTAŠA is still a common name for everything Croatian or sometimes just non-Serbian.

VOJVODINA Rich region in the North of Serbia with a relevant Hungarian minority. From 1974 until 1990, Vojvodina had been a autonomous province within Serbia with strong rights within the →SFRY, just like Kosovo. Since 2000, different Parties in Vojvodina, even members of the →DOS-coalition, try to gain autonomy again and thus press ahead the rapprochement to the EU.

YUGOSLAV UNITED LEFT [JUGOSLOVENSKA UDRUŽENA LEVICA, JUL] Founded in 1994 to provide an »alternative« to the SPS, led by MILOŠEVIĆ's wife, MIRA MARKOVIĆ. The JUL became both competitor and coalition partner of the ruling SPS, the party even had a TV station of its own. War profiteers and communist hard-liners are the main groups still

at a renewal of Yugoslav communism, mainly criticizing bureaucracy and centralism in the →SFRY. In 1975, the magazine **PRAXIS** was closed down, many of the group members were expelled from the →LEAGUE OF COMMUNISTS, deprived of their passports and demoted or even banned from university.

PRELOM Magazine and academic group of popular culture theorists, affiliated to the →CENTER FOR CONTEMPORARY ART in Belgrade.

QUEERIA LGBT Lesbian Gay Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) working group of the SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC YOUTH. Together with other LGBT groups like →LABRIS or →GAYTEN LGBT, QUEERIA LGBT is involved in campaigns against homophobia and for LGBT rights. [www.queeria.org.yu/index.htm]

RED BERETS [UNIT FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS – JEDINICE ZA SPECIJALNE OPERACIJE, JSO] Special police unit formed under MILOŠEVIĆ, recruiting members of →ARKAN'S TIGERS and of other paramilitary groups from war times. Personally, it is strongly intertwined with the ZEMUN-CLAN, which is held responsible for a number of political murders, e.g. of IVAN →STAMBOLIĆ. Also officially, the JSO was in charge of dealing with the political opposition at demonstrations, etc. Before October 5, 2000, however, JSO leader LEGIJA promised to ZORAN ĐINDIĆ, not to intervene with the JSO against the demonstrators. After the assassination of ĐINDIĆ, the JSO has been entirely dissolved.

REPUBLIKA SRPSKA [SERBIAN REPUBLIC, RS] Political Entity formed according to the Dayton peace agreement in 1995. The RS covers 49 per cent of Bosnia and Herzegovina, while the other 51 per cent belong to the BOSNIAN-CROATIAN FEDERATION, subdivided into ten cantons. There are agreements about a »special relationship« between REPUBLIKA SRPSKA and Serbia, like for instance the traveling without passport. Serbian radical nationalists claim the integration of the two states into a GREATER SERBIA, which is forbidden according to the Dayton treaty.

SANU – see →SERBIAN ACADEMY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES.

SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO [SRBIJA I CRNA GORA – SCG] Successor of the →FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA [FRY] since February 2003. After long negotiations between Serbia and Montenegro, the latter demanding more political weight than within the FRY, an agreement between the two states could only be achieved through the mediation of the EU, especially by HIGH REPRESENTATIVE FOR FOREIGN POLICY, JAVIER SOLANA. Therefore, critics ironically call the new state SOLANIA. There are hardly any fields of politics to be controlled by SCG. It is mostly considered a federal state in Serbia and a confederation of two independent states in Montene-

gro. There are open opponents of the union in both the Serbian and the Montenegrin state administration. In 2006, a referendum in Montenegro will decide about the future existence of SCG. [www.gov.yu/]

SERBIAN ACADEMY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES [SRPSKA

AKADEMIJA NAUKA I UMETNOSTI, SANU]. In 1985, the SANU appointed a committee dealing with the »most important social, political, economic, educational and cultural problems« for Serbia. The outcome, the so-called **MEMORANDUM** published in 1986, criticizes the Yugoslav constitution from 1974 in many points and suggests some »anti-Serbian-coalition« and discrimination of Serbs in →Kosovo, Croatia, Slovenia and →VOJVODINA. In its perception, the **MEMORANDUM** can be seen as the draft of an Serbian nationalistic political agenda, which has used as a main reference for →MILOŠEVIĆ.

SERBIAN RADICAL PARTY [SRPSKA RADIKALNA STRANKA, SRS]

Founded in February 1991, president: VOJISLAV ŠEŠELJ. The SRS hangs on to the ultra-nationalistic ideas of a GREATER SERBIA [VELIKA SRBIJA, which is also the name of the monthly party magazine] that – according to the Radicals – stretches from Istria to Thessaloniki. The SRS is a strong political influence in Serbia which should not be underestimated. In the early 1990s, the party was the mainstay of MILOŠEVIĆ's government until the →SPS could operate without ŠEŠELJ's support. The SRS is active in both Serbia and Montenegro and has a branch active in →REPUBLIKA SRPSKA, too.

[www.srs.org.yu/]

SERBIAN RENEWAL MOVEMENT [SRPSKI POKRET OBNOVE, SPO]

Founded in March 1990, president: VUK DRAŠKOVIĆ. The SPO, like its leader DRAŠKOVIĆ has a history of changing political color, sometimes almost overnight. In the 1980s, DRAŠKOVIĆ was a nationalist. In the early 90s, the SPO was one of the less nationalistic opposition parties and one of the few relied upon by the Western European states. When forming the ZAJEDNO-coalition in 1996, the SPO had put aside much of its nationalistic rhetoric. In 1998, DRAŠKOVIĆ cooperated with MILOŠEVIĆ and became deputy prime minister of →FRY. In the 2000 →DOS-coalition, the SPO was no longer included. In 1999 and 2000 there have been two attempts to assassinate DRAŠKOVIĆ. Lately, DRAŠKOVIĆ, who has almost become politically irrelevant, called today's government of Serbia to be »even worse than MILOŠEVIĆ's«. [www.spo.org.yu/]

ŠEŠELJ, VOJISLAV President of the radical nationalistic

→SERBIAN RADICAL PARTY. At the 2002 presidential elections, ŠEŠELJ was supported by former MILOŠEVIĆ supporters and got 23 % of the votes at the first ballot [3rd after

to key positions in the Serbian government and in 1997, when his terms as President of Serbia expired, became elected President of the →FR YUGOSLAVIA. Despite of massive protests of hundreds and thousands following the elections both in 1996 and 2000, MILOŠEVIĆ did not resign until October 5, 2000. In June 2001, MILOŠEVIĆ was extradited to the →ICTY, where he is accused of being the main person responsible for the civil wars in Croatia and Bosnia. His trial began in February 2002, a sentence is not expected before 2005. The extradition of MILOŠEVIĆ had been a basic condition of the West for economic aid and an end to the international isolation of Serbia. At the latest elections, MILOŠEVIĆ indirectly called upon his supporters to vote for →ŠEŠELJ.

MILUTINOVIC, MILAN MILUTINOVIC was elected president of Serbia as candidate of the →SPS in December 1997. In January 2003, when his term of office was over, he lost his immunity and was extradited to the →ICTY, where he is indicted together with Slobodan →MILOŠEVIĆ.

MLADIĆ, RATKO Yugoslav army General and since May 1992 overall commander of the BOSNIAN SERB ARMY. He is considered to be responsible for both the siege of Sarajevo and massacre of Srebrenica in 1995. After the end of the Bosnian war, MLADIĆ returned to Belgrade, enjoying the open support and protection of →MILOŠEVIĆ. He is still hiding and wanted by the →ICTY, while pictures and t-shirts of him are still sold on the streets in Serbian cities.

NDH [NEZAVISNA DRŽAVA HRVATSKA - INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA]. This puppet state was proclaimed after the German occupation of Yugoslavia in 1941. NDH covered all of today's Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and parts of Western Serbia. The ruling fascist →USTAŠA regime committed a genocide against hundreds of thousands of Jews, Roma and Serbs.

NGOS [NON GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS] Generic term for different kinds of state independent organizations involved in all sorts of political, economical, cultural and humanitarian work. In Serbia, several large international NGOs and foundations are present and support the work of local projects and organizations, which are often NGOs themselves. The big NGOs, among them many foundations, play a crucial role in the democratic system of post-MILOŠEVIĆ-Serbia. In various sectors, their funds exceed the corresponding state budget. Some of the most influential international NGOs in Serbia are:

FUND FOR AN OPEN SOCIETY – SERBIA [FOS], founded in 1991, Serbian subsidiary of the Soros Foundation, dedicated to the evolution of civil society. [www.fosyu.org]

HEINRICH-BÖLL-STIFTUNG. Foundation closely linked to the

German green party and funded by the German state. One of the main supporters of the →BELGRADE WOMEN'S STUDIES CENTER. [www.boell.de]

HELSINKI COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN SERBIA[HCHRS]. Established in September 1994, member of the INTERNATIONAL HELSINKI FEDERATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (IHF). [www.helsinki.org.yu]

Human Rights Watch – the largest human rights organization based in the United States, conducting research, fact-finding and reports about human rights abuses in all regions of the world. [www.hrw.org]

OXFAM INTERNATIONAL is a confederation of 12 organizations working together in more than 100 countries and currently launching a media campaign on Roma in Serbia. [www.oxfam.org]

OBRAZ – [cheek] Serbian ultra-nationalistic movement, mostly addressing students and acting against Jews, Roma, Croats and other minorities. Its main base is the department of history at the Faculty of Philosophy, Belgrade University. Literally, OBRAZ means cheek, a Serbian symbol for honor.

OTHER SERBIA Originally the name of a book published by the →BELGRADE CIRCLE in 1992, the OTHER SERBIA became a synonym for the forces of non-party opposition in Serbia and their political concept, while the term DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION was associated to the political parties like →DS, →DSS or →GSS, which the OTHER SERBIA had been criticizing as well.

OTPOR [NARODNI POKRET OTPOR – NATIONAL MOVEMENT RESISTANCE] Broad people's movement formed in 1999, to a large extent consisting of students. The formation of OTPOR was very much appreciated in the West. The movement was united on the issue to overthrow →MILOŠEVIĆ. In 2000, hundreds of thousands participated in every day rallies that culminated in the October 5 protests, after which MILOŠEVIĆ finally resigned. OTPOR still exists, but almost completely lost its political relevance. Some leaders pursue the plan of turning OTPOR into a political party. [www.otpor.com/index_en.html]

POLITIKA Oldest and most widely read Serbian newspaper. Founded in 1904 it was first a liberal, later a socialist paper. After 1987 it followed the more and more nationalistic government line. After 2000, the publishing house has been bought by a German media group [WAZ], the paper's attitude is now more or less pro-Western. [www.politika.co.yu]

PRAXIS GROUP Association of communist, yet critical intellectuals in the 1960s and 70s. Named after a magazine published at Belgrade university from 1964 on. Drawing on Marxist theory, especially the FRANKFURT SCHOOL and inspired by a lot of international contacts, the PRAXIS GROUP was aiming

the voted, had to be cancelled for the same reason. After the dissolution of the →FRY, Koštunica lost his position and is now leader of DSS-opposition within Serbian parliament.

KOSOVO Rather poor region in the South of Serbia with about 90% Albanian population [1991]. Since the foundation of the →SFRY there had been different efforts of gaining independence by ethnic Albanians. From 1974 until 1989 Kosovo had the status of an autonomous region within the SFRY. In Kosovo, the BLACKBIRD FIELD [Kosovo Polje] is located, which was presented as a Serbian nation symbol by →Milivoj Šešović since 1989. After heavy repression and in some parts even ethnic cleansings against Albanians in Kosovo, in 1999 NATO troops [KFOR] bombed and occupied the Kosovo, actually supporting the Kosovo LIBERATION ARMY [KLA or UÇK]. The vast majority of non-Albanians (Serbs, Roma, Jews) were more or less forced to leave Kosovo. Today, there is some vague talk about independency of Kosovo, which is still an international protectorate controlled by →UNMIK and secured by KFOR. Recently, there are growing tensions between the Serbian government and the UNMIK about the situation of the Serbian minority and the future status of Kosovo. Lately, Serbian PM →Živković pointed out that he regards Kosovo still being a part of Serbia, while Albanians and UNMIK actually are promoting a future independence.

KRAJINA Region in Croatia and partly Bosnia inhabited by a majority of Serbs. From 1941 to 1944, the KRAJINA was part of the Croatian state →NDH and the Serbian population became subject to persecution by Croats. After Croatia proclaimed its independence in 1991, a SERBIAN REPUBLIC OF KRAJINA was proclaimed. Unlike the Serbian actions for example in Srebrenica, the atrocities of Croats against Serbs were hardly mentioned by Western media. In a military offensive in August 1995, hundreds of thousands of Serbs were expelled from KRAJINA.

LABRIS Group for lesbian human rights, founded in 1995, emerged from the gay and lesbian lobby group ARKADIJA, which was formed in 1990. LABRIS is a women's organization supporting women who love women – aiming to strengthen their lesbian identity and self-image, and also supporting the right to a lesbian existence in society. In 2001, LABRIS got its own office for the first time.

[www.womenngo.org.yu/labris/sajt/english/site/the_index.htm]

LABUS, MIROLJUB President of the →G17 Plus. Common candidate of →DOS in the 2002 Serbian presidential elections. LABUS got 27 per cent of the votes at the first ballot [Second after →Koštunica] and 30 per cent at the second ballot. Today, LABUS is one of the strongest opponents of the

Serbian-Montenegrin union in Serbia.

LEAGUE OF COMMUNISTS IN YUGOSLAVIA [LCY] –

[SAVEZ KOMUNISTA JUGOSLAVIJE, SKJ], Founded in 1919, the party became the state ruling communist party in 1945. It followed the organizational pattern of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union until 1952, when Tito's policy turned away from Stalin's. A process of reducing direct party authority in society began and the name of the party was changed into LEAGUE OF COMMUNISTS OF YUGOSLAVIA in order to distinguish it from the other East European Communist parties. Starting from 1966, clashes and sometimes even an open rebellion of regional party sections (in Croatia, Serbia and Slovenia) somewhat weakened the LCY. Initiating the breakup of Yugoslavia, the LCY proclaimed its own dissolution in January 1990. The LEAGUE OF COMMUNISTS IN SERBIA [LCS] merged into the →SOCIALIST PARTY OF SERBIA [SPS], which was founded in July 1990.

LEGIJA [MILORAD LUKOVIĆ] Luković got his nickname through his service at the FRENCH FOREIGN LEGION during the 1980s. In the beginning of the 90s he joined the SERBIAN VOLUNTEER GUARD OR TIGERS of ČARAKA. Having the »recommendation« of this job, Luković became commander of the RED BERETS special unit in 1997. In a meeting with ZORAN →ĐINĐIĆ shortly before the mass protests on October 5, 2000, LEGIJA promised the nonintervention of the special forces and since then seemed to be under ĐINĐIĆ's protection. Today, LEGIJA is the suspected mastermind behind the assassination of ĐINĐIĆ, who just before had announced to finally smash the organized crime.

MAROVIĆ, SVETOZAR President of the state →SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO since its foundation in February 2003.

Montenegrin politician, former President of Montenegrin Parliament, close ally of MILO ĐUKANOVIĆ.

MILOŠEVIĆ, SLOBODAN Born 1941, member of the Communists party since 1958. Supported by IVAN →STAMBOLIĆ, Milošević succeeded him as Secretary General of the LEAGUE OF COMMUNISTS OF SERBIA in 1987. In two famous speeches at Kosovo Polje in Kosovo in 1987 and 1989, he was addressing the Serbian nation. His political strategy – whether it was intrinsic nationalistic or he used it as a means to reassure his power – was drawing on the nationalistic MEMORANDUM published by the →SERBIAN ACADEMY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES in 1986. In 1990, Milošević became the first president of Serbia elected in democratic elections since World War I, after which he pressed ahead with the nationalization of Serbia by abolishing the autonomy of →Kosovo and →Vojvodina and founding the →SPS. After being reelected in 1992, Milošević appointed members of his clientele

most tragic way.

ĐUKANOVIĆ, MILO Long-time official of the LEAGUE OF COMMUNISTS OF MONTENEGRO, which was transformed into the DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF SOCIALISTS in the beginning of the 1990s. ĐUKANOVIĆ became prime minister of Montenegro in 1990 and was an ally of →Milošević. After 1996, he sought to build up his image as modernizer, maintaining contacts with Serbian opposition leaders like →ĐINĐIĆ. In 1998, ĐUKANOVIĆ was elected president of Montenegro, his faithfully FILIP VUJANović became prime minister. In November 2002, ĐUKANOVIĆ became prime minister of Montenegro again, while VUJANović was elected president in May 2003. Actually, Montenegro can be said is the only former republic of the →SFRY, in which the political elite has not changed at all in the last 15 years, although there have been some clashes between a Milošević-orientated and a independent Montenegrin way within the Socialist party. Today, ĐUKANOVIĆ as well as VUJANović support the complete separation of Montenegro from Serbia.

DOS see →DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION OF SERBIA.

DS see →DEMOCRATIC PARTY.

DSS see →DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF SERBIA.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA [FRY] The FRY was formed in April 1992 after the disintegration of the SOCIALIST FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA [SFRY]. It consisted of Serbia [including the regions Vojvodina and Kosovo] and Montenegro. The FRY was not acknowledged by the EU member states until 1996 and other states, including the US, did not acknowledge the state until 2000. Since 1999, Kosovo is an international protectorate controlled by UNMIK. In February 2003, the FRY was transformed into the State of SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO [SCG].

FRY see FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA.

GAVRILOVIĆ, ŽARKO Influential Serbian cleric. First joined the SPO and then formed the SERBIAN SAINT SAVA PARTY [SRPSKA SVETOSAVSKA STRANKA – SSS], defined by him as a »movement for spiritual rebirth«, i.e. the fight against Jews, Islam and Roman Catholicism. In the last years, GAVRILOVIĆ was mainly attracting attention by publicly making heavy anti-Semitic remarks.

GAYTEN LGBT Gay group promoting Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) Human Rights. The group emerged from the gay and lesbian lobby group ARKADIJA founded in May 2001. GAYTEN LGBT is providing support and advice for gays, running the weekly radio show called GAYMING and together with other LGBT groups involved in campaigns against homophobia. [www.gayserbia.com/gayten_lgbt/index.jsp]

G17 PLUS Founded in August 1999, president: MIROLJUB

→LABUS. G17 Plus followed from G17, which had been founded two years before, being not a political party, but rather a group of independent economists lead by MLAĐAN ĐINKIĆ. G17 opposed Milošević and strived for democracy, market reforms, and contacts with Western Europe. Today, G17 Plus sees itself as a political party advocating the following fundamental program principles: liberties of all citizens, decentralization, democracy, private property and market economy. [www.G-17Plus.org.yu/english/index.html]

GSS see →CIVIC ALLIANCE OF SERBIA.

ICTY [INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA]. The so-called Hague Tribunal was established by the UN Security Council in 1993 in the face of the cruelties in the wars in the former Yugoslavia since 1991. By now, mostly defendants from Serbia have been taken to court, among them the former presidents of Serbia, SLOBODAN MILOŠEVić and MILAN →MILUTINović. In 2003, Serbian right-wing leader VOJISLAV ŠEŠELJ gave himself up to the ICTY. Politicians in Serbia were much more forced to cooperate with the ICTY as their colleagues in Croatia or Bosnia. The two men most wanted by the ICTY are still Bosnian Serbs RADOVAN →KARADžić and RATKO →MLADIĆ. [www.un.org/icty/]

KARADžić, RADOVAN Serbian poet and psychiatrist, founding member and president of the SERBIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY [SDS], the main political party of Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1992, KARADžić became president of the Bosnian Serb administration in Pale and thereby commander of the Bosnian Serb army. He is charged for leading the slaughter of thousands of Bosnian Muslims and Croats and has been indicted by the →ICTY, for the killing of up to 6,000 Muslims at Srebrenica and for the siege and shelling of Sarajevo. KARADžić went into hiding and became some kind of martyr for Serbian radical nationalists.

KOŠTUNICA, VOJISLAV – Former lecturer in law at Belgrade university. As a non-communist dissident he was excluded from university in 1975. He is leading the DSS since its breakup with DS in 1992. In September 2000, Koštunica was the common candidate of the →DOS-alliance at the presidential elections. From October 5, 2000, when →Milošević finally resigned, until the end of the state of Yugoslavia in February 2003, he was the state president. In the recent years, there have been some power struggles between Koštunica and →ĐINĐIĆ, going as far as ĐINĐIĆ calling for a boycott of the Serbian presidential elections in 2002, which most promising candidate Koštunica was. At the first ballot, Koštunica got 31 % of the votes, and 66 % in the second ballot. Both ballots had to be repeated due to poor turnout. The second series of ballots, Koštunica getting 58 %

Founded in 1994, the CCAB is »dedicated to contribute to development of new cultural policy in Serbia« [CCAB website]. The CCAB promotes arts & culture production in Serbia, organizes exhibitions, conferences, presentations, screenings, lectures and publishes books and publications on art and media theory. The Center is also sponsoring the magazine →PRELOM. [<http://www.dijafragma.com/>]

CHETNICS In World War II, Serbian royalist nationalists called themselves ČETNICI. Under the command of DRAŠA MIHAJLOVIĆ, they fought against the German WEHRMACHT and Croatian →USTAŠA. Later, there were also fights with the communist partisans and some Chetnics actually collaborated with the Germans. In 1946, MIHAJLOVIĆ was sentenced to death. Both CHETNICS and USTAŠA were forbidden in former Yugoslavia. In the 1990s, some Serbian paramilitary groups in the wars against Bosnia and Croatia called themselves CHETNICS again.

CIVIC ALLIANCE OF SERBIA – [GRAĐANSKI SAVEZ SRBIJE, GSS]. Founded in 1989 and formally registered in June 1992, the CIVIC ALLIANCE used to be a group of intellectuals and students rather than a political party, opposing the prevailing nationalistic and pro-war attitudes in Serbia. During the Bosnian war, many party members opposed the Serbian intervention and were involved in the CENTER FOR ANTIWAR ACTION [CAA], which has been founded in 1991. In 1996, the GSS split into a social democratic wing under Žarko Korac (now with the SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC UNION) and a liberal wing led by VESNA PEŠIĆ. The CIVIC ALLIANCE since then changed into a liberal party, but still a small social-democratic groups exists within the party. Since March 1999, GORAN SVILANOVIĆ is the new party president. GSS joined ZAJEDNO in 1996 and DOS in 2000, but is no longer a major political factor in Serbia. [<http://www.gradjanskisavez.org.yu/>]

DEMOCRATIC PARTY – [DEMOKRATSKA STRANKA, DS] Founded in December 1989, president: ZORAN →ĐINĐIĆ († 2003). The DS was taking part in elections already in 1993. The party could be called moderately nationalistic, but overall democratic. The DS was never pacifist during the Bosnian war as it advocated an intervention in favor of the secessionist Bosnian Serbs. In 1996, DS joined the ZAJEDNO-coalition, but after the climax of the 1996 winter demonstrations against →MILOŠEVIĆ's refusal to accept the local election results, disagreements between →SPO-leader DRAŠKOVIĆ and DS-leader ĐINĐIĆ became insurmountable and the coalition broke up. After the NATO intervention in 1999, the DS called for reforms and the ouster of MILOŠEVIĆ. DS became the most important party within the democratic opposition in Serbia and is now the largest party in the governing

→DOS-coalition. DS stays in close contact to social democratic parties all over Europe and applied for membership in the SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL. [www.demokratska.org.yu/]

DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF SERBIA [DEMOKRATSKA STRANKA SRBIJE, DSS] Founded in July 1992, president: VOJISLAV

→KOŠTUNICA. DSS split from the DS and chose to stay outside the ZAJEDNO coalition in 1996, while shifting more and more to the right in its political orientation. Today, the DSS is a conservative nationalistic party advocating liberal economic ideas. In 2000, the DSS joined the →DOS-coalition and KOŠTUNICA as its common candidate became President of Yugoslavia. Due to clashes between KOŠTUNICA and ĐINĐIĆ mainly about the extradition of MILOŠEVIĆ, the DSS was excluded from DOS in 2002. [www.dss.org.yu/index.asp]

DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION OF SERBIA [DEMOKRATSKA OPOZICIJA SRBIJE, DOS], coalition of 18 parties formed in

2000 in order to end MILOŠEVIĆ's presidency of FR YUGOSLAVIA. On October 5, 2000, the DOS candidate and DSS leader VOJISLAV KOŠTUNICA became President of Yugoslavia and DOS became the ruling party in the Serbian parliament as well with →DS leader ĐINĐIĆ being Prime Minister. Increasing power struggles between ĐINĐIĆ and KOŠTUNICA culminated in July 2002 in the DSS being excluded from DOS in July 2002. At the 2002 presidential elections, DOS even nominated an own candidate [LABUS] against KOŠTUNICA. [www.dos.org.yu/]

ĐINĐIĆ, ZORAN Born in 1952 in Bosnia, ĐINĐIĆ studied philosophy in Belgrade. He was a member of the PRAXIS GROUP and got arrested in 1974. He continued his studies and graduated in Germany (one of his professors was Jürgen Habermas). In 1994 he became leader of the DEMOCRATIC PARTY, even then regarded by some as a kind of Serbian Kennedy. After the local elections and mass demonstrations in 1996, ĐINĐIĆ became mayor of Belgrade, but was overthrown again a couple of months later, when the ZAJEDNO-coalition broke up. He was a key figure in the forming of the DOS-alliance and after the presidential elections in September 2000, it has been him to make a deal with LEGIJA. ĐINĐIĆ was loved by politicians in the West. In January 2001, he became prime minister of Serbia. Still drawing on his close contacts to the West [especially to Germany], he enforced major neo-liberal reforms in Serbia, getting less and less popular in public opinion. Soon, he fell out with Yugoslav president KOŠTUNICA and together with Montenegrin Prime Minister MILO ĐUKANOVİĆ, he worked on the dissolution of the →FRY. In spite of his low popularity, his assassination on March 12, 2003 shocked people in Serbia as well as elsewhere. The image of the »Serbian Kennedy« came true in a

GLOSSARY

Serbian special characters:

š = sh (like in shame)

Đ đ = dj (like in fridge)

ć = tsh (somewhere between the th of chalk and tu in tune)

č = tsh (hard like in church)

ž = j (like in pleasure)

ANEM ASSOCIATION OF INDEPENDENT ELECTRONIC MEDIA

[Asocijacija NEZAVISNIH ELEKTRONSKIH MEDIJA] initiated among others by B92. Today, ANEM consists of 32 news broadcast companies, that is, 28 radio and 16 TV stations. The current aims of the association are professionalization of media, legal help and technical support. The overall goal is »that stations become profitable, respecting professional and educational standards without losing the quality of program«. [<http://www.anem.org.yu/anemnews/indexEn.jsp>]

ASTRA [ANTI SEX TRAFFICKING ACTION]

Women Project against sex-trafficking initiated by →AWIN in April 2000. ASTRA's work consists of media campaigns, regional networking, assistance to victims of trafficking [SOS hotline], research, organizing workshops, etc.

[<http://www.astra.org.yu/>]

AVNOJ ANTI-FASCIST COUNCIL OF NATIONAL LIBERATION OF YUGOSLAVIA [ANTIFAŠISTIČKO VJEĆE NARODNOG OSLOBODENJA JUGOSLAVIJE]

Organization founded 1942, which functioned as the parliament of the Partisan movement. On November 29, 1943 [Still Republic Day in Serbia] AVNOJ actually formed a provisional government under the command of Josip Broz Tito and determined shape and structure of the new Yugoslavian state.

ARKAN [KELJKO RAZNATOVIC]

In the 1980s known as bank-robber all over Western Europe, ARKAN later became the symbol for the privatization of executive state power during the wars of the 1990s. In 1990 he founded the private TIGERS a.k.a. SERBIAN VOLUNTEER GUARD [SDG] – a name taken from Serbian fascists collaborating with the German GESTAPO in WWII. Its members were recruited among RED STAR BELGRADE hooligans. In Croatia and Bosnia the SDG mainly did the »dirty work«, i.e. the expulsion of Croat and Muslim population etc. After the wars, ARKAN was regarded as a national hero in Serbia, but got shot in January 2000. In 2003, the police arrested lots of people still connected to the TIGERS, including ARKAN's widow CECA.

AWIN ASSOCIATION OF WOMEN INITIATIVES [ASOCIJACIJA ZA ŽENSKE INICIJATIVU, AŽIN]

AWIN is a long-term project with the primary aim to improve quality of women's lives. That

means to help women to organize their lives better and to improve their status in private, family, professional, political and public spheres of life. AWIN is a non-hierarchical project aimed at all women, regardless of their social status, education, religion etc. The main projects of AWIN are Women's Movement – Women's Network, the INFORMATIVE DOCUMENTARY CENTER [INDOC] and the different women initiatives. [<http://www.awin.org.yu/english/news2.html>]

B92

Founded in 1989, not only a radio station, but also as a center of subculture in Belgrade and for many years regarded as the voice of the opposition in Serbia. B92 was publishing books, CDs and movies, organizing concerts, served as an internet provider and ran the cultural center CINEMA REX. Supported by Western →NGOs [e.g. the FUND FOR AN OPEN SOCIETY] and cooperating with Western Media [e.g. BBC and RADIO FREE EUROPE], B92 went through several phases of state repression during the MILOŠEVIĆ era. During the NATO-bombing in 1999, B92 was taken over by the state and afterwards broadcasted temporarily as B92-2. Today, there's a radio and a TV-program, plus lots of other cultural activities organized by B92. [<http://www.b92.net/>]

BELGRADE CIRCLE [BEOGRADSKI KRUG, BK]

Association of intellectuals, founded in 1992 in opposition to the war in Bosnia. Led by MILADIN ŽIVOTIĆ who died in 1997, the circle held weekly meetings which became a center for sharp criticism of the state propaganda and nationalistic intellectuals. After the Dayton peace agreement in 1995, the circle lost importance, but still published books like the →OTHER SERBIA and had contacts with many intellectuals in Europe and America. [<http://www.usm.maine.edu/~bcj/>]

BELGRADE WOMEN'S STUDIES CENTER

Alternative, interdisciplinary educational project founded in 1992 by anti-war-activists within the Yugoslav women's movement. The WSC is offering a one-year certificate program, open lectures, workshops and a library serving as a research center. The center deals not only with feminist theory, but also with different approaches of political, cultural and social sciences, mostly concerning processes of dominance and exclusion. Currently, the center is financed by the major →NGOs HEINRICH BÖLL STIFTUNG and FUND FOR AN OPEN SOCIETY. [<http://www.zenskestudie.edu.yu/>]

CECA [SVETLANA VELICKOVIC]

On of the most famous TURBOFOLK singers, widow of ARKAN. During the state of emergency in Serbia in spring 2003, CECA got arrested when the police found loads of weapons in her house in Zemun. In May 2003, she was reported to offer her family villa – valued at several million euros – as bond for her release from prison.

CENTER FOR CONTEMPORARY ART BELGRADE [CCAB]

DER AUSNAHMEZUSTAND

Einige Tage nach Đinđić's Tod befanden sich an sämtlichen Hauswänden, Türen und Müllcontainern in Belgrad Sticker mit der Aufschrift ›Dosta Zločina! Građani i Građanke Srbije‹ (›Schluss mit der Gewalt! Die Bürger und Bürgerinnen Serbiens‹), die von FRAUEN IN SCHWARZ entworfen und verbreitet worden waren. Die Regierung war jedoch schon längst dazu übergegangen, die Mafia auszuschalten.

Ich habe Zweifel, ob der am 12. März ausgerufene Ausnahmezustand, der bis Ende April dauerte, lediglich der Verbrechensbekämpfung nützt. Die Versammlungs- und Pressefreiheit waren massiv beschnitten: die Zeitung ›Nacional‹, die sich nicht an die Regierungsline zum Tode Đinđić's hielt, sondern ihre eigene Meinung zu seinem Tode publizierte, wurde verboten. Mehrere tausend Menschen, darunter ›Ceca‹, Witwe des Paramilitärs ›Arkan‹ und Turbofolk-Sängerin mit guten Kontakten zum Zemun-Clan und einem riesigen Waffenarsenal in ihrem Haus, wurden verhaftet. Ihnen war es nicht erlaubt, eineN AnwältIn oder die Öffentlichkeit zu kontaktieren. Ebenso habe ich die Vermutung, dass der Ausnahmezustand eher dem Ausschalten der Opposition diente, da sich unter den Verhafteten auch unbequeme Linke befanden.

Der Ausnahmezustand wurde gleichfalls dadurch sichtbar, dass in der ganzen Stadt Gruppen von maskierten, mit Maschinenpistolen ausgerüsteten und in Tarnfarben gekleideten Polizisten, die sich äußerlich nicht von Soldaten unterschieden, postiert waren: am Platz der Republik, an der Brücke zwischen Belgrad und Novi Beograd, auf der Autobahn und an anderen zentralen Stellen. Die Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu verschärfen wäre tatsächlich bereits nach dem versuchten Attentat auf Đinđić am 21. Februar sinnvoller gewesen. An jenem Tag hatte ein LKW-Fahrer versucht, Đinđić's Auto von der Autobahn abzudrängen. Der LKW-Fahrer behauptete, lediglich Probleme mit seinem Auto gehabt zu haben und außer einer gefälschten Fahrerlaubnis konnte ihm nichts nachgewiesen werden. Da er Mitglied des Zemun-Clans war, die auch damals schon als mafiose Gruppe bekannt war und gute Kontakte zu Regierungskreisen unterhielt, wurde er nach kurzer Zeit wieder frei gelassen – durch Bestechung. Đinđić

erfreute dies weniger und er hatte angeblich Pläne, Teile seiner Bodyguards, denen er misstraute, auszutauschen - aber dazu kam es nicht mehr.

Möglicherweise ist der Ausnahmezustand aber auch Folge eines schlechten Gewissens, da der Attentatsversuch im Februar nicht ernst genug genommen wurde. Wen ich auch fragte, erhielt ich zur Antwort, dass nun endlich einmal hart durchgegriffen werden müsse, um die mafiosen Strukturen, die sich unter Milošević herausgebildet hatten, zu zerschlagen. Wieso dies nicht längst geschehen sei, fragte ich und erhielt zur Antwort, dass Gruppen wie der Zemun-Clan schwer bewaffnet seien und jeder vor ihnen Angst habe und nun endlich der Zeitpunkt gekommen sei, gegen sie vorzugehen, da sie teilweise abgetaucht seien. Ich frage mich jedoch, ob angesichts der Tatsache, dass Đinđić einen Deal mit Legija hatte, der ebenfalls dem Zemun-Clan angehört, das harte Durchgreifen vor dem Attentat überhaupt erwünscht war. Im Oktober 2000 vereinbarte Đinđić mit Legija, dass ihnen keine Konsequenzen nach einem Regierungswechsel drohten, wenn sie es unterließen, auf die DemonstrantInnen zu schießen.

Als Außenstehende und Reisende kann ich diese Geschehnisse nur kommentieren und meine Zweifel daran äußern, dass nach Milošević alles besser wurde. Beunruhigend finde ich die plötzliche Verbesserung der deutsch-serbischen Beziehungen seit 2000, die auf der ökonomischen Abhängigkeit Serbiens basiert, den fortschreitende Sozialabbau und den militärisch-klerikal-royalistischen Kurswechsel der postsozialistischen Regierung.

Claudia Lichnofsky

Sehr interessanter Artikel zum Thema:

www.buko.info/buko26/texte/tx_jugoslawien.html



Der Bezug auf das serbische Königreich ist durch die jetzige Regierung wieder hoffähig geworden. Unter Đinđić und Draško ković, die schon während der Amtszeit Milošević Bürgermeister Belgrads waren, bekamen viele Straßennamen Belgrads, die Assoziationen zur kommunistischen Zeit weckten, royalistische Namen (aus dem ›Revolutionsboulevard‹ wurde der ›Boulevard des Königs Alexander‹, aus der ›Proletarischen Brigade‹ wurde die ›Kronenstraße‹, aus der ›Straße des 7. Juli‹ wurde die ›Straße des Königs Peter, etc.). Milošević hatte diesen Bruch auch schon eingeleitet - entgegen der Annahme, er sei der Nachfolger Titos - und änderte die ›Tito-Straße‹ in ›Straße der serbischen Herrscher‹, die später von den demokratischen Bürgermeistern in ›Straße des Königs Milan‹ umbenannt wurde. Der sozialistische Stern auf dem serbischen Parlamentsgebäude wurde kurz vor Đinđić's Tod entfernt, während der alte sozialistische Stern auf der Staatsflagge von Milošević Anfang der 90er entfernt wurde, was als ein Beweis seines Bruches mit dem sozialistischen Jugoslawien gedeutet werden kann.

VERÄNDERUNGEN NACH DEM 5. OKTOBER 2000

Seit der Aufhebung des Embargos kann mit Kreditkarten gezahlt werden und die Touristin ist nicht mehr verwirrt ob der unterschiedlichen Wechselkurse auf der Straße und in den Wechselstuben. Auch im Straßenbild Belgrads hat sich einiges seit 2000 verändert: Nicht nur neues Geld wurde gedruckt und Geschäftshäuser neu gebaut, auch öffentliches Straßenland wurde privatisiert, was zur Folge hat, dass Autos, die ohne Parkschein am Straßenrand stehen, abgeschleppt werden. Das Land hat sich dem Tourismus geöffnet, es gibt neue Broschüren über sehenswerte Gebäude und einige Museen (z.B. das Ethnografische Museum) erhielten eine Aufwertung durch neue Ausstellungen. Das Museum des 25. Mai (Revolutionsmuseum) wurde in Museum der jugoslawischen Geschichte umbenannt, aber außer in einem Raum, in dem temporäre Kunstaustellungen ohne Bezug auf Geschichte stattfinden, sind alle Räume leer und das Gebäude wird ab und zu als Veranstaltungsort für Theaterstücke benutzt. Die Ausstellungsräume auf dem Areal von Titos Grab sind nicht mehr zu-

gänglich, lediglich das ›Blumenhaus‹, das den Grabstein beinhaltet, ist jeden Tag für einige Stunden geöffnet. Mag es für TouristInnen einfacher geworden sein, haben die Wirtschafts-Reformen für die Bevölkerung eher Nachteile. Sie führten zu einem massiven Abbau des Sozialstaats, zu hoher Arbeitslosigkeit und ungesicherten Arbeitsverhältnissen (siehe Artikel zu AWIN) sowie zur Privatisierung von Betrieben.

ĐINĐIĆ UND DEUTSCHLAND

Er war das Lieblingskind der deutschen Sozialdemokratie, hatte Anfang der 80er bei Habermas im Zweitstudium studiert, nachdem er in Konstanz zu »Marx kritischer Theorie der Gesellschaft und das Problem der Basis« promoviert hatte. Đinđić war Mitglied der Praxis-Gruppe gewesen, eines oppositionellen Intellektuellen-Zirkels in den 70ern, der sich auf die Kritische Theorie bezog und internationale Sommerschulen auf der kroatischen Insel Korčula abhielt. Aus den 70ern, und vor allem aus der Zeit seines Studienaufenthalts in Deutschland, kennt er Joseph Fischer und einige andere aus der Neuen Linken der 60er.

Diese Kontakte waren für Đinđić und die ›demokratische Opposition‹ sehr nützlich. So konnte sich Đinđić sicher sein, dass seine Wahlkampagne von deutschen, sozialdemokratischen Stiftungen unterstützt wird. Deutschland setzte sich für finanzielle Unterstützung der EU für Serbien ein - im Austausch für die Auslieferung Miloševićs nach Den Haag. Vergessen ist die NATO-Bombardierung und die anti-serbische Politik Deutschlands. Stattdessen wird in Serbien die Verantwortung für Embargo und Bombardierung aufs ferne Amerika projiziert.

Ein Zitat aus einer Rede Đinđićs nach dem ersten Attentatsversuch im Februar 2003, in der er versicherte, die Reformen würden weitergehen und niemand solle denken, durch Attentate könne man diesen Weg verhindern, wurde – samt Foto – in massenhafter Auflage gedruckt und auf seinem Beerdigungsmarsch von den Menschenmengen als Zeichen dessen getragen, dass Serbien den Weg nach Europa weitergehen wolle.



Anteilnahme und der staatlichen Zeremonie, welche mich an die Trauerfeier für Queen Mum in London erinnerte oder vielleicht mit dem Tod Lady Dianas zu vergleichen ist. Auf mich als Außenstehende machte es den Eindruck, dass jemand, der von allen geliebt wurde, gestorben sei. So verwunderte es mich auch nicht, dass sich Einige an den Tod Titos erinnert fühlten.

DER SERBISCHE KENNEDY

Auf meiner Reise nach Belgrad, im März 2003, stellte ein Ereignis für kurze Zeit jedes andere Ereignis für die Bevölkerung in den Schatten: die Ermordung des Premierministers Zoran Đinđić durch den Zemun-Clan am 12. März 2003. Über Tage hinweg gab es kein anderes Gesprächsthema.

LIEBLING ĐINĐIĆ

Tagelang standen Menschenmengen Tag und Nacht Schlange vor dem serbischen Regierungsgebäude und dem Parteisitz der Demokratischen Partei, um sich in die Kondolenzbücher einzutragen. Vom Tag der Ermordung bis zum Tag der Beerdigung waren drei Tage der Trauer ausgerufen und sämtliche Versammlungen, Sport- und Musikveranstaltungen abgesagt worden. Kinos und Theater waren geschlossen, im Fernsehen und Radio wurde nichts anderes gezeigt und gespielt als klassische Musik, Bilder aus dem Leben Đinđićs und Übertragungen der Trauerveranstaltungen. Am Tage der Beerdigung wurde diese im Fernsehen in einer Endlos-Schleife wiederholt.

Verständlicherweise ist die Ermordung eines Premierministers ein großer Schock, da sie deutlich macht, wie einfach sich Banden ihrer Feinde entledigen können und wie machtlos die Regierung ist. Ich war zunächst beeindruckt von der großen

So beliebt, wie es sich nach seinem Tode darstellte, waren Đinđić und seine Partei jedoch längst nicht mehr: Labus, der DOS-Kandidat für die Präsidentschaftswahlen, hatte lediglich ein Drittel der Stimmen erhalten. Dabei hat Đinđić sich recht undemokratischer Mittel bedient, die von aller Welt verurteilt worden wären, hätte sie Milošević durchgeführt: Nachdem sich abzeichnete, dass Labus bei den Präsidentschaftswahlen 2002 das nötige Quorum von 50% erreichen würde, sagte er nach zwei Wahlgänge kurzerhand alle weiteren ab und verschob sie auf unbestimmte Zeit. Koštunica's DSS wurde vor der Wahl aus dem Parteienbündnis DOS ausgeschlossen und die Plätze mit anderen DOS-KandidatInnen besetzt.

SERBIEN UND DER KÖNIG

Die Trauerfeier fand im größten orthodoxen Tempel Europas statt, der offiziell noch nicht in Betrieb genommen ist, obwohl er – mit Unterbrechungen – seit 100 Jahren gebaut wird, und so wurde das eingerüstete Gebäude, das zur Zeit mit weißen Marmorplatten versehen wird, innen notdürftig für die Zeremonie dekoriert. Zur Trauerfeier erschienen alle berühmten Persönlichkeiten inklusive des Königs Alexander II aus dem Hause Karađorđević, Sohn des Königs Petar II, der 1941 ins Exil gegangen war. Karađorđević kehrte im Jahre 2000 aus dem Londoner Exil nach Serbien zurück und wohnt seitdem im sogenannten ›weißen Palast‹, dem Sitz des früheren Präsidenten Milošević, da es sich seiner Ansicht nach hierbei um Eigentum des Königshauses handele.



»If somebody thinks to stop the enforcement of laws and reforms by removing me, then they are awfully mistaken, because I'm not the system«



cher Bezugspunkt ist die soziale Frage – zum Beispiel die hohe Arbeitslosigkeit in Jugoslawien, wobei der Fokus dar- auf liegt, Arbeitslose für sich selbst sprechen zu lassen und sie nicht zu funktionalisieren.

Die INITIATIVE FOR ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY, die Teil des Bündnisses ist, sieht Demokratie am Arbeitsplatz als Ausgangspunkt anarchistischer Arbeit in den prekären Beschäftigungsverhältnissen, wie sie auch in Serbien seit 2000 eingeführt wurden, nicht verwirklicht. Stattdessen bezieht sich die Initiative eher auf die Arbeiterselbstverwaltung im ehemaligen Jugoslawien.

ANOTHER WORLD IS POSSIBLE stellt sich außerdem gegen die paternalistische Kampagne von OXFAM, die in ganz Belgrad Plakate mit dem Slogan »Rom heißt Mensch« verbreitet. Denn schließlich könne es keinen Zweifel daran geben, dass Roma Menschen sind, was sollten sie sonst sein? Es ginge darum, den Rassismus, dem Roma tagtäglich ausgesetzt sind, aufzuzeigen und eine Zusammenarbeit – anstelle von Stellvertreterpolitik – zu entwickeln. Dazu kooperiert ANOTHER WORLD IS POSSIBLE mit dem EMIGRATIVE ART COLLECTIVE, welches sich mit Globalisierung und Flüchtlingen beschäftigt, Filme und Magazine publiziert und Kontakte zu dem Publizisten Boris Buden (Wien) und der

Filmmemacherin und Autorin Hito Steyerl (Berlin) pflegt. Das EMIGRATIVE ART COLLECTIVE will mit Roma zusammen ein Theaterstück produzieren, um auf deren Situation und rassistische Diskriminierung aufmerksam zu machen.

Ein weiteres Politikfeld von Awip ist die Arbeit mit Flüchtlingen, größtenteils SerbInnen aus Bosnien und der → Krajina. Die Situation in Serbien ist für Flüchtlinge und MigrantInnen anders als z.B. in Deutschland, da sie nicht als AusländerInnen gelten (auch wenn nicht alle einen serbisch-montenegrinischen Pass besitzen). Migration findet also hauptsächlich innerhalb des ehemaligen Jugoslawiens statt, eine Ausnahme bilden etwa 40.000 MigrantInnen aus China.

Die Solidarität von Awip gilt auch den Deserteuren und perspektivisch ist eine Kampagne mit diesen gegen das Militär und für die Möglichkeit der Kriegsdienstverweigerung (Zivildienst) geplant. Bislang gibt es nur einen Ersatzdienst innerhalb des Militärs (sic!).

Awip hat verschiedene Demos und Konzerte in Solidarität mit dem Aufstand in Argentinien organisiert, da es die ökonomische Situation in Argentinien mit der Serbiens vergleichbar findet. Die Dezember-Ausgabe (2002) ihrer Zeitschrift beschäftigte sich aus diesem Grund mit der Krise und dem Widerstand in Argentinien. Globalisierung sei ein brennendes Thema, da die Abhängigkeit der serbischen Ökonomie von transnationalen Konzernen desaströse Verhältnisse für die arbeitende Bevölkerung zur Folge habe. Das Bündnis definiert sich aber nicht als Anti- Globalisierungsgruppe, sondern als Alter-Globalisierungsgruppe (engl.: to alter = ändern), da es für eine Globalisierung von unten ist und sich nicht auf Nationalstaaten beziehen möchte, aber die Globalisierung von Konzernen ebenfalls kritisch sieht.



ANOTHER WORLD IS POSSIBLE

Besuch beim Plenum des Belgrader Bündnisses ›Another world is possible‹ (AWIP)

Aufgrund der knappen Zeit, bedingt durch unseren sehr spontanen Besuch ihres Bündnistreffens und der Kommunikation mit hauptsächlich einer Person des Bündnisses, blieben viele Fragen offen. So können wir an dieser Stelle lediglich einen kurzen Einblick in ihre Arbeit geben.

Erst mal kommt uns die Welt, die wir hier betreten, sehr bekannt vor. Das Plenum von ANOTHER WORLD IS POSSIBLE, an dem wir teilhaben können und wo wir einige Fragen loswerden, gibt es seit November 2002: als libertäres Bündnis verschiedener Politgruppen, die sich der globalisierungskritischen Bewegung angeschlossen haben, eine Runde mit internationalen Kontakten und Bezügen, die lokal Politik gegen Rassismus und Kapitalismus macht. Einige definieren sich als AnarchistInnen, andere explizit nicht. AWIP ist in das PEOPLE's GLOBAL ACTION-Netzwerk eingebunden und gibt eine kleine Zeitschrift heraus.

Das Bündnis agiert unabhängig und distanziert sich von

größeren →NGOs, die finanziell und politisch abhängig von ausländischen Organisationen arbeiten. Die Kritik an NGOs zeigt sich auch daran, dass AWIP das Konzept des →»Anderen Serbiens« - ein von lokalen NGOs während der Zeit → Milošević's geprägter Begriff, der sich sowohl von Milošević als auch von den oppositionellen Parteien (→ DS, →SPO, →GSS) abgrenzte - ablehnt. Das Bündnis richtet sich gegen den Hegemonieanspruch einiger NGOs, z.B. des → BELGRADER KREISES, die sich als die Alternative zu Milošević und der Opposition darstellten. Ein weiterer Kritikpunkt an NGOs ist, dass einige von der Notwendigkeit einer Denazifizierung Serbiens sprechen, AWIP aber der Meinung ist, dass dort, wo keine Nazis gewesen seien, auch keine Denazifizierung stattfinden könne. Sie stellen sich damit gegen einen Vergleich Milošević's mit Hitler. AWIP identifiziert sich mit neueren Aktions- und Organisationsformen von PGA (PEOPLE's GLOBAL ACTION), inhaltli-

Skinheads überfallen, die auf alle losgegangen sind, die sich dort befanden. Auch vor dem Club in Belgrad versammeln sich manchmal Skinheads und beobachten wer hinein- und herausgeht. Es ist schon vorgekommen, dass schwule Männer vom Club aus losgezogen sind, um Zigaretten zu kaufen und zusammengeschlagen wurden.

Die AktivistInnen schätzen die Situation insgesamt so ein, dass es in Serbien nur wenige Leute gibt, die den Mut haben sich für ihre Rechte zu engagieren und dass viele ihre sexuelle Orientierung nicht für ein politisches Thema halten. Auch ihre eigene Organisierung steckt ihrer Meinung nach immer noch in den Kinderschuhen. So ist es für sie nicht möglich, in mehr als einer Stadt in Serbien präsent zu sein, was sie vor allem auf das Problem von Öffentlichkeit zurückführen. Sie befinden sich in der paradoxen Situation dass, obwohl die Öffentlichkeitsarbeit ein wichtiger Fokus ihrer Arbeit ist, aus Angst vor Angriffen so gut wie niemand bereit ist, sich öffentlich zu positionieren. Inzwischen gibt es zwar zwei Schwule und eine Lesbe, die öffentlich bekannt sind (Lepa Mladenović, Psychologin im Autonomen Frauenzentrum, Attila Kovač, Filmproduzent und Dušan Maljković, Direktor des Radioprogramms Gayming), alle anderen halten sich jedoch zurück und verstecken sich. So sind die regen Aktivitäten der verschiedenen Organisationen immer noch von Angst überschattet, für die es täglich neue Anlässe gibt.

LABRIS – LESBIAN HUMAN RIGHTS GROUP

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Graffiti in der Belgrader Innenstadt: »Schwules sind ok«—es stand schon mal ein »Tote« davor...

verboten war. Hate Speech und Homophobie zogen sich durch die Medien bis hinein in die regierungstreue Presse. LABRIS-VertreterInnen zufolge waren Schwule unter Milosevic sogar auf der Liste der Staatsfeinde, denen vorgeworfen wurde gegen das Regime zu arbeiten. In dieser Zeit war die LGBT-Community immer wieder Angriffen von nationalistischen und religiösen Gruppen und Individuen ausgesetzt. Die Regierung und die verschiedenen Parteien haben dazu niemals öffentlich Stellung bezogen. Insbesondere schwule Männer wurden darüber hinaus auch immer wieder physisch angegriffen.

Mit der Wahl der demokratischen Regierung hofften viele schwul-lesbische Gruppen auf eine Verbesserung ihrer Situation. An den Angriffen und Anfeindungen hat sich jedoch nicht viel geändert, nur auf der Repräsentationsebene wird heute der schwul-lesbischen Existenz etwas mehr Aufmerksamkeit entgegengebracht. Dennoch sind viele Schwule und Lesben immer noch gezwungen ein Doppel Leben zu führen. Sie leben häufig in Isolation und Schweigen. Es gibt nur wenige AktivistInnen die mutig genug sind, ihr Gesicht in der Öffentlichkeit oder den Medien zu zeigen.

Seit dem Christopher Street Day 2001 ist die schwul-lesbische Community in Serbien zusätzlich traumatisiert. Die erste schwul-lesbische Gay Parade in Belgrad, die unter dem Motto »THERE IS SPACE FOR ALL OF US« angetreten war, und von LABRIS, GAYTEN und anderen Gruppen organisiert war, wurde brutal zusammengeschlagen. Die circa 150 Schwulen, Lesben, Tanten, Drag-Kings und ihre FreundInnen konnten sich nicht einmal auf dem Platz versammeln, von dem aus sie ihre Parade starten wollten. Sie standen einer Menge von circa 1000 GegendemonstrantInnen gegenüber, die ihre Parade tatsächlich verhindern wollte – Vertreter von Obraz, aufgebrachten Christen und Tschetniks von denen sie als Ustascha (eine kroatisch nationalistische Gruppe, die im zweiten Weltkrieg mit den deutschen Besatzern kooperierte und den →NDH-Staat gründete) beschimpft wurden. Auf die homophoben Angriffe waren die AktivistInnen am Tag der Gay Parade nicht vorbereitet gewesen. Auch die anwesenden Polizisten (anfangs nur sechs) stellten keine wirkliche Hilfe dar. So kam es zu schrecklichen Übergriffen und Misshandlungen.

Viele von denen, die sich getroffen hatten, um zu feiern (40 Personen), wurden mit schweren Verletzungen ins Krankenhaus gebracht, einige werden ihr restliches Leben dadurch beeinträchtigt sein.

Die geplante Demonstration, die erst auf so wenig öffentliches Interesse gestoßen war und einen so mangelhaften Polizeischutz erhalten hatte, wurde noch am selben Abend in den Nachrichten zum Gradmesser für den Demokratisierungsprozess in Serbien. »Wir sind noch nicht so weit« lautete die öffentliche Meinung – wofür blieb offen. Einige PolitikerInnen ließen verlauten, dass die Gesellschaft wohl noch nicht bereit sei für »diese Art der Abweichung«. Nachdem die OrganisatorInnen der Parade ihre Presseerklärungen an Menschenrechtsorganisationen in Serbien und ganz Europa verschickt und sehr aufgebrachte Briefe an den Innenminister geschrieben hatten, erhielten sie schließlich einen Brief mit einer Entschuldigung für das, was passiert war – und das Versprechen, beim nächsten Mal einen besseren Schutz bereit zu stellen. Bislang gab es jedoch kein nächstes Mal. 2002 fand kein CSD in Serbien statt und auch in diesem Jahr ist wohl eher eine private Veranstaltung geplant.

Insgesamt ist die Gewalt gegen Schwule und Lesben in Belgrad weit verbreitet, wobei Männer unmittelbarer betroffen sind. Das hat zum einen damit zu tun, dass Schwule häufig als größere Bedrohung wahrgenommen werden. Zum anderen sind Lesben, aufgrund der größeren Selbstverständlichkeit von Körperkontakt zwischen Frauen, weniger sichtbar. Für Schwule wird es daher physisch gefährlich, sobald sie sich in irgendeiner Weise in der Öffentlichkeit zu erkennen geben. Das Doppel Leben von Schwulen und Lesben in Serbien drückt sich auch darin aus, dass sie keine Möglichkeit haben zu heiraten und häufig weder an ihrem Arbeitsplatz noch in ihren Familien wirklich sicher sind. Wenn ihre sexuelle Orientierung bekannt wird, werden sie oft ausgeschlossen, beschimpft oder verlieren gar ihren Job.

In Serbien gibt es inzwischen zwei Clubs für Schwule und Lesben, einen in Belgrad und einen in Novi Sad, der Hauptstadt der als liberal geltenden Provinz Vojvodina. Der Club in Novi Sad wurde bereits einmal von Mitgliedern von Obraz und von

strahlt wird (auf Radio 2o2). Gemeinsam mit anderen Gruppen haben sie eine Ausstellung zur Verfolgung von Homosexuellen im nationalsozialistischen Deutschland und zur Situation von Schwulen in den Konzentrationslagern organisiert, verschiedene Performances – unter anderem die erste drag-queen Show VIVA LA DIVA – veranstaltet und die erste Sammlung schwul-lesbischer Aufsätze herausgegeben. Auch Gayten führt Seminare und Workshops durch. Ihre Website gehört zu den meistbesuchten serbischen Websites. Hier werden Diskussionen geführt, Kontakte geknüpft, es gibt Artikel zu Queer Theory, über queere Kunst sowie Buchrezensionen. Was angesichts der wenigen schwul-lesbischen Ausgehmöglichkeiten in Belgrad zunächst als eine gute Möglichkeit erscheint, um Kontakte zu knüpfen, kann jedoch auch leicht gefährlich werden. So kommt es vor, dass homophobe Männer die Website nutzen und Schwule über ein vermeintliches Date an abgelegene Orte locken, um sie dort zusammenzuschlagen. Deshalb ist bei den Verabredungen, wie aber eigentlich grundsätzlich im öffentlichen Raum, höchste Vorsicht geboten.

Der Queer-AK der sozialdemokratischen Jugend QUEERIA LGBT besteht seit Dezember 2000. Das Anliegen von QUEERIA ist, junge Leute in ihren Entscheidungen in Bezug auf die Wahl ihrer SexualpartnerInnen zu unterstützen – insbesondere in ihrem Kampf gegen Eltern und andere Autoritäten und in ihrem Kampf gegen gesetzliche Einschränkungen und Diskriminierungen.

Die AktivistInnen starteten im Dezember 2000 eine Medienkampagne zur Legalisierung gleichgeschlechtlicher Beziehungen [»Legalization of same sex relationships«]. Die Kampagne erwies sich zunächst als sehr erfolgreich und lief über verschiedene Medien (TV Studio B, Radio B92, etc.). Sie wurde von PolitikerInnen, KünstlerInnen, Intellektuellen und Stars kommentiert, wobei die Rezeption von Unterstützung bis Ablehnung reichte. Die serbisch-orthodoxe Kirche reagierte sehr schnell und sehr ablehnend auf diesen Vorstoß. Am 9. März 2001 stürmte eine Gruppe von Skinheads die Büroräume der Sozialdemokratischen Union, in denen sich auch der Queer-AK traf, und demolierte sie vollständig. Daraufhin

stoppte die Gruppe vorübergehend ihre Aktivitäten. Im Dezember 2001 begannen sie mit ihrer Kampagne »STOP VIOLENCE, DISCRIMINATION, HOMOPHOBIA AND UNEQUALITY«, die über Plakate in Belgrad, Novi Sad, Kraljevo, Kragujevac, Niš, Subotica and Pancevo publiziert wurde. Aktuell beteiligen sie sich insbesondere an den Aktivitäten des schwul-lesbischen Netzwerks in Serbien, haben aber mit rapidem Mitgliederschwund zu kämpfen.

II. LGBT-GRUPPEN IN EX-JUGOSLAWIEN

Die drei Gruppen koordinieren auch das bestehende Netzwerk schwul-lesbischer Gruppen in Ex-Jugoslawien. In Montenegro – so berichten sie – gab es keine Gay Groups, während sich in Bosnien im Dezember 2002 die erste schwul-lesbische Gruppe gegründet hat. In Pristina (Kosovo) gibt es nur eine informelle lesbische Gruppe, die aber demnächst eine Radioshow und eine Website einrichten wird. Und auch in Sarajewo entsteht gerade eine neue Gruppe bestehend aus LGBTs unterschiedlichster Nationalitäten. In Kroatien gab es 2002 die erste Gay Parade, an der auch der Minister für Privatisierung und einige Mitglieder des Parlaments teilgenommen haben. Aufgrund des ausreichenden Polizeischutzes, der von den VeranstalterInnen organisiert und bezahlt worden war, verlief die Parade friedlich. In Slowenien fand im selben Jahr bereits die zweite Gay Parade statt, die ebenso friedlich verlief.

III. HOMOPHOBIE FRÜHER UND HEUTE

Unter Tito und auch noch unter Milosevic war Homosexualität in Jugoslawien offiziell verboten. Ein Paragraph, der bis 1994 in Kraft war, untersagte sexuelle Handlungen zwischen Männern, wurde allerdings so gut wie nie angewandt. Er kam lediglich als zusätzliches Repressionsinstrument bei Deserteuren zum Einsatz.

Die offiziellen schwul-lesbischen Aktivitäten im früheren Jugoslawien begannen Anfang der 90er Jahre als die Plattform ARKADIJA gegründet wurde. Erst vier Jahre später konnte sich die Gruppe offiziell eintragen. Denn zu Beginn der Ära Milosevic war es für schwul-lesbische Gruppen nicht möglich sich registrieren zu lassen – auch wenn das laut Gesetz nicht

»THERE IS SPACE FOR ALL OF US!«



Bericht über ein Treffen mit der Lesben-Organisation LABRIS, der Schwulen-Organisation →GAYTEN LGBT und dem Queer-Arbeitskreis der sozialdemokratischen Jugend →QUEERIA LGBT. Über die aktuelle Situation von schwulen, lesbischen, transgender und Menschen anderer Sexualitäten in Serbien – Möglichkeiten und Grenzen schwul-lesbischer Organisierung.

Different Together Kampagne von Queeria

Nichts verweist von der Straße aus darauf, dass sich in dem einfachen Mehrfamilienhaus die Räume der Lesbenorganisation LABRIS befinden. Das wäre zu gefährlich: Homophobie ist in Serbien weit verbreitet und manifestiert sich auch tatsächlich, so dass Schwule und Lesben in Belgrad immer wieder Bedrohungen und Angriffen ausgesetzt sind.

In den Räumen von →LABRIS treffen wir, neben den Vertreterinnen von LABRIS, Mitglieder der Schwulenorganisation GAYTEN LGBT und des Arbeitskreis QUEERIA LGBT der Sozialdemokratischen Jugend. Die drei Gruppen kooperieren in verschiedenen Bereichen, haben aber zugleich ihre eigenen Schwerpunktsetzungen und Strategien. Zusammen haben sie eine Medienkampagne für die Rechte von Schwulen und Lesben organisiert, die TV-Spots, Radio-Jingles und Poster mit dem Slogan »different together« umfasst.

I. SCHWUL-LESBISCHE GRUPPEN IN BELGRAD

Die Vertreterinnen von LABRIS, einer lesbischen Menschenrechtsgruppe, die Mitte der 90er Jahre aus der schwul-lesbischen Plattform Arkadija hervorging, arbeiten auf zwei Ebenen: Sie unterstützen lesbische Frauen auf einer persönlichen Ebene darin, ihre eigene Identität zu akzeptieren und Diskrimierung und Gewalt zu entgehen (Empowerment) und machen Öffentlichkeitsarbeit. Für viele lesbische Frauen ist LABRIS die einzige Möglichkeit, Kontakt zur LGBT-Community aufzunehmen, da es kaum andere Räume (Diskotheken, Bars, etc.) für Lesben gibt. Seit Februar 2001 besitzt LABRIS eigene Räume (zuvor teilten sie sich die Räumen mit verschlie-

denen Frauengruppen) wodurch das Programm bedeutend erweitert werden konnte. Das Angebot umfasst psychologische und kreative Workshops und Trainings, kulturelle Aktivitäten und Bildungsseminare. Es werden Ausstellungen mit Bildern oder Fotografien lesbischer Frauen organisiert, Konzerte, Theater und Partys veranstaltet. Zugleich bietet LABRIS ein Informationszentrum für alle Interessierten mit einer Bibliothek und einer Videosammlung.

Auf juristischer Ebene bemühen sich die Aktivistinnen Gesetze zu erstreiten, die sich gegen Diskriminierung aufgrund sexueller Orientierung wenden. Durch Veröffentlichungen, Ausstellungen und Aktionen versuchen sie zugleich die öffentliche Meinung zu beeinflussen. Dabei geht es ihnen um die Akzeptanz lesbischer Existenz und den Kampf gegen Homophobie in der serbischen Gesellschaft. Zugleich beteiligen sie sich an Kampagnen von Frauengruppen (z.B. der Kampagne gegen Gewalt gegen Frauen) und geben Aufklärungshefte über lesbischen Sex für junge Lesben und deren Eltern heraus. Eines ihrer Ziele ist eine Coming-Out-Gruppe für jüngere Frauen zu gründen. Das Gesetz zum Schutz von Minderjährigen verbietet ihnen allerdings die Aufklärungsarbeit mit jüngeren Mädchen. Deshalb müssen sie diese an Frauengruppen verweisen, die mit Kindern und Jugendlichen arbeiten und das Infomaterial von LABRIS weitergeben.

Auch die Gruppe GAYTEN LBGT, die sich als Zentrum zur Unterstützung der Rechte sexueller Minderheiten versteht, ist aus der Plattform Arkadija hervorgegangen. Die Gruppe gibt es seit 2001, den Aktivisten ist es wichtig zu betonen, dass sie mit lesbischen, schwulen, bisexuellen und transgender Gruppen zusammenarbeiten, bei vollem Respekt der Unterschiede und Einzigartigkeiten, die in diesen Gruppen existieren. Da die Gruppe noch nicht so lange besteht, sind einige der Projekte noch in der Entwicklungsphase. Die AktivistInnen haben im Dezember 2001 die Radiosendung GAYMING ins Leben gerufen, die sich an die LGBT-Community richtet und seitdem zweimal wöchentlich ausge-

nicht, da das Reisen in den Kosovo seit dem Eingreifen der NATO 1999 nur noch in Begleitung der OSZE möglich ist.

Was nach unserem Besuch bleibt ist der Eindruck eines professionell arbeitenden Zusammenschlusses von Frauenorganisationen, der sich an verschiedenen gesellschaftlichen Brennpunkten für die Interessen von Frauen stark macht, und ein Netzwerk unterschiedlichster Kontakte – von Geschäftsfrauen bis hin zu AktivistInnen unabhängiger Gruppen – aufgebaut hat.

AWIN – ASSOCIATION OF WOMEN'S INITIATIVES

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schaften bestehen eigene Sektionen für Frauen, was jedoch nicht auf eine Initiative der Basis zurückgeht, sondern von einem internationalen Gewerkschaftszusammenschluss vorgeschrieben wurde, dem die serbischen Gewerkschaften angehören. Von den gewerkschaftlich organisierten Frauen wurde diese Idee allerdings enthusiastisch aufgenommen. Tanja erzählt, dass die neue Situation gerade für Frauen bedeute, kaum noch Jobs zu bekommen. Nach dem Zusammenbruch Jugoslawiens waren Frauen, die beispielsweise in der Textilindustrie beschäftigt waren die ersten, die ihre Jobs verloren haben. Von den 30% Unbeschäftigte in Ex-Jugoslawien sind 60% Frauen.

Zorka schildert die aktuelle Situation so, dass die Arbeitslosigkeit von Frauen mit ihrem Ausbildungsstand steige. Dazu komme, dass Frauen – wenn sie denn Arbeit hätten – schlechter bezahlt würden als ihre männlichen Kollegen. Diese Diskrepanz in der Entlohnung von Frauen und Männern erhöhe sich wiederum mit dem Ausbildungsgrad der Frauen. Die Flexibilisierung von Arbeit bezieht sich z.B. auf die Situation von Frauen mit Kindern, die dazu gezwungen sind, in Heimarbeit Kleinteile bzw. »irgendwelches Zeug« zu produzieren, welches dann an Straßenständen weiterverkauft wird. Dieser Bereich der sogenannten grauen Ökonomie ist zu einer wichtigen Einkommensquelle von Frauen geworden. Darüber hinaus erledigen Frauen zwei Drittel der unbezahlten (Haus-)Arbeit. Nach einer Untersuchung von AWIN bügeln beispielsweise lediglich 1% der Männer und nur 0,4% putzen Toiletten. Die ökonomische Abhängigkeit von Frauen ist gleichzeitig ein unmittelbarer Grund für Frauen, sich nicht aus (häuslichen) Gewaltverhältnissen zu befreien. Tanja und Zorka betonen darüber hinaus die gesellschaftliche Notwendigkeit für grassroots-initiatives, da in Serbien sexualisierte Gewalt gegen Frauen nicht als Problem bzw. Verbrechen wahrgenommen wird. Frauen, so Zorka, seien oft noch vorurteilsbeladener als Männer und würden Opfer von sexualisierten Übergriffen selber dafür verantwortlich machen, was zeige, wie tief traditionelle Geschlechterrollen und -bilder verankert sind.

Die Fraueninitiativen haben momentan auch mit dem religiösen Comeback der Kirchen zu kämpfen, welche zunehmend ihren gesellschaftlichen Einfluss erweitern, obwohl nach dem

Zweiten Weltkrieg die jugoslawische Gesellschaft weitgehend säkularisiert wurde. So wird in Schulen mit christlichen Erziehungsbüchern gelehrt, wie Mädchen und Jungen »zu sein haben« und Enthaltsamkeit statt Verhütung gepredigt. Kindergeld erhalten Frauen bzw. Familien für das zweite bis zum fünften Kind, für das sechste Kind gibt es keine Unterstützung mehr. Um Unterstützung zu bekommen müssen Familien erst polizeilich nachweisen lassen, dass sie sich nichts haben zu Schulden kommen lassen und ihre ökonomische Situation offen legen. Für die Frauen von AWIN ist klar, dass es dabei letztlich um den Versuch der bevölkerungspolitischen Steuerung geht, die Frauen dazu bringen soll, eine bestimmte Anzahl Kinder zu bekommen.

Die Kampagnen, die unter dem Dach von AWIN entwickelt werden, fokussieren jeweils ein bestimmtes Thema und werden strategisch formuliert und eingesetzt. Genannt seien hier eine Gesetzesinitiative gegen sexuelle Belästigung am Arbeitsplatz, die kürzlich im Parlament eingeführt wurde, und die Gruppe »Women at Work«, die ökonomische Empowerment-Strategien für Frauen verfolgt, um die ungleichen Startpositionen von Frauen und Männern auszugleichen. Konkret unterstützt »Women at Work« die Idee von Frauen-Kooperativen, ihre Arbeit bezieht sich auf die Werbung für günstige Kredite und niedrigere Steuern für Frauen-Kooperativen.

Des Weiteren finden unter der Regie von AWIN Selbsthilfekurse im technischen und handwerklichen Bereich, sowie Sprach- und Computerkurse statt, um Frauen in diesen Bereichen mehr Unabhängigkeit zu ermöglichen. Die Idee ist, Frauen stärker dazu zu animieren, das Internet als strategisches Werkzeug zu nutzen. Außerdem befinden sich in den Räumen eine Bibliothek mit feministischer Literatur, und die Initiative »Handy Woman«, die ein Verzeichnis selbständiger Geschäftsfrauen erstellt.

Auf die Frage nach Kontakten zu Frauengruppen und -organisationen in anderen Gebieten Ex-Jugoslawiens erzählen Tanja und Zorka, dass es 1997 ein Treffen mit Frauen aus Ljubljana, Zagreb und Belgrad gegeben hat, und dass diese Kontakte weiterhin existieren. Eine Kooperation zwischen albanischen und serbischen Gruppen besteht allerdings

»Association for Women's Initiatives is a long-term project with the primary aim to improve quality of women's lives. That means to help women better organize their lives, to improve their status in private, family, professional, political and public spheres of life. It is a non-hierarchical project aimed at all women, regardless of their social status, education, religion, etc.«

(zitiert aus einer Info-Broschüre von AWIN)

post-jugoslawischen Gesellschaft aufmerksam zu machen, wird AWIN auf verschiedenen Ebenen aktiv: sie initiiert Medienkampagnen, Runde Tische und Direkte Aktionen/Performances. Die ersten Erfahrungen mit Kampagnen datieren Zorka und Tanja auf das Jahr 2000, als anlässlich der Präsidentschaftswahlen ein Wahlauftruf gestartet wurde, der sich speziell an Frauen richtete. In den Kampagnen geht es zunächst einmal darum, sich an den Realitäten zu orientie-

»WHATEVER WOMEN DO, THEIR WORK HAS TO BE PAYED!«

Besuch bei AWIN (Association for Women's Initiatives)



Die Räume von →AWIN [Association for Women's Initiatives] sind in der Innenstadt Belgrads gelegen. Wir werden dort von Tanja und Zorka empfangen. AWIN versteht sich als praxisorientierter Zusammenhang verschiedener Gruppen, der 1997 aus dem Women Studies Center hervorgegangen ist. Die Gründungsidee war, sowohl die Aktivitäten unabhängiger Frauengruppen in Serbien in einem Netzwerk zu bündeln, als auch einen Treffpunkt und ein Archiv für die Frauenbewegung zu schaffen.

Um auf die schlechter werdende Position von Frauen in der

ren, beispielsweise Frauen über die Vor- und Nachteile der neuen Arbeitsgesetze aufzuklären. Der Fokus liegt dabei auf den seit dem Regierungswechsel insbesondere für Frauen veränderten ökonomischen und sozialen Bedingungen, so zum Beispiel den Privatisierungsgesetzen, die keine Tarifverträge vorsehen. Wer sich in den Gewerkschaften engagiert muss befürchten, gefeuert zu werden, da es kein Abkommen über die Rechte von Gewerkschaften und den in ihnen organisierten ArbeiterInnen gibt. Die Folge davon ist, dass es kaum gewerkschaftliche Aktivitäten gibt. Innerhalb der Gewerk-

than in local NGOs, because they are like a status symbol, they have lots of money, they are doing campaigns etc. From our experience, the IOM tends to monopolize its work, so that no one can approach them.

How do you think sex trafficking and prostitution are connected with each other?

Trafficking is a very complex issue. Prostitution is one part of it. There are some similarities, for example that the victims of trafficking and prostitutes are treated the same, as if they were not human beings.

Do you think that legalizing prostitution would help to combat sex trafficking?

Legalization of prostitution is not the best solution. There are different ways. In Germany and in the Netherlands, for example, it is legalized now. What happens there, is that the migrant prostitutes (and there are many of them, in the Netherlands 90% of the prostitutes are migrants) are deported, because the law permits prostitution only for the 'native' prostitutes. The law improved the situation for 'native' prostitutes, but it made it even worse for the migrants.

Thus we now discuss what a better solution could look like. There is another model in Sweden where the clients of prostitutes are criminalized. But it is important to look at the impacts of this model first, and to find out the best way to protect the interests of the women working in the prostitution business.

But to come back to trafficking, it is important to see that it is the final outcome of everything: women and equality, gender-based violence, the EU model for preventing migration, globalization, feminization of poverty, etc. The nucleus of all that is trafficking. So it is important to tackle a lot of questions, such as 'Why are some countries so poor and others so rich', the division of power, etc. A good solution would be to legalize migration. But who would do that?

Who are the prostitutes in Serbia?

We don't have data about that. There are really few things that have been done concerning prostitution. Some of the pro-

stitutes are members of minorities, Roma women, some women come from rural areas and there are also women coming from urban areas, educated women, all levels. You can't say the majority is like this or that, there are all kinds of women. But speaking about trafficked women, there is a difference. They are young women who are from 12 to 25 years old.

Are there any organizations in Serbia working with prostitutes?

In Serbia, nobody supports prostitutes, nobody works with them. They are seen like fallen women, like somebody who doesn't need any help and assistance. That is why they are very vulnerable to exploitation. One of the police women working on sexual crimes once told me that within the 13 years she has been working on sexual crimes (like rape, incest etc.), she had only two cases of prostitutes who have been raped. But we know that the figures are much higher, the cases are just not reported. It is a gray zone, and one problem is that the feminist scene here never discussed that. It is a tough issue within the women's movement, either they are for or against prostitution. But just being against it doesn't help!

One last question: Why is your office in an ordinary flat, not at all visible from outside and equipped with a video camera at the entrance?

Our address is not public. Trafficking is a very lucrative business, it brings a lot of money, it is connected with organized crime, and the people involved in it might think we are working against them. We feel safer with the camera, otherwise, we wouldn't work on the issue. But we haven't had any security problems yet, unlike the shelter for trafficked women opened in Belgrade this year.

ASTRA – ANTI SEX TRAFFICKING ACTION

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Who supports you financially?

We don't fundraise from the government, but we get donations from embassies like the Dutch, the Swedish, or the German embassy, from some Swedish organizations and from other organizations.

What is the legal situation in Serbia concerning sex trafficking?

There is no specific law against trafficking, but there are different laws used to sentence the violators. Within the ,Yugoslav Team for combating trafficking in human beings', we are now lobbying for a change in legislation. There is a new bill, a proposal for a law, that should have been put to the vote in parliament from July of this year, which is an extremely long time. It is a combination of European standards, very similar to laws in the EU, but adjusted to the Serbian situation.

What are the destination countries for trafficked women from Serbia?

They are sold within Serbia and in regions and countries like →Kosovo, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, and Bosnia. In →Kosovo, for example, there are many soldiers, so there is a need for cheap women labor. German soldiers are there as well, but Germany is no country of destination for trafficked women from Serbia. An interesting fact which occurs again and again is that the USA gives money to the →NGOs, and then US soldiers are the ones who use women in Bosnia. A lot of →NGOs in Bosnia were founded by the USA.

Where do the women who are sold to Serbia come from?

They come from East European countries like Russia, Ukraine, Rumania, Bulgaria - countries with ruined economies.

How does the trafficking work? How do the women get in contact with those selling them?

In Serbia, there are not many legal ways for women to migrate. Serbia is a country in transition, and also the wars have seriously affected its economy. Within this general context, women are particularly exposed to unemployment. So, there is a need for young women to find a better life. At the same

time, a growing demand exists in countries of destination for cheap labor. There is this picture presented in the media, that it is easier to live and to work abroad, that life is fantastic abroad, etc. These are the messages sent to women. The women are very active and they want to change their surroundings, their lives, so they are looking for ways to migrate. But since there is no legal way to migrate, they are running into illegal ways, like proposals from friends and so on. They are looking for the easiest way to migrate, they don't pay attention if it is legal or not. They have no one advising them or checking the proposal. And when you do something illegal you become very vulnerable, and this is how they get exploited.

There is another way for recruiting them. There are advertisements by employment agencies which are very easy to find in the daily newspapers, a typical one would be: ,Attractive girls needed for work abroad, good salary, visa obtained, etc.' Another way would be friends, families, or relatives approaching the girls with proposals for work abroad. Of course they trust them, because it is their family surrounding, and then they end up being trafficked.

How do the organizations selling the women abroad work?

We don't have too much information about organized crime, because this is not our business. Our business are the women and the work on prevention.

Working against sex trafficking, do you cooperate with the International Organization for Migration (IOM)?

Yes, they are working everywhere on that issue, also in Serbia. But they work against migration, they are not pro-migration. So, they have a very different approach than we do. The EU is very closed, and its strict borders make the problem even harder, because there are very little opportunities to go abroad, to work abroad. You can't imagine how hard it is to get a visa to go abroad. This is a perfect basis for exploitation. That is why we support the migration of women. As an intergovernmental organization, the IOM has a lot of money. It is also involved in the ,Yugoslav Team for combating trafficking in human beings', but the government has more trust in international

friends, or citizens who think that something suspicious is going on in an apartment, or from women who work in escort agencies. We never get calls from the trafficked women themselves. And this is the case all over Europe, you rarely get contacted by the victims.

How do you work with the victims of trafficking?

I don't do it personally, so I can't tell you from my own experience. But it is a feminist concept based on principles of support, trust and believing the women. We formed the 'Yugoslav Team for combating trafficking in human beings', and now we have a referral mechanism. Within this mechanism, there is a mobile team consisting of ASTRA, the shelter for trafficked women and the center for social welfare. One possible contact for a victim is the police, because they make raids, enter the hotels and bars. When the police comes into contact with a woman and suspects her being a victim of trafficking, they contact the mobile team. The mobile team interviews the woman and provides her with everything she needs. For us, it is important to lobby for the →NGOs to have the first access and that they interview the women first. Not IOM (International Organization for Migration), not the police, but →NGOs should do that.

What is the difference between the governmental strategy and your strategy?

The difference is the human rights approach. This is the approach of the →NGOs towards the victims of violence which is completely different than that of the government. The people working in governmental organizations are not educated, they stigmatize the women, they judge them, they are full of prejudices, etc. They aren't concerned about the victims, their concern is something else. They try to fight crime, for example. We are the ones who are reaching the victims in the easiest way, we are the ones the community calls to report cases of trafficking, not the police. But actually the police should be the one the cases are referred to. Another difference is that we get more information about the cases. For instance, there is a woman or a man who wants to report that their daughter is being trafficked, and they would approach us

instead of the police. We are something like a mediator between the victims and the government, somebody who can facilitate this process and make it easier, because we are not judging. We are working by ourselves.

Does the government accept you as a mediator?

They have to. It was a good situation when we entered the governmental structure, because Serbia had signed some important international agreements. We could use the situ-



tion to influence the government. We were the only →NGO starting to work on trafficking, and we had been building up ASTRA for five years in order to become recognized. Now there are more than 30 groups in Serbia working on trafficking. These are →NGOs we supported because it is important to develop a network. But the problem was that there had been different approaches. During the Milošević regime, the →NGOs and the governmental structures were on different sides, and the gap between them was huge. Now we try to minimize and fill this gap, because we need the governmental structures and the government needs us. We need them because they can prosecute the traffickers, the perpetrators, the violators. They need us because we know how to approach the women.

FORTRESS EUROPE, POVERTY AND PATRIARCHY – A PERFECT BASIS FOR SEX TRAFFICKING

An interview with ASTRA (Anti Sex-Trafficking Action) in Belgrade



On 30 December 2002, we talked to Jelena Djordjević who is a member of ASTRA (Anti Sex Trafficking Action). ASTRA is a feminist women →NGO working against sex trafficking. Their aims are prevention and education, sensitizing of relevant state institutions and public opinion and direct help and assistance to the victims of trafficking. They started their work in 1998 as an initiative within →AWIN and became independent in 2001. The women working at ASTRA are paid full-time workers and volunteers in the SOS-hotline.

Question: What is your strategy in combating sex trafficking?

There are different levels. One is the national level, that is the level of governments which are working in one field. The other

one is the level of →NGOs which have different strategies. But we all work together in the 'Yugoslav Team for combating trafficking in human beings'. It is a team which has been formed in 2001, consisting of →NGOs, governmental organizations, international organizations, etc. The strategy of ASTRA is to prevent sex trafficking, to provide an SOS-hotline and to do field work.

We also work with women who have become victims of trafficking. For the next year, we plan to work with the peers and to do peer education, that is working with young people who will educate their friends in schools on trafficking prevention and on sexual and reproductive health.

How do you get in contact with the women exploited by sex trafficking?

At the moment, there is no →NGO in Serbia working with street workers like in Germany. We don't have that, but there is a need for it. We reach the women by the SOS hotlines at the moment. These are women who work in escort agencies, for example. They are reporting that they had entered the job at their free will, and now they want to quit it, but they can't, because they are forced to stay in the job.

We run the SOS hotline only for the issue of trafficking. It was opened in March 2002 after we had launched a big media campaign. But since the trafficked women are highly exploited in a slavery-like condition, they are never the ones who call us. They are not allowed to use the telephone, they are deprived of their basic human rights and put in a position of dependency. We get the contact from the parents, relatives,

The core course—compulsory for the certificate—has an interdisciplinary approach and presents different contemporary feminist and cross-cultural theories and practices. Primarily, it takes issues from Humanities and Social Sciences, but also includes introductions to Arts and Sciences.

In the elective courses the role of sex/gender and patriarchy within methodology, epistemology, philosophy, Sciences, literature, movies, visual arts, dance, music, theology, psychoanalysis, politics, media, etc is analyzed. There are also courses on >classic< topics of the feminist movements such as gender based discrimination and violence, homophobia and compulsory heterosexuality, lesbian and gay rights, or the role of women in today's Serbia. Other topics that are of importance in Serbian society and history are dealt with as well, such as traditionalism and nationalism, intellectuals and democracy, or responsibility.

There is also an interdisciplinary lecture series such as those focused on the following issues: eco-feminism, human rights, violence against women, epistemology, peace studies, etc.

Besides the certificate program, there is an open program consisting of panel discussions, debates, public presentations or book release parties. Altogether 300-400 people attend the courses and events of the Center each year. The Center is also engaged in promoting independent research, building a library and a documentation and information center (which are also open to the public), supporting workshops and training programs, organizing conferences and supporting diverse publication projects.

Publications of the BELGRADE WOMEN'S STUDIES CENTER include a growing number of books by affiliated members, translations of key texts, journals and others. The main publication of the Center is the journal in feminist theory »Genero« which was initiated in order to support the Center's intellectual activities, and to promote feminist theory in Serbian culture. The editorial policy is interdisciplinary, and open to various orientations in contemporary feminist thinking.

This openness to different theoretical orientations also goes for the lectures of the Center: first the French theories of deconstruction were prevailing, then Anglo-American the-

ories gained importance, and there are radical and anarchist feminists. Another line is Marxist feminism, not at least because Marxism was part of some of the lecturers' university training in former Yugoslavia. Daša's professors, for example, had been members of the so-called →PRAXIS-GROUP. They were exponents of a progressive and critical Marxism in the early 70's and later thrown out of the university.

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Picture of Karl Marx in a Berlin kitchen

HISTORY OF THE CENTER

The Women's Studies Center in Belgrade was founded in 1992 as an alternative, interdisciplinary, educational and research project at university level. It developed from the Yugoslavian women's movement which has a history of about 25 years. All the founders of the Women's Studies Center were involved in this movement, and they were discussing the political situation in Yugoslavia at that time as well.

The beginning of the Center is marked by an experimental course that took place in 1992. The initiative for starting this program had been two years earlier, but because of the wars the start of the program was postponed. During the experimental course, the interest in a continuation of the program was so great, that it answered the question whether to go on with it or turn to more pressing matters like the peace movement's activities.

Over the years, the Center tried to incorporate all these burning issues into its programs. As one of the first educational organizations, it introduced courses on nationalism, war, ethnicity and racism. It was definitely the first organization in Serbia to introduce a course on the political responsibility for the wars and for war crimes. It has also been the first institute to introduce issues of marginalization and exclusion, including gay and lesbian issues.

THE CENTER TODAY

»The Center, through addressing issues of gender, ethnicity, race, class, etc., is committed to exploring and building models of tolerance to differences; and theoretically locating potentials of resistance to social suppression.«

This is how the Center presents its aims on its website. So, the name of the **BELGRADE WOMEN'S STUDIES CENTER** only partly says what it deals with. Arising from the Yugoslav women's movement, it might have been correct in the beginning, but in the course of its work, more issues were added. Furthermore, the women's understanding of feminism was changing, and today, the concept of women's studies is criticized as rather essentialist. The women in the Center have been discussing about these problems without finding a solu-

tion yet. When we asked why they do not rename the Center, Daša asked back: »The Center is not only about women, and not only about women and men, either. It's also about ethnicity, race, class. How do you call studies like this? Studies of the excluded?«

The Center has activities in different areas, all striving towards creating a complex educational program. The primary activity is its teaching program, and although the (mainly female) lecturers are all university graduates and most of them also teach or taught feminist and other issues at university, the Center is not part of the Belgrade University. This is partly due to the fact that most of the things they teach here could not be taught at the university, where gender studies is hardly a recognized subject at all. The women's aim is not to be integrated into university, but to collaborate much more closely with the university. The Center has lots of reasons to remain autonomous, »because if we were integrated into the university, it would mean the collapse of the Center in its programmatic and political sense. But we plan to infiltrate into the university!«, Daša pointed out. So, the Center functions as an → NGO, obtaining funds by the Fund for an Open Society, the German Heinrich Böll Stiftung, the Network of East West Women in New York and other institutions. These funds enable the Center to offer their program basically for free, except for symbolic fees for copies and library support.

BELGRADE WOMEN'S STUDIES CENTER offers a university level certificate for following a one year program. This certificate is not a full university degree, but it is accredited at some universities. Applicants first have to pass an entrance test which had to be introduced when the number of applicants exceeded the Center's capacity (in 2002, for example, 170 people applied for the certificate program, while there is only a capacity of 35 students per year), the test focuses on the applicants' motivation. The effort is worthwhile, as the Center offers a very broad selection of subjects and courses to the students.

The educational program consists of a core course and elective courses (most of them are held in the Serbian language).

Eine explizit an die albanische Volkszugehoerigkeit anknuepfende politische Verfolgung ist auch in
Kosovo nicht festzustellen. [Aussenministerium 12.01.1999]

Wir waeren ja auch niemals zu militaerischen Massnahmen geschritten, wenn es nicht die humanitaere Katastrophe im Kosovo gaebe mit 250.000 Fluechtlingen innerhalb des Kosovo, weit ueber 400.000 Fluechtlingen insgesamt und einer zur Zeit nicht zaehlbaren Zahl von Toten.

[Scharping 27.3.1999]

